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Hostility or Tolerance?
Philosophy, polyphony and the novels of Thomas Pynchon
Summary
This thesis undertakes a systematic, tripartite analysis of the interactions between the fiction and 
essays of Thomas Pynchon and the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Michel Foucault and Theodor W.  
Adorno, resulting in a solid set of original reference-material for those undertaking work on Pynchon and  
philosophy, or more generally on philosophico-literary intersections.
Premised upon the  notion  that  Pynchon's  literature  harbours  a  fundamental  hostility  to  much 
systematizing  philosophical  thought,  this  work  avoids  a  dominating  imposition  of  philosophy,  or  an 
application of philosophical thought as a validating Other, by examining those aspects of Pynchon's work  
that seem ill at ease with, or aggressive towards, aspects of each philosopher's thought. This is explored  
through the concept of an intra-textual polyvocality and relational situation of philosophical intersection; 
when Wittgenstein is cited, for instance, who is speaking and what are the connotations of that placement?  
I  do not propose,  therefore, a  Wittgensteinian / Foucauldian / Adornian Pynchon, but rather explicitly  
highlight  excluded  aspects  of  thought  to  instead  develop  a  complementary  reading;  a  form  of  
intersubjective triangulation. This polyvocality is examined from a univocal perspective.
The specific conclusions of this work re-situate Pynchon, in many cases against forty years of critical 
consensus,  as  a  quasi-materialist  or  at  least  anti-idealist,  a  regulative  utopist  and a practitioner  of  an  
anti-synthetic  style  akin  to  Adorno's  model  of  negative  dialectics.  In  a  broader  sense,  it  answers  the  
questions regarding hostility towards philosophical thought in Pynchon's work by demonstrating that no  
single philosophical standpoint has yet to totally resonate with even one of his novels. Simultaneously, it  
also shows that a profitable approach can be found in the spaces of philosophical overlap and divergence.
In memory of my grandfather, John Gray
10/02/1920 – 14/06/2012
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5Chapter One: What Matter Who's Speaking?
The writings of Thomas Pynchon have spawned more critical commentary than almost 
any other American author of the last fifty years.1 Pynchon's texts are perhaps most famed for 
their “difficulty and apparent unfriendliness”, as works that require, as Inger H. Dalsgaard, Luc  
Herman and Brian McHale put it, “a collective enterprise of reading wherein none of us could 
succeed without the help of the others”.2 Among the interpretative toolkits that come in for a 
hard time in Pynchon's writing, though, perhaps none are so disparaged and under-attempted 
than those of philosophy and theory.
Indeed, over the course of a 50-year career, Pynchon has managed to acquire an entire 
critical industry dedicated to unravelling his ultra-dense works of prose. Thus far there have 
been,  among  innumerable  other  thematic  approaches,  texts  on  Pynchon’s  historicity,3 
Pynchon’s politics,4 Pynchon's post-secularism5 and, by far the most common element in the 
early  critical  phase,  Pynchon’s  postmodernism.6 His  works,  though,  present  an  outright 
aggression towards philosophical theorization. In V. [1963] we are shown the clear delineation 
between useless theoria and concrete praxis in my ironic epigraph “[t]he only consolation he 
drew from the present chaos was that his theory managed to explain it” (189). Furthermore,  
the character Mafia in Pynchon's first novel attracts a “fan club that sat around, read from her  
books and discussed her Theory” that “the world can only be rescued from certain decay by  
Heroic Love”, a love that actually means, with scathing bathos, “[i]n practice […] screwing five  
or six times a night” (125). Other such instances of hostility to theory and philosophy abound  
1 As of June 2012 to merely cite all criticism on Pynchon would take over 90,000 words.
2 Dalsgaard, Herman, and McHale, ‘Introduction’, 8.
3 Smith, Pynchon and History.
4 Thomas, Pynchon and the Political.
5 McClure, Partial Faiths.
6 Cooper, Signs and Symptoms; Madsen, The Postmodernist Allegories; Seed, The Fictional Labyrinths; 
see also Eve, ‘Thomas Pynchon, David Foster Wallace and the Problems of “Metamodernism”’.
6through all  of Pynchon's work: Wittgenstein is cited amid the dubious moral sentiments of  
Mondaugen and the, later Nazi, Weissmann's exchange in  V.  (278), an aspect that continues 
into Gravity's Rainbow  [1973] (415); Vineland [1990] has no qualms ridiculing the “essential” 
works  of  Deleuze  and  Guattari  (97);  Mason  &  Dixon [1997]  offers  a  critique  of  both 
enlightenment  rationality  and,  specifically,  empiricism (615);  while  Against  the  Day [2006] 
contains, by turns, an ambiguous condemnation and then praise of the terrorism influenced by  
various  anarchist  philosophies  including  Max  Stirner's  egoism  and  William  Godwin's 
utilitarianism.7
Amid  such  a  vast  field,  therefore,  it  is  notable  that  there  has  been  no sustained 
examination of the factors rendering Pynchon hostile to interpretation through the discourses  
of philosophical thought and theory. It is the nature of this resistance, through the terminology  
of hostility, that this thesis explores and, as far as such a concept is  not naïve in Pynchon 
scholarship, resolves.
Implicitly,  Pynchon's  novels  exhibit  what  Hanjo  Berressem  has  referred  to  as  an 
“autodestruction”8 in which they consistently undercut their previous statements,  Gravity's  
Rainbow's incest scene (420-421) being the most well-known example of this. Early Pynchon 
criticism saw this  phenomenon as a universal  resistance to all  interpretation; for instance,  
Peter Cooper described  Gravity's Rainbow as a satire upon thematic readings, “perhaps not 
because [they are] wrong but because [they are] only partial” concluding that “Pynchon is  
deeply ambivalent about this human compulsion to find – or make – patterns of experience 
and  then  interpret  them”.9 Similarly,  David  Seed  argued  that  “Pynchon  repeatedly  mocks 
7 For instance, Kathryn Hume sees potential for Pynchon’s complicity, yet, as I see it, this stands in 
severe tension with anti-Reaganist strains in his more overt political writing. See Hume, ‘The 
Religious and Political Vision’; for further discussion, see my book chapter Eve, ‘It Sure’s Hell Looked 
Like War’.
8 Berressem, Pynchon’s Poetics, 244.
9 Cooper, Signs and Symptoms, 187, 1.
7dualistic schemes as Manichean” and also that the “drive to acquire knowledge” is merely “an  
Emersonian sense of nostalgia for a lost wholeness” that can never be recovered.10 Yet, as an 
example, while a study on film may not yield the master narrative key for Gravity's Rainbow, 
the  text  appears  more  hospitable  towards  such  an  approach  than  to  much  philosophical  
interpretation.11 Indeed, the case is curious: drawing comparisons between the theorizations 
of  other  art  forms  (such  as  film  theory)  and  Pynchon's  work  seems  valid  but  a  direct  
engagement with frameworks that are broader, encroaching upon sociology and philosophy 
in-itself, is rarely attempted and appears unwelcome in Pynchon's novels.
This hostility chimes with notions of paranoia and opposition, both of which abound in  
Pynchon's work and are explicitly, reflexively, broached. In  The Crying of Lot 49  [1966], for 
instance, this situation is explored through Mike Fallopian's Peter Pinguid society – posited by  
Metzger as “one of those right wing nut outfits” – provoking the oft-quoted passage:
Fallopian twinkled. "They accuse us of being paranoids."
"They?" inquired Metzger, twinkling also.
"Us?" asked Oedipa (TCoL49, 32).
Clearly,  presuppositions  are  being  made  regarding  the  political  position,  and  therefore,  
identification, of each respective agent. In Gravity's Rainbow, this generalized hostility is even 
more pronounced. In this novel hostility has concretely materialised through the materiality of  
a commercial system in which “the real business of the war is buying and selling [...] the true 
war is  a  celebration of  markets”, the underlying principle of which is  that “the real  war is 
always there” (GR, 105, 645). When this is coupled with the distinctly polyphonic nature of  
Pynchon's writing, identifying one's own political stance – which, amid a paranoid world of  
opposition, depends upon identification of the Other – becomes entangled with the difficulty 
10 Seed, The Fictional Labyrinths, 169, 160, 187.
11 See, for instance, Clerc, ‘Film in Gravity’s Rainbow’.
8of knowing who is speaking and from what position.
What is it  about philosophy/theory that is being rejected? Before broaching this  in 
earnest,  it  is  important  to  note  that  many  of  the  aforementioned  critical  stances  are  
predicated upon the notion, at some level, of a unified voice in the text; a somewhat tenuous 
supposition. In fact though, as others among the early critics nonetheless still noted, Pynchon's  
texts are intersubjective works that cut across unities of voice: Kathryn Hume, for instance, 
writes that “[w]e are also used to a reasonably stable narrative perspective, but in  Gravity's  
Rainbow one can only talk of narrative voices”12 while Louis Mackey points out that although 
Gravity's Rainbow  is “told by an omniscient narrator […] It is not obvious that he is even a 
single persona”.13 From the constant proliferation and fragmentation of speakers in Gravity's  
Rainbow to the escape from the framing narrative of Wicks Cherrycoke by the “Ghastly Fop” 
sub-text in Mason & Dixon (MD, 511-541), if we are to still speak of uncertainty in Pynchon, it 
is often an uncertainty over who is speaking. Who is speaking at these points of refusal? What 
is  their  position?  It  is  to  these  questions,  through  in-depth  case  studies,  that  this  thesis  
addresses itself.
Thesis Statement
If  the  theoretical  description of  reality  produces philosophy  and if  all  recognizable 
fictive  language  has,  at  some  point  in  its  stratified  hierarchy,  some  interaction  with  an 
identifiable  aspect  of  reality,14 it  is  only  logical  that  the  two  must  have  some  binding 
interdependence.  As  Catherine  Belsey  puts  it  in  the  meta-context  of  literary  criticism: 
“[a]ssumptions about literature involve assumptions about language and about meaning, and 
12 Hume, Pynchon’s Mythography, 7.
13 Mackey, ‘Paranoia, Pynchon, and Preterition’, 23.
14 See Hutcheon, A Poetics of Postmodernism, 143, 146–149 for more on the co-existence of intra- and 
extra- textual reference in fiction.
9these in turn involve assumptions about human society. The independent universe of literature 
and autonomy of criticism are false”.15 This thesis undertakes a systematic, tripartite analysis of 
the interactions between the fiction and essays of Thomas Pynchon and the philosophy of 
Ludwig  Wittgenstein,  Michel  Foucault  and  Theodor  W.  Adorno,  resulting  in  a  solid  set  of  
original reference material for those undertaking work on Pynchon and philosophy, or more  
generally  on  philosophico-literary  intersections.  The  conclusions  of  this  work  re-situate 
Pynchon, in many cases against forty years of critical consensus, as a quasi-materialist, or at 
least  anti-idealist,  a  regulative  utopist  and a  practitioner  of  an anti-synthetic  style  akin  to  
Adorno's model of negative dialectics. In a broader sense, it answers the questions on hostility 
towards  philosophical  thought  in  Pynchon's  work  by  demonstrating  that  no  single 
philosophical standpoint has yet to completely resonate with even one of his novels. Indeed, it  
is only through a mode of intersubjective triangulation that takes account of divergence and 
hostility that any approach becomes grounded; it is only through multiple theorizations that 
we militate against that “something that will surprise the Law and the Theorem”, as Katalin  
Orbán puts it.16
Of equal importance to the juxtaposition and intersection of philosophy and literature 
for this thesis has been the need to pose some preliminary challenges to the methodology of 
interdisciplinary work on philosophy/theory and literary studies. The traditional approach 
tends to infer a deep parity of thought from mere surface similitude, a grasping of an image 
that is taken to  embody the whole philosophical work; an “application”  of philosophy as a 
validating Other to literature. While there has been a greater tendency in recent works 
towards a historicizing approach, this is also not without its flaws. Under such a method, it 
would be assumed that Pynchon had read Wittgenstein, or that some form of shared historical 
15 Belsey, Critical Practice, 27.
16 Orbań, Ethical Diversions, 23.
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geist is the prerequisite for the possibility of both their writings: “that something-in-the-air” 
(GR, 578), as Pynchon terms it. Regardless of the truth of these sentiments, the genesis and 
conclusion are coerced along a parallel course because at a superficial level their work exhibits 
thematic alignment. In contrast, I suggest the path to be taken must tread the space between 
these chasms of “application”  and “historicity”. Where philosophico-literary thematics are 
historically rooted in a period, this should be noted and deployed, but not necessarily to the 
same endpoint. Where conclusions or interpretational resonances coincide, the process should 
not be inferred from a common origination of a shared teleological arc. In short, the tangential 
line of philosophy must be approached at the point of intersection with its literary curve. Their 
convergences and differences must be explained historically and theoretically, neither ceding 
to a reliance upon biographical speculation and literary influence, nor using an aversion to this 
mode as a catch-all for an entirely absolute axis of disconnected non-identity. The relationship 
under  discussion  here  can  best  be  thought  of  as  a  cross-cultural  pollination  wherein  
historicism, direct reference and shared thematic precepts are allowed to co-exist as equally 
valid, as long as no single one of these aspects dominates. Indeed, the term that springs most  
readily  to mind is  pointed out by Harold Bloom's swerving  clinamen:  “its  root meaning of 
'inflow'”, continued in  tessera wherein “an ephebe's best misinterpretations may well be of 
poems he has never read”.17
This  thesis'  first  chapter  begins  with  the  concrete  textual  engagement  in  V. with 
Wittgenstein's  Tractatus  Logico-Philosophicus  and  demonstrates  that  Pynchon's  stance 
towards early Wittgenstein is definitively hostile, viewing the logical positivism therein as a 
reifying  force  that  strips  human beings  of  their  individuation.  The  chapter  then moves  to 
appraise  other  critical  takes  on  this  philosopher's  late  stages  including  the  New 
17 Bloom, The Anxiety of Influence, 26, 70.
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Wittgensteinians and the orthodox Philosophical Investigations as read by Gordon Baker and 
P.M.S. Hacker. The conclusion from this is that late Wittgenstein's remarks on naming, private  
language and Platonism, while in contrast to the views posited by his earlier writings, embrace 
and  extend  the  readings  of  Pynchon's  work  as  a  rejection  of  a  nationalism  born  of  
Romanticism, while simultaneously acknowledging – through cluster theories of naming – that  
even counter-nationalistic stances are constructed from conflicting histories.
The second chapter, building upon remarks on relativism that come to the fore at the 
end of the Wittgenstein chapter, moves into an analysis of the still  most-cited postmodern  
theorist  (no  matter  how  much  he  disliked  such  an  appellation),  Michel  Foucault.  As  a 
philosopher of stunning breadth, the primary point of interaction with Pynchon traced here is  
tactically  limited  to  the  theme  of  enlightenment  as  a  process,  and  the  Enlightenment  as  
epistemological event, subdermally following this engagement through Foucault's paratexts, 
including  those  unavailable  in  English,  from  1957  until  his  death.  Examining resistance, 
revolution and the critical attitude alongside a focus on the Foucauldian sphere of ethics, this 
work posits Pynchon's negative and positive utopianism as a regulative idea. Reading both 
Pynchon's fiction and his essays, particularly “Nearer My Couch to Thee”, alongside Foucault's 
two pieces on Kant's “Was ist Aufklärung?”, I conclude that the divide between Pynchon and 
Foucault hinges on ipseic constructions and the boundaries of knowledge and not necessarily, 
as has always been supposed, on who, or how, we can dominate.
Finally, as the locus point for all this work, be that in a hostility to Wittgenstein's logical 
positivism,  or  an  affinity  with  late  Foucault's  views  on  revolution,  the  ultimate  chapter  
appraises  the  work  of  Theodor  W.  Adorno's  Negative  Dialectics  [1966],  Dialectic  of  
Enlightenment [1944]  (with  Max  Horkheimer)  and  Aesthetic  Theory [1970]  in  relation  to 
various aspects of Pynchon's fiction. From this final triangulative coordinate I conclude that 
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Pynchon's idealism is less solidified than many critics would like to assume; that Pynchon is 
opposed to synthetic  dialectics and a concept of identity that erases subjectivity;  and that  
Pynchon's  aesthetic  can  be  profitably  read  through  the  lens  of  Adorno's  final,  unfinished  
magnum opus.
Lost in Translation
The issue of translation in this project has clearly defined boundaries. In relation to  
Wittgenstein, Pynchon cites the original German, but at other moments exhibits his flawed 
mastery  of  that  tongue;  Rocketman  should  not  be  “Raketemensch”  but  rather 
“Raketenmensch” or even “Raketemann”.18 From this, and the section in  V.  concerning the 
Tractatus  poem  (which  performs  its  own  “translation”),  it  becomes  clear  that  Pynchon's 
reference  is  actually  to  the  English  translations  of  Wittgenstein's  work,  retrospectively  
reverting to the German to fit the context of Weissmann and the Herero genocide in which the  
scene is embedded. When it came to Foucault, as Pynchon does not directly cite this thinker,  
there was no clear rationale for favouring the original French, or the work in translation. That  
said,  as it  became clear that  the texts to be examined were necessarily  to be subdermal,  
determined  by  Pynchon's  notions  of  preterition  along  a  different  fork  from  Max  Weber, 
through necessity I had to turn to the French in the Dits et Écrits collection as these works were 
not all available in translation. Where my own translation has been necessary, this is indicated. 
Finally, in the work of Theodor W. Adorno and the Frankfurt School, I have rested primarily  
upon English translations with only minor recourse to the original German, and even then with 
assistance from other critics, such as Neil  Larsen, who have the admirable aptitude for the 
German language that I lack.
18 See Weisenburger, A Gravity’s Rainbow Companion, 216.
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In  all  of  these  cases,  even  where  it  goes  against  the  ethos  of  the  philosopher  in  
question, I have sided with a form of popularism. Most readers of Pynchon encounter him in 
the English language. Most studies of Pynchon, therefore, are undertaken by Anglo-American 
scholars in a monolingual environment. While it may have been truer to these writers to have  
rendered them in their unadulterated original, the damage that is done (or perhaps the truth  
that is  extracted) in the re-writing and examination of philosophy is  only slightly extended  
when undertaken in translation. This ceding to the dominant linguistic culture obviously carries  
some  risk.  Even  in  the  case  of  an  immanent  critique  of  dominance,  though,  it  must  be 
immanent, inscribed before the critique can take place.
Critical Situation
This thesis is directly situated in a critical lineage from Samuel Thomas'  Pynchon and  
the Political [2008]. Indeed, Thomas' work is the only piece of sustained Pynchon criticism to 
substantially engage with the thinkers of the Frankfurt School and the convincing argument 
therein prompted my initial interest into Pynchon's hostility towards formalized theoretical  
interpretation.  Tracing  this  backwards,  the  consistent  scorn  that  Adorno  pours  onto 
Wittgenstein and the logical positivists is, given the historicist portion of the methodology, the  
most sensible place to begin. Clearly, as Thomas puts it, the utopian (“that which is particular,  
unique and 'non-identical'”) is to play a key part, while also requiring a resistance to that very 
utopianism's re-absorption into a dominating ur-state.19 The conclusion of this work affirms the 
validity of Thomas' comparison more schematically through a systematic dialogue with these 
thinkers. 
Methodologically, however, this thesis diverges from Thomas' approach. The critical 
19 Thomas, Pynchon and the Political, 2.
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passages discussed in this work are not the seemingly insignificant moments of utopia that 
Thomas isolates, but are rather those that affirm or discredit the philosophical moment under 
contemplation.  This  has  yielded  a  selection  of  passages  that  ranges from those  never  yet 
considered in the scholarship, to a fresh appraisal of some of the most critically cited sections 
of Pynchon's work. The second point of departure from Thomas' methodology is related, but 
different.  Thomas  adopted  a  novel  structuring  premise  in  his  scholarship  that  arranged 
Pynchon's  works in  the chronology of  their  predominant  fictional  setting.  In  so doing,  the 
works are given an overall coherence that is admirable and neat. While still believing in this 
coherence, I have opted for a different structure that better suits the needs of this project. In 
order  to  avoid  a  crude  historicism  that  would  enact  a  mere  tracing  of  influence  from 
philosophy to literature, the philosophy forms the structuring device. This is, until  the final 
chapter,  intra-chronological  to  the  philosopher  in  question.  Rather,  then,  than  taking  
Pynchon's authorial chronology and reductively aligning this in isolation with the philosophy 
(“in 1963 Pynchon had published V. while Foucault had just written The Birth of the Clinic!”), 
this thesis surveys the entirety of Pynchon's canon in relation to the point under discussion,  
using such a historicist approach carefully. Furthermore, while it acknowledges that Pynchon's 
stance shifts and never loses sight of the specificity of each work, where the texts can be seen 
as speaking through a coherent voice, albeit one that artfully deploys many sub voices, it is 
treated as such.
This work is not, of course, the first to attempt a theoretically formulated Pynchon. 
That dubious honour must go, instead, to the bold Hanjo Berressem, whose Pynchon's Poetics:  
Interfacing Theory and Text  [1993] is the second anchor point. Although I cannot profess to 
share Berressem's interest in “[t]he creation of a 'poststructuralist Pynchon'”, it  is from his 
diagnosis of failure when Pynchon criticism uses “only one specific theory” that this thesis  
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proceeds.20 Furthermore, this thesis does not follow Berressem's notion of “complementary 
rather than exclusive readings”; this mode appears overly susceptible to a formulation akin to 
confirmation bias in the sciences.21 Instead, reformulating Berressem's terms, this thesis works 
on a single reading that explicitly  excludes  points of incompatibility from each theorist, with 
reasoning,  thus  ruling  out  pronouncements  of  the  “Wittgensteinian/Foucauldian/Adornian 
Pynchon”, while formalizing a set of precepts specifically examined in the contexts of each  
thinker  that  are  complementary  to  one  another.  This  thesis  examines  polyvocality  from a 
univocal perspective.
The final key reference point for this project is in the political Pynchon constructed by 
Jeff  Baker,  whose  work  prompts  the  analysis  of  the  ethico-political  function  of  Pynchon's 
novels in this thesis. In such pieces as his “Amerikkka Über Alles”,22 Baker builds a picture of 
Pynchon  as  an  ethically  committed  writer  opposed  to  many  right-wing  twentieth-century 
historico-political developments. While Linda Hutcheon asserts that the central question asked 
of the politics of postmodernism is whether its art forms are “neoconservatively nostalgic or 
[…] radically revolutionary”,23 the novels of Thomas Pynchon severely challenge her assertion 
that they could be “both” and do not affirm any fence-sitting. Instead, they edge towards the  
radically  revolutionary  in  so  far  as  the  radical  modifier  means  radically  re-conceiving  our 
notions  of  revolution.  Yes,  Pynchon's  novels  are  “doubly  encoded  as  both  complicity  and 
critique”,24 but this tradition asserts that it would be very difficult for the right to convincingly  
recuperate Pynchon's work, despite the bracket of “Young Conservatives” under which I have 
no doubt  that  Jürgen  Habermas would categorize  Pynchon.25 While  placing  such  definitive 
20 Berressem, Pynchon’s Poetics, 1.
21 Ibid., 10.
22 Baker, ‘Amerikkka Über Alles’.
23 Hutcheon, The Politics of Postmodernism, 12.
24 Ibid., 163.
25 See Habermas, ‘Modernity Versus Postmodernity’.
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statements at the beginning of this work could leave it vulnerable to critique as a form of what  
Derek Attridge calls “literary instrumentalism”, it is hoped that in this complement and exclude  
approach there still  remains a response “to the work's  distinct utterance”;26 a “responsible 
textual instrumentalism”,27 while the cultural-historical intersection should allow, as Attridge 
puts it, the “context to move in and through” the work.28
It  might  be surprising to note,  for the reader acquainted with Pynchon only  as an 
American novelist, the selection of philosophy that I have here brought into contact with the 
fiction;  all  three  thinkers  examined  herein  are  of  a  European  background  and  could  be  
considered,  as  Elliott  and  Attridge  put  it,  “untimely”.29 For  those  with  even  the  slightest 
knowledge of Pynchon's modus operandi, however, this should not be a total shock. After all, 
although Pynchon's fictions are explorations of America's history and identity, they are framed  
through reference to the Other.  Gravity's Rainbow  in particular is located in central Europe, 
but almost all  of  Pynchon's epic  novels  employ a wide geographical,  and temporal,  range;  
consider Mason & Dixon's excursions to the Cape and St. Helena or Against the Day's “Great 
Tour”, as Thomas calls it, through the Icelandic wastes, the Balkans and beyond.30 This meeting 
of minds through dislocation is shared by each of the philosophers in this work. Wittgenstein 
relocated from Austria to England in 1929; Foucault visited America with a growing frequency  
towards the end of his life and is now read, by certain critics, differently in this phase: “an 
‘American Foucault’ whose principal preoccupation is with freedom [...] in a world that, despite  
its dominant rhetoric, seems [...] to deny the reality of freedom”31; and Adorno, of course, was 
deeply shaped by his enforced period of exile to America during the Second World War. Even 
26 Attridge, The Singularity of Literature, 6–10.
27 Ibid., 13.
28 Ibid., 117.
29 Elliott and Attridge, ‘Theory’s Nine Lives’, 4.
30 Thomas, ‘Metković to Mostar’, 354.
31 Fillion, ‘Freedom, Responsibility, and the “American Foucault”’, 115.
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when exploring intra-national issues, none of the writers examined in this work are limited in  
their geographical scope.
Finally,  a  closing  note  is  necessary  on  the  terminology  of  theory/Theory  and 
philosophy. In many cases it is sensible to speak of these terms as interchangeable. In others, 
though, the former implies a dualism, the counterpart to which is practice, most prominently  
flagged up by Althusser.32 It is, however, beyond the scope of this work to engage with the 
detailed political and cultural histories connoted by each of these terms, especially since doing  
so involves constantly disambiguating the quotations of others, including Pynchon,33 who do 
not.  As  a  pragmatic  stance,  then,  these  terms  will  be  used  interchangeably,  with  explicit  
signposts at the points where the theoria/praxis divide problematizes their synonymity, most 
prominently in the shared space of Foucault and Adorno.
32 Althusser, For Marx, 162; see also Osborne, ‘Philosophy after Theory’, 21; Phillips, ‘Melancholy 
Science?’, 130–131.
33 For instance, Pynchon's capitalization of “Theory” does not refer exclusively to the materialist 
dialectic.
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Chapter Two: Discarded Ladders
On Ludwig Wittgenstein
“God knows, few of us are strangers to moral ambiguity”
 – Thomas Pynchon, Inherent Vice1
1 IV, 7.
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Wittgenstein and Pynchon: A Historical Context
In 1980, at the request of S.E. Gontarski, Samuel Beckett wrote  Ohio Impromptu,  a 
short piece of theatre featuring two doppelgängers seated opposite one another. In a clear-cut  
instance of nominative determinism, the figures are called Reader and Listener respectively.  
However, superficially, the most striking aspect of this piece in relation to Pynchon's work is its  
potential for metatextual readings. Reader tells of a figure who has fled from the place where  
he used to live with his lover in an attempt to get away from his grief. At this new location a  
spectral figure appears who tells a “sad tale” that comforts the figure. It is unclear whether  
Reader and Listener are the two figures in the frame narrative, but it  is probable, thereby 
introducing,  as  Brian  McHale  would  put  it,  strange  loops  at  the  extreme  edge  of  
limit-modernism. However, opening a metafictional floodgate in relation to Pynchon's fiction is  
not where this work begins. Instead, it is notable that Beckett's Reader repeats the line “little is  
left to tell” throughout the piece as the figures, or the characters in the tale, silently merge:  
“[w]ith never a word exchanged they grew to be as one”.2 Ohio Impromptu is, as with much of 
Beckett's work, a piece concerned with silence. While the text gives a Pinter-esque “Pause”, 
the stage directions also explicitly frame “Silence. Five seconds” amid the final modulation of  
the sad tale wherein, at last, “[n]othing is left to tell”.3 From strictly limited bounds of speech 
to silence, as with The Unnamable, what can and cannot be said takes centre stage. Given the 
clear resonance with Wittgenstein's  famous declaration in his  Tractatus  that “whereof  one 
cannot  speak,  thereof  one  must  remain  silent”  (TLP, §7)  the  potential  for  interpretation 
through this strand presents an obvious route to take. Thomas Pynchon, likewise, presents  
contexts for the  exploration of  silence, speech and reality;  even giving a direct  citation of  
2 Beckett, ‘Ohio Impromptu’, 447.
3 Ibid., 448.
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Wittgenstein.  As  shall  be  seen,  however,  the context  is  so  very  different  as  to  render an 
outright hostility toward this line of philosophical thought.
Perhaps,  though, one of  the best  reasons to begin a study of  literary-philosophical 
interaction with Wittgenstein is that his work questions the very nature of philosophy itself.  
Within  his  lifetime,  Wittgenstein  published  a  single  text,  heavily  influenced  by  the  logical  
atomists,  the  Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.  For many years Wittgenstein claimed to have 
“solved  all  the  problems  of  philosophy”  and  returned  to  his  native  Austria  to  teach 
mathematics (TLP, x). However, in 1929, he began lecturing again at Cambridge and, following  
his death in 1951, the world was presented with the unfinished product of these intervening  
years:  the  Philosophical  Investigations.  Many  early  studies,  and  indeed  this  biographical 
overview, present a bi-polar, bi-tonal Wittgenstein, who enacts a retraction of the Tractatus by 
the  Philosophical Investigations. However, a closer examination of Wittgenstein's notebooks 
has revealed that PI has a moment of genesis in a critique of TLP, but that the process was a 
gradual  transition.4 Wittgenstein's  two  publications  differ  wildly  in  their  content  and  it  is 
beyond the scope of this work to give a detailed synopsis of each. Let it suffice to say that the  
Tractatus  is a work that attempts to derive the bounds of meaningful speech from a logical  
structure, while the Philosophical Investigations is an inquiry into logical perspicuity and clarity 
of philosophical thought through language, taking the form of short, aphoristic enunciations.
The analysis in this chapter will consist of three parts. The first section will focus on  
Pynchon's  V.,  developing  a  model  of  character  in  Pynchon's  work  that  depends  more  on  
functional, structural positioning than humanizing empathy; “juxtaposition and resemblance” 
as Molly Hite puts it.5 This is crucial because it allows a deduction of the importance of the  
4 For a comprehensive summary of this transition and the critical reception, see Glock, ‘Perspectives 
on Wittgenstein’, 43–46.
5 Hite, Ideas of Order, 28.
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placement of Wittgenstein's philosophy within the novel. It is my foremost contention from 
this reading that Pynchon is, in this first presentation of Wittgenstein, deeply hostile to logical  
positivism as a reductive world view that enacts an Adornian transit towards obliteration, at  
the terminus of which sits the Holocaust. From this model, I next show that other instances in  
V. also centre around such interrelations, in particular the Tractatus song, an element of the 
novel  that  again  brings  a  critique  of  logicality  to  the  fore.  Finally,  when  positing  ethical 
judgements  against  such  relativism,  I  contend  that  it  is  important  to  situate  the  text's 
relationship to Nazism, an ideology cast very much in the Romantic sphere. As such, this model  
will  then  be  applied  to  a  reading  of  Pynchon's  treatment  of  Romanticism –  also  strongly 
affiliated with the conclusion of Wittgenstein's  Tractatus – and I will provide both intra- and 
extra-  textual  justification  for  viewing  Romanticism  in  Pynchon's  fiction  and  essays  as  a  
compromised, judged discourse of internal contradictions; a discourse infected and infecting 
with nationalism.
The second portion of this chapter will begin by noting a structural affinity between 
Pynchon's linguistics, exemplified in The Crying of Lot 49, and the structure of Wittgenstein's 
Tractatus as seen in a New Wittgensteinian interpretation. This will be approached from both 
Pynchon's micro-linguistic perspective and also from the historiographic aspects of his texts.  
Flagging up the ways in which Pynchon troubles the left-right binary of the political spectrum, 
it will become apparent from this work that Pynchon's notions of alternative time are integral 
to his ethical and political thinking; a linear chronology presents a totalitarian unity at the  
expense of its constituents; linear time destroys the history upon which it is founded. Noting 
the  overwriting  that  takes  place  in  Inherent  Vice alongside  controlled  readings  of  history 
remarked upon by the anarchists in Against the Day, I will then show that Pynchon's texts work 
against a unified notion of history as this devolves control away from centralised institutions  
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towards the individual.
The final part of this chapter will focus on the late Wittgenstein's themes of naming, 
private  language  and  Platonism  in  relation  to  Gravity's  Rainbow through  the  structural 
mediation of  Vineland to show that, contrary to criticism that would read no succession in 
Wittgenstein's work, these philosophical aspects extend and embrace the themes explored in  
earlier sections. Ultimately, I  will  demonstrate that a reading of Wittgenstein with Pynchon 
results in a curious troubling of political polarities and that this shows, in its delegation to the 
demos, that a simple placement on the spectrum will not suffice.
The critical reception of Wittgenstein's work has been voluminous and by no means 
univocal.6 It is therefore vital, before attempting any correlation with Pynchon, to ascertain 
and name some of the stances and trends that have emerged in this area. Among others, Guy  
Kahane, Edward Kanterian and Oskari Kuusela have recently performed an excellent service to  
the  field  by  dividing  this  prolific  critical  canon  into  essentialist  forms:  the  “orthodox” 
interpretation,  “New”  Wittgensteinians,  therapeutic  readings,  analytical  philosophy, 
continental  philosophy  and  other  interpretations.7 Although  it  would  serve  no  purpose  to 
replicate their concise and compelling summary, a degree of recapitulation is inevitable and 
necessary.  Therefore,  this  section  presents  an  overview  of  interpretative  phases  in 
Wittgenstein scholarship, beginning with the orthodoxy as regards TLP and several of the main 
strands in the Philosophical Investigations, moving to the New Wittgensteinians and early/late 
divisions, before finally considering Pynchon's direct interaction with Wittgenstein.
6 There are, for example, 9,000+ entries in a now fifteen-year-old bibliography. See Glock, 
‘Perspectives on Wittgenstein’, 38; Philip, Bibliographie Zue Wittgenstein-Literatur.
7 Kahane, Kanterian, and Kuusela, ‘Introduction’, 4–14; see also, Biletzki, (Over)Interpreting 
Wittgenstein.
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Orthodoxy: Early and Late
It  is  a  sign  of  the  cursory  nature  of  the  existing  Wittgensteinian  commentary  on 
Pynchon  that  it  is  implicitly  the  early  Gordon  Baker's  and  P.M.S.  Hacker's  “orthodox” 
interpretation  of  TLP,  presented  retrospectively  through  their  colossal  body  of  analytical 
scholarship on PI, that has featured almost exclusively to date. Baker and Hacker's stance sees  
Wittgenstein's  early  work  as  the  outcome  of  an  inheritance  from  Frege  and  Russell, 
culminating  in  a  “picture  theory”  of  language  that  delineates  the  interrelation  between 
language, the world and the mystical. In this view, Wittgenstein is read as presenting linguistic  
propositions as pictures of reality: “[a] picture is a model of reality” (TLP, §2.12) / “[a] picture is 
a fact” (§3.141) / “[a] propositional sign is a fact” (§3.14) / “[a] proposition is a picture of 
reality”  (§4.01).  This,  in  turn,  hinges  upon  a  distinction  between  the  speakable  and  the 
showable; in Wittgenstein's view, many propositions are nonsensical; they do not atomize into  
discrete pictures. From this, he deduces the ineffable: “[t]here are, indeed, things that cannot  
be put into words. They make themselves manifest” (§6.522). This is achieved through a work 
of logic, laid out with extraordinary innovation in a hierarchical ordinal format.
While this summary presents  TLP  as a text with a single dominant focus, the same 
cannot be said of the Philosophical Investigations. A highly fragmented work punctuated by the 
polyphonic  voice  of  an  interlocutor,  PI is  often  treated  thematically  with  interpretations 
advanced upon single strands of the disjointed threads of argument. Although the orthodoxy 
of  Baker and Hacker focuses upon the destruction of  an Augustinian, referential  model of  
language,  there  have been  notorious  alternative  readings,  the most  prominent  being  Saul 
Kripke's 1982 treatise on rule-following.8
As a looming tower in Wittgenstein scholarship, though, it is Gordon Baker and P.M.S.  
8 Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules.
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Hacker's four-volume series of analytical commentary on the Philosophical Investigations that 
will be treated as the closest to canonicity yet found in this field. This work, which sets out the  
orthodoxy of  PI  interpretation, is generally rigorous and insightful. Of note, however, is that 
the final two volumes (Analytical 3 and 4) were authored solely by Hacker amid disagreements 
with Baker over “nuance” (Analytical 3, x). This nuance was, supposedly, laid out clearly by a 
five-point  summary  in  a  piece  by  Hacker  focusing  on  the  late  Baker's  interpretation  of  
Wittgenstein's  philosophy  as  a  psychoanalytic,  patient-specific  model.9 However,  these 
single-authored  volumes  are  saturated  with  Hacker's  growing  preoccupation  with  the 
mereological fallacy that he insists on proving is inherent in Wittgenstein's thought at every 
turn. This dogmatic approach, which is lacking in the other volumes, is worth noting at this 
juncture,  so  that,  unlike  Kripke's  Wittgenstein,  this  study  will  present  more  than  Hacker's  
Wittgenstein.
Overall, the only grand, meta-narrational unifying fact that can be stated about the 
orthodox interpretation is that, regardless of whether one sees it as an Early/Late divide in the  
published works, or as a graduated transitional stance through the notebooks, Wittgenstein 
holds  one  set  of  views  in  the  Tractatus that  are  then  undermined  by  the  Philosophical  
Investigations. The evidence for such a view is historical as well as interpretative, Wittgenstein  
himself writing explicitly of the “grave mistakes” in “that first book” (PI, x). The primary point 
of departure is a disagreement with the presentation of language set out by St. Augustine.  
However, such a slight departure harbours great philosophical difference.
The New Wittgenstein
As Kahane et  al.  point  out,  the orthodox interpretation of  TLP  leads to an internal 
paradox: its own propositions must be nonsensical “given that they are trying to say what  
9 Hacker, ‘Gordon Baker’s Late Interpretation of Wittgenstein’, 88–122.
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cannot  be  said”.10 Such  a  contradiction  –  taken  up  as  the core  tenet  of  the  text  by  the 
self-professed “New Wittgensteinians”, led by Alice Crary, Rupert Read,11 James Conant12 and 
Cora Diamond13, yet based upon the writings of Hidé Ishiguru as far back as 1969 14 – is an area 
that remains unexplored, although implicitly called for in Pynchon studies by Samuel Thomas. 15 
Although far from unified within itself, this perspective generally sees  TLP as “engaging in a 
therapeutic activity whose goal is to make its reader turn away from philosophical theorising” 
and  thus,  through  this  shared  trope  with  PI, bridges  the  gap  between  “early”  and  “late” 
Wittgenstein.16
This interpretation is derived by taking the statements on “silence” and “nonsense” at  
the beginning and ends of TLP as a “frame” that instructs the reader to disregard all that lies 
within, to truly jettison the ladders that have been climbed, but to keep the conclusion, itself  
formed from the logic now discarded. Therefore, the New Wittgenstein can be construed as a  
meta-structural  mapping that sees an overall,  functional  purpose to the text  but that also 
explicitly declares a logical inconsistency within itself. Whether this strengthens or weakens 
the New Wittgensteinian argument is up for debate. Irrespective of this, the primary evidence  
for this stance occurs at TLP §6.54 wherein Wittgenstein declares all his previous propositions 
to be “senseless”, mere “ladders” that the reader must “transcend” and “discard”. While, in 
many ways, this stance is convincing for its ability to present one of the few coherent readings  
of  TLP  §6.54,17 it  is  also hugely incompatible with other interpretations (after  all,  they are 
dealing  with  “nonsense”)  and  therefore  represents  a  dead-end  for  plurality.  Perhaps,  in  
10 Kahane, Kanterian, and Kuusela, ‘Introduction’, 5.
11 Crary and Read, The New Wittgenstein.
12 Conant, ‘Elucidation and Nonsense in Frege and Early Wittgenstein’.
13 Diamond, ‘Ethics, Imagination and the Method of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus’; Diamond, ‘Throwing 
Away the Ladder’.
14 Ishiguru, ‘Use and Reference of Names’.
15 Thomas, Pynchon and the Political, 85.
16 Kahane, Kanterian, and Kuusela, ‘Introduction’, 7.
17 See Proops, ‘The New Wittgenstein: A Critique’, 93.
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Wittgensteinian  terms,  this  is  a  positive  step;  an  elimination  of  what  Anat  Biletzki  has 
pejoratively termed a “recursive endlessness”.18 However, such readings feel, in another sense, 
deeply flawed. Biletzki  posits that the reason behind this is  that it  can serve no exegetical  
function: “because they are true to Wittgenstein (and thus do not interpret him)”.19
While it is possible to criticise the New Wittgensteinian interpretation as a form of 
postmodern nihilism, this stance has the advantage of observing a parallel between the early  
and late Wittgenstein through the concept of therapeutic philosophy. In dispelling the vast  
majority of its own text as nonsense, the Tractatus  can be seen as stating that it is, instead, 
philosophical  sophistry that is  to be transcended. This introduces a strong bind to  PI  §133 
which proposes that “the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed  complete  clarity”, meaning 
“that the philosophical problems should completely disappear”; the discovery that “makes me 
capable  of  stopping  doing  philosophy”.  Such  a  stance  provides  potential  insight  into 
bi-directional literary-philosophical hostility with Wittgenstein's work. Indeed, five years before 
his death, at a point when he was deeply immersed in the authorship of the second part of the  
Investigations, Wittgenstein remarks on “[h]ow hard we find it to believe something that we 
do not see the truth of for ourselves” (CV, 48). In this instance, Wittgenstein is referring to the 
brilliance, or otherwise, of Shakespeare, of which it “takes the authority of a Milton really to 
convince”  him  (CV,  48).  However,  Christopher  Norris  has  recently  suggested  that 
Wittgenstein's aversion to literature is predicated upon a belief shared with the earlier Dr.  
Johnson in a “verbal self-indulgence or weakness for extravagant flights of metaphor” within 
Shakespeare's work.20 From such a statement it is clear that Wittgenstein has a problematic 
relationship  with  self-referential,  contradictory  voices;  voices  that  speak  on  top  of  one 
18 Biletzki, (Over)Interpreting Wittgenstein.
19 Ibid., 26.
20 Norris, Fiction, Philosophy and Literary Theory, 177.
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another; voices that employ ambiguity to raise questions in new ways (“God knows, few of us 
are strangers to moral ambiguity” (IV 7)); voices that engage in flights of fancy, metaphorical or 
otherwise; voices among which Pynchon must surely number.
28
The Tractatus and V.
“I prefer the hard and tangible things I can measure”
– Thomas Pynchon, V.21
It is only in Pynchon's first novel, V., that Wittgenstein appears explicitly. Although by 
1963 it would have been possible for Pynchon to have read the entire corpus of Wittgenstein's  
“official” philosophy, the primary focus, with one exception, of Pynchon's depiction is the early 
work  of  the  Tractatus.  However,  the presentation of  Wittgenstein  in  V.  is  problematic,  as 
would be expected of Pynchon. As Grant and Pittas-Giroux note, Pynchon even goes so far as  
to make reference to a non-existent portion of Wittgenstein's text; the mythical Proposition 
1.7.22 This section will broach the central question of explicit delegation in the novel: what is  
the extent, and what are the consequences, of Pynchon's direct reference to Wittgenstein in  
V.? Following a brief critical survey I will  situate Wittgenstein in relation to his Pynchonian 
articulators, beginning, most prominently, with Lieutenant Weissmann. In this process I will 
demonstrate the non-standard literary means by which Pynchon establishes Weissmann as a  
Nazi and Nazism as a product of extreme rationalisation. As will be shown through an analysis  
of the  Tractatus  song, a model of characterization will emerge that prioritises the structural 
interconnectivity of the novels over empathic response. The resulting conclusions on structure 
will be used to open up the debate into the realm of ethics through Wittgenstein's comments 
on the mystical, an area that will here be explored through the Romantic heritage to which  
Wittgenstein is indebted and Pynchon is ambivalently affiliated.
Addressing this question will encroach upon the fields of politics, poetry, ethics and 
21 V., 289.
22 Grant, A Companion to V., 143; Pittas-Giroux, ‘A Reader’s Guide to Thomas Pynchon’s V.’
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literary history while finally paving the way for an examination of compromised critique that 
depends upon that which it  destroys:  writing  under erasure.  This  issue will  spawn further  
questions  that  will  haunt  this  entire  work;  questions  on  moral  relativism  and  strains  of 
liberalism in Pynchon's work.
What Where
Initially, the direct citation of Wittgenstein in  V. must be strictly delineated from the 
text's implicit reference to pertinent philosophical themes such as solipsism, Platonism and 
logical positivism.23 This is because, in the process of referencing an individual rather than a 
philosophical principle, Pynchon extends a hostile invitation; Wittgenstein is welcomed into V.  
so that he may be the representative of the concepts under critique, yet also, as will be seen in  
the final part of this section, as an individual artist. If this hostile invitation sounds somewhat  
akin to an Althusserian interpellation or hailing, then this is not surprising; indeed, I suggest 
that a triangulation of this interpellation could allow an identification of Pynchon's ideological 
apparatus.24 Within which Pynchonian or more general literary practices can Wittgenstein be 
located? What does this tell us about the assumptions of the literary ideology? 
The location of the direct references to Wittgenstein in V. can be stated with obvious 
ease. The text of TLP 1 appears in “Chapter Nine: Mondaugen's story” (278); the name of the  
Tractatus  is  bandied  about  in  “Chapter  Ten:  In  which  various  sets  of  young  people  get 
together”  (288-289);  and  Wittgenstein  is  directly  named  by  Rachel  Owlglass  in  “Chapter 
Thirteen: In which the yo-yo string is revealed as a state of mind” (380).  There is also one 
potentially unsound reference in the character name “Slab” which David Seed believes could  
23 See, for examples V., 189, 296–297; aspects that will be addressed later.
24 See Althusser, ‘Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses’, 162–163; this will be explored more fully 
shortly.
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be an allusion to the analysis of imperatives at PI §20.25 Each of these references is, however, 
embedded  within  its  own  context  and  the  shifting  allegiances  of  each  voice  form  the 
characterization of Wittgenstein in V. To begin this survey of actual, concrete occurrences of 
Wittgenstein, each of these moments will be contextualised and examined as a precursor to an  
exploration of Pynchon's over-writing that will be undertaken later in this chapter.
First, though, it is necessary to present a brief chronology of Pynchon criticism that has  
addressed  the  direct  presence  of  Wittgenstein  in  Pynchon's  work  and  a  curious  fictional 
corollary.  As  shall  be  seen,  for  the  most  part  these  readings  have  focused  on  internal 
consistency;  warping  Wittgenstein  so  as  to  fit  a  model  of  the  world  that  corresponds  to 
recurring motifs of the inanimate in V.; regardless of who is speaking. As little new material on 
this theme has emerged since Grant's 2001 neutral literature review, it may also be useful to 
consult his work alongside this summary as a comparative effort.26
The first piece to pick up on the Pynchon-Wittgenstein correlation was William Plater's  
The Grim Phoenix  in 1978. This reading, as McHoul and Wills point out, only focuses on the  
Wittgenstein  of  the  Tractatus.27 Although  always  easy  to  show  with  hindsight,  Plater's 
aspirations – an exploration of Pynchon's “ability to make manifest a reality that cannot merely 
be  described  with  language”28 –  are,  from  his  own  Wittgensteinian  interpretative  stance, 
inherently  flawed.  Indeed,  at  the  close  Plater  declares  that  “Pynchon  achieves  what 
Wittgenstein means when he says that there are things that cannot be put into words, things  
that make themselves manifest”, an uncited reference to Tractatus §6.522.29 What is missing is 
a grasp of the fact that this is, under Wittgenstein's model, not possible, for it is that which is  
25 Seed, The Fictional Labyrinths, 75.
26 Grant, A Companion to V., 139–140.
27 McHoul and Wills, Writing Pynchon, 13.
28 Plater, The Grim Phoenix, xiii.
29 Ibid., 241.
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only subject to ostensive definition: Clov's reply of “here”, senseless on the page, when asked 
“where  are  you?”  in  Beckett's  Endgame.30 Instead,  though,  Plater  states  that  Pynchon's 
inclusion of “all the dialectical polarities” and the “basic dualities of order and disorder” are 
enough to perforate a reality circumscribed by language.31 However, to include all the poles 
does  not  give  a  sense of  “the  world  as  a  limited  whole”  –  Wittgenstein's  criteria  for  the  
“mystical”  – it  merely  sets  out  boundaries  that  it  must,  then,  be possible  to  conceptually  
transcend (TLP, §6.45). Although Plater claims an awareness of the philosophical pitfalls of his 
interpretation,32 I would argue that the trans-textual presence of Pynchon's characters;33 the 
recurring motif of an interdependence between art and reality34 (which Plater even explores35); 
and the disparaging remarks on the short story “Entropy” in Pynchon's introduction to  Slow 
Learner (SL, 12-15) do great damage to Plater's entire conceptualisation of the novels as closed 
systems, the premise on which his application of Wittgenstein rests. Much of the argument in 
this chapter works against this early criticism, especially Plater's assertion that Wittgenstein  
and Pynchon both share a philosophy that stresses the negligible impact of human agency 
upon the world, which would carry profound ethical implications.36
The next scholars to deal with this interaction were David Wills and Alec McHoul in  
1983, wherein they attempt, in part, a reading of Wittgensteinian affinities with  V.  Amid a 
playful  performative  style,  they  assert  that  Wittgenstein's  “text  is  present-as-logic  and 
absent-as-mysticism”,  thereby  acting  as  a  parallel  to  the  problematized  signifiers  within  
30 Beckett, ‘Endgame’, 95.
31 Plater, The Grim Phoenix, 241.
32 Ibid., 245.
33 For example: Pig Bodine across many of Pynchon's novels; Weissmann and Mondaugen in V. and 
Gravity's Rainbow; Mucho Maas from TCoL49 to Vineland and the Traverse family from Vineland to 
Against the Day.
34 For instance, Gerhardt von Göll’s ‘dreams of flight’ paralleled with Fritz Lang: GR, 159, 793.
35 Plater, The Grim Phoenix, 66.
36 Ibid., 42.
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Pynchon's novel.37 Whether this cryptic utterance means that they believe Wittgenstein's text 
to contain only logic and no mysticism, or that Pynchon incorporates only Wittgenstein's logic  
and  not  his  mysticism,  remains  unspecified.  The  extension  of  this  article  in  1990  to  a 
book-length publication sheds little further light, except for a critique of Plater's work – calling  
for a focus upon the later Wittgenstein in Pynchon scholarship38 – and an argument that the 
citation of Wittgenstein is only one of many instances of a Levi-Straussian bricolage effect in 
Pynchon's writing.39
Other work from the mid-eighties to early  nineties includes Jimmie Cain's  Pynchon 
Notes article, in which he writes that Wittgenstein is cited to give Mondaugen an “inkling” of 
the  “essential  randomness”  of  the  universe,  prompting  his  flight  from the  imperio-centric  
environment of Foppl's Siege Party. While this could be seen as an admirable anti-Colonialist  
sentiment, Cain retreats into the depths of postmodern scepticism with “the realization that  
events carry with them a multitude of 'historical' interpretations, no one more necessarily valid  
that another”, a realization that would surely imply that no moral critique can be placed upon 
such environments.40 Dwight Eddins, on the other hand, takes the application of Wittgenstein  
in V. to represent a contradictory, cyclical form of solipsism, seeing therein the premise that  
the message owes its existence only to human interpretation but is nevertheless correct in its  
assertions of an arbitrary universe: a random series is interpreted into a coherent message that 
specifies  the  randomness  of  the  universe.41 John  W.  Hunt  even  took  the  presence  of 
Wittgenstein to be an invitation to silence; “to remain sane”, he claims, “we should let it go at  
that and ask no questions”.42
37 McHoul and Wills, ‘Die Welt Ist Alles Was Der Fall Ist’, 277.
38 McHoul and Wills, Writing Pynchon, 13.
39 Ibid., 8–9.
40 Cain, ‘The Clock as Metaphor in “Mondaugen’s Story”’, 76–77.
41 Eddins, The Gnostic Pynchon, 72.
42 Hunt, ‘Comic Escape and Anti-Vision’, 38.
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Perhaps  the  most  protracted  study  of  Wittgenstein  and  Pynchon  in  V.  has  been 
undertaken  by  Petra  Bianchi43 in  1995.  In  her  Wittgensteinian  reading,  Bianchi  sees  an 
impotence of language that cannot express the mystical. Many of Bianchi's points are valid 
here and she proposes a shift to the inanimate in V. via “Wittgenstein's theory that love is a 
meaningless concept and cannot be talked about but only demonstrated”.44 Aside from the 
fact  that  “love”  is  not  explicitly  described  by  Wittgenstein  as  “mystical”,  this  reading  is 
problematic and loose in its terminology. For love to be “meaningless” it would have to be a  
name, in Wittgenstein's sense: an object with a single, immutable, concrete, but non-existent, 
referent. On the other hand, if love is supposed, here, to represent a possible state, then it  
could only be “senseless”, not meaningless.45 Furthermore, Bianchi stops short of an analysis of 
Pynchon's hostility to Wittgenstein and her analysis is situated within a tired debate on notions  
of order and subjective construction.
Most recently, Sascha Pöhlmann's 2011  Pynchon Notes  article takes centre stage. In 
this piece Pöhlmann examines the shared point of overlap between Pynchon and Wittgenstein  
in the realm of the ineffable.46 This reading is fruitful, bringing fresh attention to Pynchon's 
stylistic traits such as ellipses and em dashes alongside the implication of the possibility of  
private  language.  To  some  extent,  though,  my  analysis  here  will  run  directly  counter  to  
Pöhlmann's  stance;  it  is  my  conclusion  that  Pynchon's  works  demonstrate  a  deep-seated 
antipathy and hostility to Wittgenstein's early logical positivism.
It is worth noting, also, a similarity between Pynchon and the author most commonly 
proclaimed as his successor, David Foster Wallace. Many reviews instantly noted the literary 
lineage between the writers. Furthering this reputation is the Wittgensteinian presence in both 
43 Aptly, of the University of Malta.
44 Bianchi, ‘The Wittgensteinian Thread’, 9.
45 The best explanation of this I have found is in Tejedor, Starting with Wittgenstein, 33.
46 Pöhlmann, ‘Silences and Worlds’.
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of their  first  novels;  Pynchon's  V.  and Wallace's  The Broom of  the System.47 Sadly,  for the 
astute Wittgenstein reader, one of the most striking features of this presence in Wallace is an 
abundance of misinformation. While this could, indeed, be deemed a metatextual structural  
feature of a fictional construct that plays heavily upon communication breakdown and mimetic 
distortion, the environment is not sufficiently delineated from the reader's extra-textual world 
for this to hold; despite the construction of the Great Ohio Desert, this is not the strange fusion  
of  Canada  and  the  States  that  Wallace  calls  O.N.A.N.  in  Infinite  Jest,  it  is  contemporary 
America. As with the shared patronymic of Herbert and Sidney Stencil in V., The Broom of the  
System centres on successive generations of characters both named Lenore Beadsman, the 
earlier of whom was, in Wallace's novel, a student of Ludwig Wittgenstein's at Cambridge. The 
most prominent display of this is the cryptic reference to Lenore Senior's unwillingness to part  
from her prized “copy of the Investigations”.48 However, any smugness the reader may feel at 
understanding this to be a reference to Wittgenstein's  Philosophical Investigations is quickly 
smashed  by  the  incongruous  reference  to  an  “autographed”  copy;  PI  was  only  published 
posthumously.  The  only  “copies”  in  existence  would  have  been  the  manuscripts  of  the 
Proto-Investigations and, even if the character of Lenore Senior is based upon Alice Ambrose,49 
to whom the Brown Book was dictated (BB, v), the citation is misleading. Indeed, this reference 
appears again in Wallace's story “Westward the Course of Empire Takes Its Way” in which the 
author of  Lost in the Funhouse  – obviously, in reality, John Barth – is replaced by “Professor 
Ambrose”, making a Wittgensteinian connection. It is likely, however, that the other named 
coincidence in “Westward the Course of Empire Takes Its Way” of “D.L.” to Pynchon's Vineland  
is mere chance; the publication dates are too proximal for Pynchon to have made this edit 
47 See, for instance, James, ‘Wittgenstein Is Dead and Living in Ohio’.
48 Wallace, The Broom of the System, 39.
49 Olsen, ‘Termite Art, or Wallace’s Wittgenstein’, 202–3; Boswell, Understanding David Foster Wallace, 
36.
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deliberately. With this survey of the critical material and literary parallels acknowledged, it is  
now  time  to  explore  Pynchon's  specific  interactions,  hospitality  and  hostility  towards 
Wittgenstein more thoroughly. To begin this process I will turn towards Pynchon's first novel  
and explore the direct references to Wittgenstein found therein.
The Case (Weissmann)
The most widely examined Wittgensteinian moment in V. is the triumphant declaration 
of Lieutenant Weissmann, the companion of Vera Manning during Foppl's Siege Party (236),  
that he has unravelled the “code” that Kurt Mondaugen – an employee of Yoyodyne, Inc (227)  
–  believes  to  be  embedded  within  the  atmospheric  disturbances  (“Sferics”).  Weissmann's 
decoded  message,  derived  through  an  unspecified  cryptanalytical  methodology,  reads 
“DIGEWOELDTIMSTEALALENSWTASNDEURFUALRLIKST”.  As Weissmann continues:  “I  remove 
every third letter and obtain: GODMEANTNURRK. This rearranged spells Kurt Mondaugen. […] 
The  remainder  of  the  message  […]  now  reads:  DIEWELTISTALLESWASDERFALLIST.” 
Mondaugen's initial response is, to put it homophonically, curt: “I've heard that somewhere 
before” (278).
To make contextual sense of this reference to the first line of Wittgenstein's Tractatus, 
several aspects of the citation must be unpicked – or so it seems at a first glance. To begin:  
from  where  does  the  message  originate?  Is  this  the  personal  opinion  of  Weissmann;  a 
solipsistic world view derived from Weissmann's own interpretative bias but delivered in good  
faith; or truly a message from the atmospheric disturbances? However, I want to pose here a 
rebuff even to the assumptions that would underlie this mode of questioning and instead to  
focus upon the relative location of Wittgenstein in V.
To expand upon this, consider that critics such as Eddins have, thus far, seen fit to 
36
interpret these aspects with minimal consideration of the idiosyncrasies of Pynchon's writing, 
which fit poorly with the traditional critical framework for understanding character. It is often  
noted50 that Pynchon's characters appear two-dimensional; they apparently lack depth and 
produce little emotional affect. Regardless of whether one sees an emotional void in Pynchon's 
work, this impression of a superficial surface comes about because Pynchon's characters often  
do  not  engage  in  protracted  dialogue  interpolated  with  narrationally  privileged  empathic 
introspection. Instead they act as functional puppets, established through connections with 
one  another  within  associated  domains  of  Pynchon's  metaphorico-allegorical  totality.51 
Pynchon establishes these domains predominantly through repeated narrative interjection of  
specific phrases, character interaction (most notably, sexual interaction) and textual proximity.  
It rests with the reader not to infer character purely from that which is attributed directly, but 
through delineation and scrutiny of their resident domains.
The question to be asked,  then,  changes significantly  in  nature.  It  now becomes a  
matter of assessing the limited artistic device that is “Weissmann” in Pynchon's novels. It also  
becomes a move away from broad, totalising sweeps. For instance: merely because portions of  
Pynchon's  early  work,  especially  TCoL49,  present  certain  characters  with  solipsism  as  a 
potential conclusion does not mean that one can infer it as a universal phenomenon. This is  
especially true in the case of Pynchon's character Weissmann. Instead of  speculating upon 
whether the entire text promotes solipsism because a Nazi character exhibits such views, it is 
possible  to  define,  with  specificity,  Weissmann's  interaction  with  this  philosophy  by 
ascertaining his domain. Interestingly, there is also a sort of Wittgensteinian irony within this  
quasi-narratological method. In one sense, Pynchon's placement of Weissmann in a certain  
relation to Wittgenstein expresses or highlights, more than anything, the relation itself rather 
50 Most recently, Madsen, ‘Alterity’, 151.
51 First noted by Mendelson, ‘Introduction’, 5 who stresses ‘the network of relations’ over ‘character’.
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than a direct critique of the constituents. This mode of reasoning is supremely applicable here  
for it is the logic of which Wittgenstein writes: “[i]nstead of, 'The complex sign “aRb” says that  
a stands to b in the relation R', we ought to put, “That 'a' stands to 'b' in a certain relation says 
that aRb”.52 Using Wittgenstein's own logic leads to the conclusion that the juxtaposition of 
Weissmann and Wittgenstein acts to query Pynchon's political  judgement of the  Tractatus, 
asking which systems would appropriate, or are legitimated by, this mode of philosophy. It is 
also worth clarifying here my earlier brief reference to Althusser. For Althusser, “it is not their 
real conditions of existence, their real world, that 'men' 'represent to themselves' in ideology,  
but above all it is their relation to those conditions of existence which is represented to them 
there”.53 It is a conceptually similar structure of prioritized relation that I propose to examine 
with regard to the early Wittgenstein; Pynchon's writing summons Wittgenstein and so, like 
Althusserian  ideology,  it  “has  the  function  (which  defines  it)  of  'constituting'  concrete  
individuals as subjects”.54 While this system of “domains” and linkage must strike a balance 
between paranoia  and  anti-paranoia,  it  is  no  longer  feasible  to  ignore  these  connections, 
despite the infeasibility of quantitatively mapping their bounds.
Who, then, is Weissmann? What subject is constituted? Weissmann is, of course, the 
character  otherwise  known  as  Captain  Blicero  in  Gravity's  Rainbow,  the  sadistic  Nazi 
responsible for the launch of Rocket 00000: the Schwarzgerät and its sacrificial asymmetric 
load,  the  boy  Gottfried.  However,  even  in  V., Weissmann's  tendencies  towards  extreme, 
right-wing politics  are  manifested through his  interrogation of  Mondaugen's  knowledge of 
“D'Annunzio”,  “Mussolini”,  “Fascisti”  and  the  “National  Socialist  German  Workers'  Party”. 
52 TLP, sec. 3.1432; Max Black highlights the multitude of interpretations that this passage has 
undergone in Black, A Companion to Wittgenstein’s ‘Tractatus’, 105–106; see also Anscombe, An 
Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, 89; also addressed to a lesser extent by Copi, ‘Objects, 
Properties, and Relations in the Tractatus’, 155–156.
53 Althusser, ‘Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses’, 154.
54 Ibid., 160.
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Finally, he is disappointed: “'[f]rom Munich and never heard of Hitler,' said Weissmann, as if  
'Hitler' were the name of an avant-garde play” (242). Weissmann is also, dressed in his 1904  
get-up (260), instrumental in the conflation of two historical periods that occurs during Foppl's  
Siege Party; the Nazi regime and the German Südwest. He not only foresees, and approves of,  
the collapse of the League of Nations and a return to German colonialist supremacy (243), but 
appears in direct proximity to the scene of Hedwig's entrance riding a Bondel (265) and its 
antecedent referent, the murderer and his mount, Firelily (who could possibly be Foppl). The 
cumulative  effect  of  this  evidence  is  dramatic  for  it  not  only  serves  to  build  a  horrific 
awareness of the genocidal drive enacted by von Trotha against the Herero population in 1904,  
but also, crucially, provides a referent for the Nazi death camps. Pynchon, in his aside quip – 
“[t]his is only 1 per cent of six million, but still pretty good” – relativizes the Holocaust and  
situates Weissmann, and Wittgenstein's Tractatus, amid such sentiment (V., 245).55
Such relativity entails grave ethical problems and it is necessary to unravel these in  
relation to Pynchon's co-incidence of Weissmann and Wittgenstein. V. was written at the apex 
(or nadir, depending upon one's perspective) of postmodern historiography, best embodied by 
Hayden White.56 White, known primarily for the extension of Hegelian emplotment advanced 
in Metahistories, suggests that there is, essentially, only a single difference between narrative 
history and fiction: the claim to truth.57 As a causal chain is constructed between the events of  
the  chronology,  White  claims  the  emergence  of  “an  inexpungable  relativity  in  every 
representation of historical phenomena”, a relativity that “is a function of the language used to  
55 While the term ‘Holocaust’ is problematic, for pragmatic reasons, I will use it throughout. See 
LaCapra, ‘Representing the Holocaust’, 109, Footnote 4; the distinction between Shoah (האוש), 
Churban and Holocaust is also succinctly covered alongside the terminologies’ respective 
politico-religious implications for Labour Zionism in Young, Writing and Rewriting the Holocaust, 
85–89; also see Felman, ‘The Return of the Voice’, 212–213, which tackles the untranslatable nature 
of the term ‘Shoah’ with reference to Benjamin; also note that Katalin Orbán, among others, has 
previously spotted this connection: Orbań, Ethical Diversions, 162.
56 For more on this in relation to Pynchon, see Smith, Pynchon and History, 6.
57 White, Metahistory, 93–97.
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describe  and  thereby  constitute  past  events  as  possible  objects  of  explanation  and 
understanding”.58 Such  statements,  when  pertaining  to  the  Holocaust,  have  found  poor 
reception  among  survivors.  Perhaps  the  most  uncompromising  of  these  voices  is  the 
perspective of Elie Wiesel who believes, not only in the absolutism of his experience, but also  
in its quale-like inexpressibility: “only those who lived it in their flesh and in their minds can 
possibly transform their experiences into knowledge. Others, despite their best intentions, can  
never do so”59; an injunction that, as Yael Feldman highlights, has not been heeded. 60 Wiesel's 
view is intensely problematic. While White might take issue with the possibility of transforming  
any  experience  into  knowledge,  this  absolute  epistemology  also  impinges  upon  any 
pedagogical  function  of  history.  To  exclude  the  possibility  of  total  empathic  response  by  
banishing Holocaust experience to the realm of the ineffable is, in a Tractarian framework, to 
designate it as on par with the “mystical” (TLP, §6.522) – that which “we must pass over in 
silence” (§7). It is amid such debate that Pynchon wades in with Weissmann and with which 
Weissmann wades in with Wittgenstein.
From  the  above  evidence,  and  the  chilling  events  of  Foppl's  Siege  Party  in  V.,  it 
becomes  clear  that  Weissmann's  political  domain  is  fascist/Nazi  Europe,  especially  as  it 
pertains to the Holocaust,  but that it  also carries a strong transatlantic suggestion: that of  
America. Furthermore, this is  confirmed by an earlier encounter between Mondaugen and  
Weissmann  that  leads  to  a  confrontational  accusation  that  the  former  is  among  the 
“[p]rofessional traitors”. Mondaugen refutes this with an argument that hinges upon a factor 
that links into Gravity's Rainbow; Mondaugen claims that his device “can't transmit [...] It's for 
receiving only” (V., 251). This system is exactly the configuration that Weissmann uses in the 
58 White, ‘Historical Emplotment’, 37.
59 Wiesel, From the Kingdom of Memory, 166.
60 Feldman, ‘Whose Story Is It Anyway?’, 228.
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launch of 00000 for, as Gottfried goes to scream, he remembers that “they can’t hear him” 
because there is “no radio back to them” (GR, 758). Indeed, “[t]he data link runs through the 
radio-guidance system, and the words of Weissmann are to be, for a while, multiplexed with  
the error-corrections sent out to the Rocket. But there’s no return channel from Gottfried to  
the ground” (GR, 751). As will be covered later in the chapter on Adorno, this appears to be  
one of the fatal flaws in Weissmann's attempt at transcendence. Rather than establishing new,  
bi- or omni- directional modes of time and history, Weissmann the Nazi merely reconstitutes  
the “hopeless [...] one-way flow of European time” (GR, 723). From this, the specific critique of 
America's  path  towards  right-wing  politics  is  here  signalled  through  the  politically  and 
historically metonymic radio-link. As  Gravity's Rainbow puts it: “America was a gift from the 
invisible powers, a way of returning. But Europe refused it” (722). Europe's refusal of this new 
space –  although this vision of America as an uninhabited continent to be colonised is itself 
deeply problematic61 – actually points towards a dissolution of American exceptionalism. If the 
colonial enterprise failed to generate a new system, a way back, a return, then Europe and 
America share a common course. Clearly, the unidirectionality or simplex nature of the Sferics 
in V. is in alignment with this system of European time and falls under Weissmann's domain.
Why does  Weissmann cite  Wittgenstein? Instead  of  speculating  upon whether  the 
message really came to Weissmann – as though “Weissmann” were a human being, rather 
than a  non-mimetic  literary  device  –  it  makes more sense  to  query,  given  the  contextual 
domain of Nazism and the Holocaust in which Wittgenstein is implicated, how the philosophy 
of  the  Tractatus  could  be  seen  as  aligned  with  National  Socialism  and  genocide  and, 
furthermore, why Pynchon would make this connection. Ultimately, the obvious terminus for 
this reasoning is to further ask: has Pynchon got it right?
61 As Pynchon clearly shows in Mason & Dixon.
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The foremost consideration of Tractarian logic as a precursor to genocidal regimes is to 
be  found  in  Theodor  W.  Adorno's  critique  of  enlightenment;  the  path  of  rationality  to  
industrialised killing.  The most  well-known statement  by Adorno on this  latter  subject,  his  
“famous dictum”, is frequently either wrongly sourced or misappropriated, as Klaus Hofmann 
has noted.62 The actual first instance of Adorno's thought is in the context of an essay on the  
hypocrisy of cultural criticism:
To  write  poetry  after  Auschwitz  is  barbaric.  And  this  corrodes  even  the 
knowledge of why it has become impossible to write poetry today. Absolute  
reification, which presupposed intellectual progress as one of its elements, 
is now preparing to absorb the mind entirely. Critical intelligence cannot be 
equal  to  this  challenge  as  long  as  it  confines  itself  to  self-satisfied 
contemplation.63
As a call  for  praxis,  embedded within thought that recognises its own limited immanence, 
Adorno's use of “barbaric” must be deemed ironic.  If  taken literally,  with the usual  causal  
elision, Adorno would himself be a cultural critic who could “hardly avoid the imputation that  
he has the culture which culture lacks”; he would be purporting false transcendence. 64 Instead, 
the dictum challenges the knowledge/certainty of the rationale for the impossibility of poetry 
through  the  irony  of  the  cultured-barbarian  “narrator”.  This  does  not  preclude  the 
impossibility of poetry but acceptance of such an impossibility leads to self incrimination; to 
brand as barbarous is to contaminate oneself with barbarousness. Adorno's “dictum”, so often  
used  as  unidirectional  causal  logic  for  the  failure  of  art  and  culture,  is  actually  a  cyclical  
indictment of humanity's universal infection.
Furthermore,  the antiserum required for  such toxicity  is  a  regression.  For  Adorno, 
situated at  the terminus of  “the final  stage of  the dialectic  of  culture and barbarism” is  a  
62 Hofmann, ‘Poetry After Auschwitz’.
63 Adorno, ‘Cultural Criticism’, 34.
64 Ibid., 17.
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paradigm of  “absolute reification” that must inevitably produce,  as its  endgame symptom, 
Auschwitz.65 When later revisiting these remarks, Adorno furthered this concept, stating that  
“genocide is the absolute integration. It is on its way wherever men are leveled off” and that  
“Auschwitz  confirmed  the  philosopheme  of  pure  identity  as  death”.  Pure  identity  is  an 
“indifference [to] each individual life”, an indifference that is, in a Pynchonesque definition of 
European-time, the dialectical “direction of history” (ND, 362).
As  is  glaringly  obvious  with  even  a  first  reading  of  V.,  this  absolute  reification  is 
prominently featured. This is most explicit  through the Lady V.'s  theorization of the fetish:  
“[s]o you know what a fetish is? Something of a woman which gives pleasure but is not a  
woman. A shoe, a locket… une jarretière. You are the same, not real but an object of pleasure” 
(404). Aside from the direct link to Marx and Lenin immediately following this moment that  
brings these statements squarely in line as a critique of capitalism and commodity fetishism, 
the S&M-scene outfits that the Lady V. introduces (407) resonate strongly with the voyeuristic  
experience  of  Kurt  Mondaugen  who  accidentally  encounters  “Vera  Meroving  and  her 
lieutenant  […]  she  striking  at  his  chest  with  what  appeared to be a  small  riding  crop,  he 
twisting a gloved hand into her hair” (238). The reification principle at play in this small-scale  
sadomasochistic  episode  through  the  lineage  of  de  Sade  is,  in  Pynchon's  world-view,  a  
microcosm of the dehumanising logic employed by Nazism. As the leading exponent of that  
regime, Weissmann exhibits the dependence on S&M that Pynchon will  later depict as the  
foundation of  repressive right-wing state apparatuses. This is  best  exhibited when Thanatz  
voices his disappointment to the Nazi cub scout (GR, 556) lemming hunter Ludwig:66
Why will the Structure allow every other kind of sexual behavior but that 
one? Because submission and dominance are resources it needs for its very 
65 Ibid., 34.
66 The nominalism of which I do not propose as anything more than coincidence.
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survival. They cannot be wasted in private sex. In any kind of sex. It needs  
our  submission  so that  it  may remain in  power.  It  needs our  lusts  after 
dominance so that it can co-opt us into its own power game. There is no joy 
in it, only power. I tell you, if S and M could be established universally at the  
family level, the State would wither away. (736)
With the identity of Weissmann established in the realms of Adorno's “absolute reification”,  
the stage is set for a production that equates the process of objectification with transit to the  
death camps. 
However, to answer the question arching over this section it must be seen that, in  
Wittgenstein's text, which equates the structure of the world with the structure of language  
(TLP, §6.13), there are strong elements of this objectifying reification. This can be seen in the 
amalgamation of three Tractarian propositions that paint an essentially bleak view for human 
agency and that are the focus of Plater's early reading of a Wittgensteinian Pynchon:67 1.) “the 
case – a fact – is the existence of states of affairs” (TLP, §2); 2.) a “state of affairs […] is a 
combination of  objects  (things)”  (§2.01);  and,  most  crucially,  the demolition  of  the  causal  
nexus 3.) “[t]he world is independent of my will” (§6.373). This disillusionment with the role 
humankind can play in its own existence (“[e]ven if all that we wish for were to happen, still  
this would only be a favour granted by fate” (§6.374)) seriously troubles a Wittgensteinian  
reading of V. that searches for an ethical centre.
The World (“anything lovely you'd care to infer to”)
The  key  to  unravelling  this  situation  begins  with  the  multiple  presentations  of 
Wittgenstein  within Pynchon's novel. Initially, the negative portrayal of  TLP resurfaces in the 
less aggressive form of a parody song, voiced with “Tractatus in hand” (V., 289):
It is something less than heaven
To be quoted in Thesis 1.7
67 Plater, The Grim Phoenix, 42.
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Every time I make an advance;
If the world is all that the case is
That's a pretty discouraging basis
On which to pursue
Any sort of romance.
I've got a proposition for you;
Logical positive and brief.
And at least it could serve as a kind of comic relief:
(Refrain)
Let P equal me,
With my heart in command;
Let Q equal you
With Tractatus in hand;
And R could stand for a lifetime of love,
Filled with music to fondle and purr to.
We'll define love as anything lovely you'd care to infer to
On the right, put that bright,
Hypothetical case;
On the left, our uncleft,
Parenthetical chase
And that horseshoe there in the middle
Could be lucky; we've nothing to lose,
If in these parentheses
We just mind our little P's
And Q's.
If P (Mafia sang in reply) thinks of me
As a girl hard to make,
Then Q wishes you 
Would go jump in the lake.
For R is a meaningless concept,
Having nothing to do with pleasure:
I prefer the hard and tangible things I can measure
Man, you chase in the face
Of impossible odds;
I'm a lass in the class
Of unbossable broads.
If you promise me no more sticky phrases,
Half a mo while I kick off my shoes.
There are birds, there are bees,
And to hell with all your P's
And Q's (V. 289-290).
Pynchon's counterargument to logical  positivism within this  light-hearted “comic relief”,  as  
with Tchitcherine's redemptive encounter in the penultimate episode of Gravity's Rainbow, is 
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voiced through love. In an elaborate series of puns upon P's and Q's – in the sense of etiquette 
and decorum – set against the deadly earnest symbolic logic at  TLP 5.242 and 6.1201, the 
tongue-in-cheek nature of the passage is established. In fact, as William Vesterman points out:  
the more serious the topic of prosody, the more comical the parody.68 This does not, however, 
preclude  Pynchon  from  flaunting  his  erudition  and,  while  the  humour  is  evident,  the 
seriousness of the subject matter means the parody itself is not beyond scrutiny. There are 
references to the “[h]ypothetical case” “[o]n the right” and the “[p]aranthetical chase” “[o]n  
the left” with the “horseshoe there in the middle” all “in these parentheses”. As is evident, this  
is an accurate representation, right down to the “horseshoe” of the implication operator and 
the necessary encapsulating brackets, of Wittgenstein's key example in his demonstration of 
tautological propositions: “(p  q)”. ⊃
Yet, the consistency of the verse soon breaks down. The final stanza begins with what 
appears to be a condemnation of the first speaker – “Q wishes you / Would go jump in the 
lake” – but then actually moves towards a nihilistic affirmation of purely logical sentiments,  
dismissing “R” as a “meaningless concept”, this variable having been previously defined as “a 
lifetime of  love  […]  /  Love  [being]  anything  lovely  you'd  care  to  infer  to”.  Indeed,  in  the  
proximal  shadow  of  SHOCK  and  SHROUD's  invocation  of  the  Holocaust,  Mafia  sings,  in  a  
double-entendre-laden refutation of the fact that “R” has “nothing to do with pleasure”, that  
she  “prefer[s]  the  hard  and  tangible  things  [she]  can  measure”;  only  a  page  earlier  she  
expressed her hatred, not for “the Jewish people”, but merely “the things they do”, thereby 
re-invoking  the  arguments  surrounding  anti-Semitism  and  Zionism.  The  amorous  situation 
emerging  from  this  sub-blanket  ballad  brings,  in  a  typically  Pynchonesque  style,  a 
double-edged reading of the Tractatus.
68 Vesterman, ‘Pynchon’s Poetry’, 213.
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As  this  superficial  summary  leads  to  no  useful  outcome,  it  becomes  necessary  to 
painstakingly recapitulate the verse's “narrative” alignment with  Tractarian  sentiments. The 
first  stanza  is  easy  enough  to  define  as  a  trivial  referential  set-up,  establishing  the 
Wittgensteinian frame for the poem. The second, however,  not so.  This  portion begins by  
casting the singers as the variables in TLP 5.242: “[t]he operation that produces 'q' from 'p' also 
produces 'r' from 'q', and so on. There is only one way of expressing this: 'p', 'q', 'r', etc. have to 
be variables that give expression in a general way to certain formal relations”. This stance is 
derived  from  the  earlier  cited  TLP  §3.1432,  wherein  a  complex  sign  denoting  the  formal 
relations of its constituents does not express its sub- and relational components discretely, but  
is itself expressed by the implicit relationship of the constituents therein. The verse, therefore,  
posits pRq as a complex sign made possible by the proposed “lifetime of love” between “me”  
and “you”. In doing so, this passage contextualises a Wittgensteinian motif on the levelness of  
variables  with  their  relations  (i.e.  p  and  q  are  no  more  important  in  this  sign  than  the 
connective R) within love; an emotional phenomenon. Obviously, it is incongruous to express 
something so abstract and romantic as “a lifetime of love” within such a logical formation. The 
refutation in the third verse is  equally  complex.  The first  six  lines could  be interpreted as  
dispelling  the  need  (“go  jump  in  the  lake”)  for  feigned  romantic  sentiments  (“R  is  a  
meaningless  concept”)  which  are  intended  only  to  increase  the  “odds”  of  success  in  the 
“chase” of a “girl hard to make”. This could be confirmed by the demand for logical perspicuity:  
“no  more  sticky  phrases”.  Yet,  “no  more  sticky  phrases”  is  precisely  the  line  taken  by  
Wittgenstein in TLP: “[e]verything that can be put into words can be put clearly” (§4.116). 
To  clarify:  the  argument  for romance  in  the  second  verse,  even  if  false,  brings 
Wittgenstein's text into play and insists that “We just mind our little P's / And Q's”, yet all the  
while employing vagaries and abstract language: “a lifetime of love” and “anything lovely you'd 
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care  to  infer  to”.  Meanwhile  the  rebuttal,  which  dismisses  the  Wittgenstein  reference  by  
stating “to hell with all your P's / And Q's” actually aligns with Wittgenstein, dismissing the  
abstract notions (“I prefer the hard and tangible things I can measure”) in pursuit of linguistic  
clarity (“no more sticky phrases”) and hedonistic pleasure (“there are birds, there are bees”) in 
a  lived-once  tangible  world.  The  former,  therefore,  constructs  an  environment  of  affect 
(however  mendacious)  that  supports  a  logical  model,  while  the latter  destroys  the  logical 
model while taking its conclusions; a crucial point for the upcoming arguments on erasure.
As the target of Pynchon's parody is an exemplar of the structural relations exposed by  
tautological  propositions,  it  is  fitting  to  evaluate  the critique in  the same sense.  The  first  
speaker issues an explicit invitation of hospitality, in order to attack and subvert the Tractatus. 
Meanwhile, the second speaker declares her overt hostility to the Wittgensteinian framework, 
while affirming the supposed “doctrines” within the work. The overall effect of this partisan 
structure of allegiance, hostile hospitality and hospitable hostility is, in the dual tautology of  
each speaker meaning, yet speaking, the opposite of their counterpart, to reveal this structure  
itself.
In 1974, Richard Patteson believed, as did almost every critic  of the time, that the  
structure of Pynchon's novel was a reiteration of the “ultimate limitations of knowledge” 69; 
according  to  Patteson,  Wittgenstein  is  there  simply  to  remind  us  that  the  solipsistic 
interpretative plotting of history is all that is the case.70 Yet, in Wittgenstein's text, the world is 
not all that is the case; “there are things that cannot be put into words […] They are what is  
mystical”  (§6.522)  and  the  domain-based  structure  of  V. shows  a  great  deal  about  the 
relationships of which the narrative does not speak. It might be tempting to say, as Plater does  
69 Patteson, ‘What Stencil Knew’, 30.
70 Ibid., 32.
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– although  not  with  any  specificity  –  that  Pynchon is  here  showing  what  cannot  be  said.  
Instead, it is what V. does, as opposed to can/cannot say. Indeed, there is a distinction made 
between saying and showing within V.'s presentation of Wittgenstein, but it remains unrelated 
to an epistemology bound in servitude to a new order of hermeneutics; instead it becomes, 
through  this  double-act  of  contradictions,  paired  to  form  tautologies,  woven  to  show  a 
structure  of  relationships,  a  Tractarian  mirror  of  the proscriptions  on metaphysical  ethical 
absolutism.
The Ethical (V. in Romance)
Wittgenstein's early work, in specifying whereof we ought, and ought not, to speak,  
contributes to both normative ethics and meta-ethics, Wittgenstein himself having written of 
TLP  that  “the  point  of  the  book  is  ethical”.71 In  the  concrete  specificity  of  its  dogmatic 
injunction, the  Tractatus  gives a substantive account of correct behaviour for philosophical 
discourse, derived from a logical stance; its contribution to normative ethics. On the other  
hand,  for  Wittgenstein,  the  “transcendental”  (§6.13)  nature  of  logic  reveals  that  “[a]ll  
propositions  are  of  equal  value”  (§6.4)  and  that  any  purposive  sense  cannot  be  deduced 
immanently; it “must lie outside the world” (§6.41). In Wittgenstein's account, “ethics cannot  
be put into words”  (§6.421),  for  ethical  propositions  correlate  to  no state of  affairs;  “it  is  
impossible for there to be propositions of ethics” (§6.42). Here, though, Russell's critique of 
Tractarian logical  formation  can  also  be  said  to  apply  to  Wittgenstein's  ethical 
pronouncements: “Mr. Wittgenstein manages to say a good deal about what cannot be said”.72
One of the conclusions that comes from Wittgenstein's writing on the ethical and the 
ineffable  is  that  the mystical  sensation derived from this  clear-cut  bounding – involving  a  
71 Wittgenstein, ‘Letters to Ludwig Ficker’, 94–95.
72 Russell, ‘Introduction’, xxiii.
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disregard for the theological logic of infinite regress – is to “[feel] the world as a limited whole”  
(TLP, §6.45); a romantically awe-struck stance towards the sublimity of creation: “[i]t is not  
how  things are in the world that is  mystical,  but  that  it  exists” (§6.44).  This  notion places 
Wittgenstein  within  a  specific  philosophical  and  literary  lineage.  One  of  the  most  glaring  
comparisons is  a  correlation to  the Hegelian infinite  as  exemplified in  the morality  of  the 
“ought”. In this reading the “all that is the case” world is, in actuality, a false infinite because, 
in accepting this infinite as a limited whole, an externality is acknowledged that lies beyond the  
bounds of expression: the true infinite. As Hegel puts it: “[w]hat is lost track of in this claim  
[that there are limits that cannot be transcended] is that something is already transcended by 
the very fact of being determined as a restriction”. Indeed, Hegel then goes on to speak of the  
“self  [that  is],  the  totality  that  transcends  the  determinateness  of  the  negation”.73 This 
interplay  is  also,  needless  to  say,  a  theme that  runs  through  the  work  of  the  Romantics,  
particularly Coleridge, who wrote in Biographia Literaria that imagination is “a repetition in the 
finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM”.74 The sentiments of Romanticism, 
as a generic term embracing the sublime, transcendence, experience, individualism and affect  
appear,  surprisingly,  at  the  conclusion  of  a  philosophical  work  on  logic.  M.W.  Rowe  and 
Richard Eldridge have both argued that Wittgenstein owed a debt to German Romanticism75 
and indeed, as shall be seen, whereof the  Tractatus speaks of mysticism, thereof it broadly 
speaks of Romanticism.
Pynchon also has a vexed relationship with Romanticism, best summarized through 
Judith Chambers' compelling argument that “Vineland has underscored the fact that a project 
of  repair  and recovery will  never  be as  seductive  as  the romantic  brutality  which did this  
73 Hegel, The Science of Logic, sec. 21.121–21.122; see also Norman, The Moral Philosophers, 121.
74 Coleridge, ‘Biographia Literaria’, 304; see also Barth, Romanticism and Transcendence, 1.
75 See Eldridge, Literature, Life and Modernity, 49–68.
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damage”.76 Indeed,  there  is  no  critical  consensus  on  Pynchon's  entanglement  with 
Romanticism. Following on from Arthur Mizener's early assessment,77 Kathryn Hume gives an 
account of the means by which Rilke's Sonnets to Orpheus (which Thomas Moore calls a “late 
transformation” of Romanticism78) plays out a new system of Heroics with which Pynchon is 
aligned79 while Joel Black sees Pynchon as a post-Romanticist excavating the Romantic, lost 
sub-strata that will teach Blicero of the “joy in falling”.80 Perhaps the most spurious argument 
on Pynchon's Romanticism is Alan Friedman and Manfred Puetz's use of Rilke to assert that 
Pynchon is aligned with the Nazi rocket scientist Wernher von Braun: “Pynchon's argument, 
however, is not  identical  to von Braun's”.81 Although in Kathleen Komar's  assessment Rilke 
does share the concept of “dying [as a] direct means of transcendence” with “his predecessors,  
the German Romantics”,82 all the evidence points to practically no identity between Pynchon 
and von Braun. Conversely, Moore presents Pynchon as demonstrating the misappropriation  
of  “Fichte,  Nietzsche  and  Wagner”  into  the  “Nazi  pantheon”  while  putting  forth  a  more 
“credible  thesis  […]  that  twentieth-century  German  conditions  issued  from  the  interplay 
between Volk-ish charisma and technologized rationality”.83 This final intersection will expand 
on this interpretation and conclude, as does every section in this chapter, with a collision of  
relativism and ethics. 
As David Cowart has noted,84 Pynchon's Romanticism in V. is explicitly articulated as a 
genre playing on a “single melody, banal and exasperating […]: 'the act of love and the act of 
death are one'” (410). This neatly ties in with the casting of the frequently quoted Rilke in the 
76 Chambers, ‘Parabolas and Parables’, 21.
77 Mizener, ‘The New Romance’.
78 Moore, The Style of Connectedness, 205.
79 Hume, Pynchon’s Mythography, 170–172.
80 Black, ‘Probing a Post-Romantic Paleontology’, 248.
81 Friedman and Puetz, ‘Science as Metaphor’, 71 my italics.
82 Komar, ‘Rethinking Rilke’s Duineser Elegien at the End of the Millennium’, 194.
83 Moore, The Style of Connectedness, 206–210.
84 Cowart, Thomas Pynchon: The Art of Allusion, 77.
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single-strand, love-death Blicero domain, which further resonates with Adorno's critique of 
“[t]he evil, in the neoromantic lyric”.85 “Once, only once” is an interplay of love and death for, 
although superficially appearing as a nihilistic stance, it is actually situated within a context of 
the affirmation that one life is  enough when the original is expanded. At last, though, amid 
Pynchon's systems, this is then brought back into line as a means for authority to temper  
subjects to ask for no more; one life is too much to lose.86 However, those critics who have 
asserted that Pynchon exhibits a critical moral perspective do so from a presumptive stance;  
as, indeed, this piece has done until now. To posit a moral condemnation, because a statement 
is made by a Nazi, fallaciously casts the reader's voice as the voice of the writer and assumes  
that the writer must share their hatred of Nazism, imperialism and murder. Indeed, if Pynchon 
has inherited one trait from an Eliotic lineage, it must be considered – albeit more frequently 
through Barthes – to be the depersonalization of the authorial presence. As one of the very 
earliest pieces of Pynchon criticism noted,87 it follows from this that there can be no direct 
ethical statement that could definitively pin down some aspect of intentionality: “[i]n times of  
crisis he preferred to sit in as voyeur” (V. 17).  What does emerge, however, is evidence that 
certain  cultural  outlooks  become  locked  in  their  own  unidirectional movements  towards 
death. In Pynchon, Romanticism is one such outlook. Pynchon does not present Nazism as a 
consequence of Romanticism suppressed, or employed, by rationality, but instead lays equal  
blame on both parties; rationality may attempt to write over Romanticism, but a Romanticism  
that takes this lying down must be deemed complicit in the march towards death. There is no  
place in Pynchon's fiction that would affirm this; no place where a narrator, completely free of  
irony, speaks on behalf of the novel and decries certain behaviours. There are places, however,  
85 Adorno’s critique of Rilke is brief, but sharp, accusing the poet of ‘fitting out the words with a 
theological overtone’: Adorno, The Jargon of Authenticity, 83–88.
86 For the first two of these points, see Moore, The Style of Connectedness, 205, while the latter is my 
own.
87 Levine, ‘Risking the Moment’, 120–121.
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where Pynchon, the man, writes outside the frame.
Two of Pynchon's non-fiction pieces can be cited in support of this view. On the means  
by which rationalisation leads to the death camps, Pynchon remarks, in the essay “Is it O.K. to  
be a Luddite?”, that “[i]t has taken no major gift of prophecy” to see how “the factory system – 
which, more than any piece of  machinery,  was the real  and major result  of  the Industrial  
Revolution – had been extended to include the Manhattan Project, the German long-range 
rocket program and the death camps, such as Auschwitz” (47-48). Pynchon further specifies a  
need to “insist on the miraculous” in fiction so as “to deny to the machine at least some of its  
claims  on  us”.  According  to  this  piece,  this  sentiment  is  best  embodied in  Mary  Shelley's  
Frankenstein; the epistolary framing of which is surely recapitulated in the narrative layering of 
Mason & Dixon. Pynchon believes in the rebellious power of this Romanticism so strongly that  
he writes “if there were such a genre as the Luddite novel, this one [ Frankenstein], warning of 
what can happen when technology, and those who practice it, get out of hand, would be the 
first and among the best” (45). Lest it be thought that this is merely a praise for the Gothic,  
Pynchon also appreciates the poetic space or gap between the knowledge of the technologized  
world and the experience of the poet, for Shelley “deal[s] in disguise” and refuses, despite 
critiquing science, to let the mechanical infect her work: “neither the method nor the creature  
that  results  is  mechanical”;  the  counter-science  “badass”  remains  an  organic  entity.  This 
Luddite sensibility is certainly present in Wittgenstein's thinking. In 1947 he remarked that:
It isn't absurd, e.g. to believe that the age of science and technology is the 
beginning of  the end  for  humanity;  that  the  idea  of  great  progress  is  a  
delusion, along with the idea that the truth will ultimately be known; that 
there  is  nothing  good  or  desirable  about  scientific  knowledge  and  that 
mankind, in seeking it, is falling into a trap (CV, 56).
The difference is  that  in  Wittgenstein's  early  work,  if  he  there  expresses  such a  view,  he  
attempts to derive it through the positivism that he decries.
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Looking back at Pynchon's historical record once more, though, it becomes clear that in 
a Ford Foundation grant application88 the early Pynchon “identifies himself as one who has 
dabbled for short spans of time with a contemporary Romantic view, only to swing back […] to  
a  'classical'  outlook”89 and  also  as  “fully  disaffected  with  the  Byronic  romanticism  of  the 
Beats”.90 In short, in decrying the means by which a “concrete dedication to abstract conditions 
results  in unpleasant things like wars”,91 Pynchon actually  aligns himself  with the Byron of 
182092 and sees “Romanticism and Classicism – locked in a great war”.93 This bipolar fluctuation 
towards and away from the Romantic has spanned Pynchon's entire career; he believes that on 
the one hand, the Romantic ideal has the power to draw out an individualised experience of  
beauty while on the other it has the capacity to incite aggressive nationalism.
Romanticism,  however,  is  multiple;  as  Duncan  Wu  puts  it:  the  term  itself  “has 
remained fluid” and resists coherence.94 Certainly, this Luddite tendency is only one aspect of 
Romanticism, yet in Pynchon's contextualisation it appears to act as a metonymic signpost for  
the whole. Pynchon's Luddite essay concludes with a new prophecy (“you heard it here first”) 
that,  in  our  so-called  “computer  age”,  Luddite  sensibility  will  be  embedded  within  the 
technological culture it opposes; forced to adopt a belief in the miracles of the machine itself 
to “cure cancer, save ourselves from nuclear extinction, grow food for everybody, detoxify the 
results  of  industrial  greed gone berserk  –  realize  all  the  wistful  pipe dreams of  our  days” 
(48-49). Although, “Blake's dark Satanic mills represented an old magic that, like Satan, had 
fallen from grace” (46),  here,  the belief  in true miracles is  being pushed further back.  For 
88 The scholarship on which I owe to Steven Weisenburger.
89 Weisenburger, ‘Thomas Pynchon’, 696.
90 Ibid., 697.
91 Ibid., 695.
92 See Wu, ‘Introduction’, xxx.
93 Weisenburger, ‘Thomas Pynchon’, 697.
94 Wu, ‘Introduction’, xxx.
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Pynchon,  if  Luddites/Romantics  admit  the  beast  into  their  own house,  they  are  internally  
compromised.
What emerges from this reading is that “Romanticism” can take the rap in Pynchon 
because the terminology is insufficiently defined over a historical context; it is a term of fluidity 
that once signified rebellion and now signals collusion. For every Hannah Arendt who sees a  
political Romanticism in 1870s Germany prizing the individual above all,95 there is a proponent 
of Dark Romanticism in Frankenstein, “The Tell- Tale Heart” and Moby Dick with an “isolated 
self  […]  pressing  onward  despite  […]  an  internal  evil”;96 a  “Romanticism  that  forgot  the 
Peasant's War” in the terms of Ernst Bloch.97 Whether Pynchon's notion of Romanticism is fair 
must now be put to rest, though; it is in this terminology of a compromised Romanticism that I  
will now turn full attention to V.
The foremost representation of this compromised Romanticism lies in the sloganeering 
of the now infamous98 McClintic Sphere. Amid contemplations on his group's “signature” tune,  
“Set/Reset”, Sphere realises that human emotion must be restricted for the good of society. As  
he puts it to “Ruby” (Paola Maijstral):
“Ruby, what happened after the war? That war, the world flipped. But come 
'45, and they flopped. Here in Harlem they flopped. Everything got cool – no 
love, no hate, no worries, no excitement. Every once in a while,  though,  
somebody flips back. Back to where he can love...”
“Maybe that's it,” the girl said, after a while. “Maybe you have to be crazy to  
love somebody.”
“But you take a whole bunch of people flip at the same time and you've got 
a war. Now war is not loving, is it?” (V., 293).
The presentation of the Romantic sentiments of redeeming, transcendent love in this passage 
95 Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 165–170.
96 Thompson, ‘Introduction’.
97 Bloch, The Spirit of Utopia, 2.
98 See Herman and Krafft, ‘Fast Learner’, 6.
55
cannot be overlooked. The individualist concept of the Romantic hero (again, like Byron, we  
may “want a hero”,99 but all we get is Profane: “[n]othing heroic about a schlemihl” (V., 288)) is 
here  unworked  to  show  that  it  depends  upon  an  impassioned  minority,  the  occasional 
“somebody” who “flips back”  and is  redeemed,  while  the majority  must  remain bound to 
lobotomy in the name of peace; the act of death and the act of love are one. The dispossessed,  
“[h]ere in Harlem”, remain “flopped” in a displacement economy of the privileged few which 
will feature later in Gravity's Rainbow under a Calvinist rhetoric. This displacement and erasure 
aspect  of  Romantic  poetry  has  not  gone  unnoticed  by  the  academy,  where  it  became  a 
canonised critique of Wordsworth's “Tintern Abbey” in the 1980s and 1990s; a poetry that  
relegated the smoke and factories to a corner and “'displaced' and 'erased' its local, historical  
moment in order to secure an ideal image of self and nature”.100 To turn back to Pynchon, 
though, the model of individualist passion presented here is clearly compromised. In lieu of  
maintaining a protesting hope that miracles might occur, this mindset has already accepted the 
oppressive logic that individualism, en masse, can lead only to war and that the solution is to 
embrace the numbing similarity between the “flip and flop” of both “a musician's” and “a  
computer's” brain, settling for the glib, perhaps meaningless, reassurance of a compromised 
jazz man: “keep cool, but care” (266).
This section appears, of course, within a linear narrative progression through which the 
character “domains” cross-cut.  If,  in many senses,  Pynchon encourages readings that forge  
connections  against  linearity,  it  must  also  be  accepted  that  Pynchon's  novels  exploit  the 
unidirectionality  of  reading.  This  can  be  seen  clearly  in  the  fact  that  this  extract  directly 
precedes  Shoenmaker's  attempts  to  surgically  transform  Esther  into  his  idealised  version.  
Through plastic surgery, Schoenmaker seeks “the beautiful girl inside”, “the idea of Esther”,  
99 Byron, ‘Don Juan’, 9.
100 See Roe, The Politics of Nature, 166–171.
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which he justifies as a “kind of Platonism” (294-296), with clear resonance for Frenesi's search  
for a “real” Brock Vond later in Vineland (VL, 216). The final portion of this contained unit is the 
shift to Profane's, now “imaginary”, conversation with SHROUD about Auschwitz (295). When 
Profane suggests that the Holocaust was a freak occurrence (“Hitler did that. He was crazy”),  
SHROUD replies that the new logic of obliteration does not admit the lexicon of non-socially 
constructed mental illness: “[h]as it occurred to you there may be no more standards for crazy  
or sane […]?” This sudden link back to Ruby's speculation on love and craziness confirms the  
sequence of Sphere/Ruby, Schoenmaker/Esther, Profane/SHROUD as an atomised unit from 
which  emerges  a  condensed  narrative  of  the  Romantic  lineage.  Reductively  plotted:  in  
Pynchon,  from  the  Luddite  sensibilities  of  true,  rebellious  Romanticism,  we  move  to  a 
compromised Romanticism, to a Platonic idealism, to the death camps.
Compromised Critique
Once  again,  Pynchon  demonstrates  a  hostility  to  Tractarian-affiliated  concepts, 
invoked by a means of literary reference that pulls in a related concept (Romanticism) only to  
tear it down through a revelation within the novel's structural underpinnings. The finality of  
this  condemnation of  Wittgenstein is,  however,  enshrined in a moment of  erasure.  Rachel  
Owlglass,  speaking  to  the  unemployed,  recent  initiate  of  dope-culture,  Benny  Profane, 
expresses disdain for the passive nature of the Whole Sick Crew: “that Crew does not live, it  
experiences. It does not create, it talks about people who do. Varèse, Ionesco, de Kooning,  
Wittgenstein, I could puke” (380). Suddenly, if we take this at face value, Pynchon presents 
Wittgenstein in a tree of creators; admirable thinkers and artists when, earlier, all that had 
been given was critique.
Yet,  who is  speaking? Rachel  Owlglass  is  a  conflicted character  who has  an  erotic 
encounter  with  her  car  (28-29),  but  who is  “disgusted”  by  Jewish  girls  undergoing  plastic  
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surgery to erase their Jewishness (45), and, most prominently, is the chief protagonist in the 
campaign to intercept Esther and Slab on their way to a Cuban abortion clinic. As before, at a  
structural level the abortion fund in  V. is strongly connected to the theme of Nazism under 
critique.
This is first raised in Esther's opinion on the abortion debate. In what could be perhaps  
seen as an offline instance of Godwin's Law,101 she nevertheless advocates:
“It's murdering your own child, is what it is.”
“Child, schmild. A complex protein molecule, is all.” [said Slab]
“I guess on the rare occasions you bathe you wouldn't mind using Nazi soap 
made from one of those six million Jews” (354).
This  is  furthered when the final  part  of  the unwilling  abortion  fund is  donated by  Fergus  
Mixolydian, “who has just received a Ford Foundation grant”102 (355) that is explicitly linked to 
the anti-Semitic Protocols of the Elders of Zion forgery (360). It is, however, not so much the 
issue  of  abortion  but  the  right  of  the  individual  to  choose  self-consistency  that  is  being 
highlighted here; Esther is being forced to compromise her standpoint. Indeed, though, the 
Whole  Sick  Crew  is  infected  by  the  culture  against  which  it  is  supposed  to  stand  as  a  
subculture. As Roony Winsome phrases it:
“Listen friends,” Winsome said, “there is a word for all our crew and it is sick 
[...]
“Fergus Mixolydian the Irish Armenian Jew takes money from a Foundation 
named after a man who spent millions trying to prove thirteen rabbis rule 
the world. Fergus sees nothing wrong there.
Esther Harvitz pays to get the body she was born with altered and then falls  
deeply in love with the man who mutilated her. Esther sees nothing wrong 
either.
“[…] Anybody who continues to live in a subculture so demonstrably sick has 
101 ‘As an online discussion grows longer, the probability of a comparison involving Nazis or Hitler 
approaches one.’ See: Godwin, ‘Meme, Counter-Meme’.
102 The very grant for which Pynchon applied.
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no right to call himself well” (360-361).
Rachel Owlglass claims, eventually, that she has moved beyond the logic of the Crew, splitting  
up with Slab because: “[t]he Crew lost all glamour for me, I grew up” (358).
Wittgenstein's  TLP  is itself an infiltrated text. From a rigorously positivist outlook, it  
deduces that the bounds of knowledge must sit aligned with the bounds of language. We will,  
under Wittgenstein's  model,  never  speak meaningfully  or sensibly of  the mystical,  sublime 
wonder  that  could  explain  how  our  reality  exists.  Pynchon  appears,  in  V.,  to  deride 
Wittgenstein's approach, while exploring the historical lineage of his (Romantic) conclusion. As  
the elements of logical positivism and Romanticism are critiqued as part and parcel  of the  
rationalisation and nationalism that led to the atrocities of the Holocaust, it is amid the context 
of a character who “grew up” that we are finally given a positive appraisal of Wittgenstein. In  
many ways, Esther kicks away her formative ladders in order to approach a stance of some  
coherence.
However,  Pynchon's  scathing  critique  of  early  Wittgenstein  remains  in  flux.  In  his  
non-fiction  writing,  he  has  issued  high  praise  for  a  principled  novel  that  imagines  a 
“countercritter” big enough and bad enough to take on the system, without the writing itself  
succumbing to the terminology of the system under critique. As also illustrated by the Luddite 
essay, we are now in too deep. If we take Pynchon at his word in the introduction to  Slow 
Learner, the novel of which he is least fond is The Crying of Lot 49. Is it coincidental that this 
was, at the time of writing, his only novel set in the contemporary era; the one critique that  
embedded so much of its target explicitly within itself? Pynchon's solution for a novel that  
opposes relentless rationalisation is not to retreat into an uncompromised Romanticism; the  
time of innocence has passed. Instead Pynchon writes it twice, once to score the point and  
once to score the point out. As shall now be shown, Pynchon adopts a Tractarian methodology 
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of writing-over, a methodology of writing under erasure. This structure works in an entirely  
different way to an ethics of relativism and absolutism; it is the third way. Rather than posit a  
relativism, it determinedly presents a stance. Rather than positing an absolutism, it scores out  
the determined position and presents counter-stances.
60
Language Games: New Wittgenstein, The Crying of Lot 49 and 
Inherent Vice
“never the central truth itself [...] which must always blaze out, destroying 
its own message irreversibly”
 – Thomas Pynchon, The Crying of Lot 49103
In the mid 1980s, a new wave of Wittgenstein criticism emerged that did not sit well  
with the orthodoxy.104 The New Wittgensteinian interpretation was conceived to bridge the 
chasm of early and late, but as already covered in the introduction, many critics, such as P.M.S. 
Hacker, saw it as an interpretation devoid of methodological rigour and lacking historical fact. 
While the New Wittgensteinian reading surfaces at the zenith of postmodernism – and, despite  
having existed as an undercurrent for many years beforehand, it is distinctly of its time – the  
technique of ascending a logical ladder to reach a conclusion, only to discard the ladder, has  
featured in the linguistics and politics of all Pynchon's novels. Hanjo Berressem has already  
noted this phenomenon and termed it “autodestruction”105 while Katalin Orbań has referred to 
it  as “overwriting”.106 Yet, although Orbán's  phrasing is  closer, such a terminology does not 
admit the inadequacy of the “destruction” in a literary context. A true literary destruction is  
one that never entered the published text at all; an excised “Fresca” from The Fire Sermon, a 
politicising McClintic Sphere from the V. typescript. What then would be the impact of erasure 
in full sight? A proof that shows its workings? An architect's drawing retaining construction  
lines? Perhaps a means towards non-identitarian thought?
103 TCoL49, 66.
104 See Hacker, ‘Was He Trying to Whistle It?’.
105 Berressem, Pynchon’s Poetics, 244.
106 Orbań, Ethical Diversions, 116.
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This section will examine the impact of Pynchon's overwriting with reference to the 
already-considered  political  context:  the  rise  of  fascism,  the  Holocaust  and  an  ethics  of  
representation  that  hinges  upon  an  absolutism/relativism  dichotomy.  Pynchon's  shortest 
novel,  The  Crying  of  Lot  49,  is  an  atomised  example  of  how  Pynchon  linguistically  and 
structurally re-works New Wittgensteinian logic in his texts. From this investigation it will be  
shown  that  this  New  Wittgensteinian  mode  culminates  in  an  ethics  of  multiplicity  and 
self-devaluation in which the uniqueness of the Other emerges while reconciling Pynchon, to 
some degree, with early Wittgenstein.
Linguistic and Structural New Wittgensteinian Forms in The 
Crying of Lot 49
If  we  are  to  take  Pynchon's  Slow  Learner  introduction  at  face  value,  he  regrets 
publishing The Crying of Lot 49 (SL, 22), referring to the work as a “potboiler” and a “piece of 
shit” in his editorial correspondence.107 Yet, however watered-down the “essence of Pynchon” 
contained therein, TCoL49 does provide an exemplary model for the examination of Pynchon's 
literary structure; it is key for analysis of any “central truth itself [...] which must always blaze 
out, destroying its own message irreversibly” (TCoL49, 66).
To begin, then: The Crying of Lot 49 is, syntactically, still an extremely challenging read. 
I assert that the primary reason for this is linked to Pynchon's mode of over-writing and lurks  
initially within prepositional specifications of direction within the work. Consider this passage 
in the very opening pages of TCoL49:
She tried to think back to whether anything unusual had happened around 
then. Through the rest of the afternoon, through her trip to the market in 
downtown Kinneret-Among-The-Pines to buy ricotta and listen to the Muzak 
(today she came through the bead-curtained entrance around bar 4 of the 
Fort Wayne Settecento Ensemble's variorum recording of the Vivaldi Kazoo 
107 Gussow, ‘Pynchon’s Letters Nudge His Mask’; Rolls, ‘Pynchon, in His Absence’, note 11.
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Concerto, Boyd Beaver, soloist); then through the sunned gathering of her 
marjoram and sweet basil from the herb garden, reading of book reviews in  
the latest Scientific American, into the layering of a lasagna, garlicking of a 
bread, tearing up of romaine leaves, eventually, oven on, into the mixing of 
the  twilight's  whiskey  sours  against  the  arrival  of  her  husband,  Wendell  
("Mucho")  Maas  from  work,  she  wondered,  wondered,  shuffling  back 
through a fat deckful of days which seemed (wouldn't she be first to admit 
it?)  more  or  less  identical,  or  all  pointing  the  same  way  subtly  like  a 
conjurer's deck, any odd one readily clear to a trained eye (6).
This passage serves as an excellent mise-en-abîme for much of Pynchon's fiction, featuring, as 
it does: classical music played on the Kazoo, digressive asides, characters who accrue only a 
single mention before disappearing and a syntax that is difficult to parse. Interspersed in this  
passage are no fewer than three instances of “through”, two appearances of “into” before a 
turnaround: “back”.
This  “through […]  through […] then through […]  into […]  into […]  against  […]  back 
through” sequence gives a rationale for the sentence's difficulty.  The first five prepositions  
carry connotations of forward movement, rapidity, involvement and progress. As with much of 
Oedipa's investigative unravelling, it falsely appears that she might be getting somewhere; she  
“knows a few things” (75). With each additional “through” and “into”, the pace of the sentence  
gathers.  Despite  the  stalling  “against”  moment  before,  which  introduces  the  first  hint  of 
oppositional tension, it comes as a surprise when the central active verb within this extract  
(“wondered”)  reverses  the  flow  of  the  sentence  by  omitting  the  anticipated  conjunction  
(“whether” or “if”) that would begin an interrogative content clause. Instead, Pynchon forces a  
back reference to the antecedent sentence: “[s]he tried to think back to whether anything 
unusual had happened around then”. The final temporal locative adverb in this sentence refers  
back further to “a year ago”, which must be construed relatively from the book's very first,  
nondescript, clause: “[o]ne summer afternoon” (5). There is no subsequent forward motion in 
this extract, only a reversal, a “shuffling back through” the card deck of days, searching for the 
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oddity. Indeed, this reversal continues throughout the entire novel, which contains, despite 
the initial pages bulging with forward throughness, a grand total of 75 occurrences of the word  
“through” compared to 131 instances of “back”; an average for the latter of over one use per 
page in the edition here cited.
It is possible to see this as metatextual metonymy for the uninspired interpretation of 
TCoL49 as an inverse detective novel; the more one reads, the less one supposedly knows, in 
parallel  with  the  central  character.  Yet,  if  this  linguistic  overwriting  is  to  be  seen  as  
representative of the totality within which it is enclosed, it makes more sense to regard it, at 
least in part, as a  Tractarian structure in the New Wittgensteinian tradition. The first hint of 
such a form comes at the beginning of Chapter Three when it is declared that “[i]f one object  
behind her discovery of what she was to label the Tristero System […] were to bring to an end  
her encapsulation in her tower, then that night's infidelity with Metzger would logically be the  
starting point for it; logically” (TCoL49, 29). On consideration, this is a curious statement; the 
true logical starting point would be to regress further and state that Pierce Inverarity's naming  
of Oedipa as executrix, or even his death, would be the logical starting point as these are 
narrated within the novel. However, neither of these is Oedipa's starting point, it is instead her  
encounter with Metzger, which doesn't take place until the second of the novel's six chapters.  
If the reader is supposed to identify with Oedipa's tripartite choice of a secret underworld, a  
personal conspiracy against her, or insanity, then it must be noted that everything before the 
“logical starting point” (section 2) is excluded from the paranoid swirl and are remarks that can 
be taken seriously. This bears a strong similarity to the New Wittgenstein; as Diamond puts it:  
“[t]he frame of the book contains instructions, as it were, for us as readers of it”.108
Furthermore, it seems that the only explicit revelation of Pynchon's novel is that the 
108 Diamond, ‘Ethics, Imagination and the Method of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus’, 151.
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reader will receive no revelation. In the New Wittgensteinian reading, the closing portion of  
the frame is missing. Pynchon will not specify – as with Wallace's Wittgensteinian The Broom  
of the System – any resolution; “certain events will not be shown onstage” (TCoL49, 48). Yet 
the reader knows, by the six chapters of the book, where it should fall. It should be, as with the  
novel's  An Account of the Singular Peregrinations of Dr Diocletian Blobb among the Italians,  
Illuminated with Exemplary Tales from the True History of  That Outlandish and Fantastical  
Race, and as with the Tractatus, “around Chapter Seven” (TCoL49, 108).
While  Oedipa's  required  information  actually  appears  in  Chapter  Eight  of  the 
mise-en-abîme text, implying that however far one searches for a revelation, there will always  
be a further level that could meta-explicate a deeper stage, this realisation brings a twofold 
contradiction into play  as  regards  “postmodernism”.  P.M.S.  Hacker,  in  his  critique of  New  
Wittgensteinian methodology calls Cora Diamond's reading the “post-modernist defence”.109 
Yet, contrary to those sceptical readings of postmodernism as a discourse that proliferates into  
an endless, ambiguous plurality, the criticism levelled by Hacker is that this “'deconstructive' 
interpretation”  –  which  he  implies  means  a  disregard  for  authorial  intent110 –  ends  up 
“dismissing  the  philosophical  insights  that  [the  Tractatus]  contains”.111 In  short,  Hacker's 
critique here is that the postmodernist interpretation closes down meaning to the extent of 
saying nothing, as opposed to the more common charge that it proliferates in an attempt to 
say  everything.  The  question  is  one  of  function;  if  adopting,  in  part,  a  structural  
postmodernism  of  the  limiting  New  Wittgensteinian  form  and,  in  part,  a  pluralised  
postmodernism, where on the spectrum of being able to speak do Pynchon's texts sit?
109 Hacker, ‘Was He Trying to Whistle It?’, 356.
110 Ibid., 384 note 22.
111 Ibid., 359.
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Whereof We Can Speak
Two of the choices presented to Oedipa – a conspiracy specifically designed to fool her, 
or  her  own  insanity  – would  lead  to  a  reading  of  TCoL49 that  is  similar  to  Diamond's 
interpretation  of  Wittgenstein;  the  reader  must  dismiss  everything  except  the  frame  as 
nonsense.  Contrary  to  the  orthodoxy  –  which  holds  that  the  well-formed,  if  senseless,  
propositions of logic are capable of  showing the truths that they cannot say112 through their 
own structural relations – the New Wittgensteinian interpretation states that the  Tractatus  
exhibits plain nonsense throughout the text in order to treat it as a form of anti-philosophical  
therapy. Given the structural similarities between Pynchon's work and a New Wittgensteinian 
interpretation of  the  Tractatus,  and in  spite  of  the hostility  already covered,  it  is  not  too 
far-fetched to suggest that  TCoL49  could manage to  say, or structurally  show other aspects 
that Wittgenstein believed to be ineffable, the most interesting of which is ethics.
Beginning with what, if any, ethical or political sentiments are set out in the novel, it 
would be easy to lapse into the absolute relativism that at one point surfaced in the reading of  
V.113 Indeed, Katalin  Orbán has pointed out,  among many others,  that Pynchon's “narrative 
voice rarely judges any of the horrors it recounts”.114 However, TCoL49 is also firmly tethered 
to its environment of 1960s America. As Scott MacFarlane notes, Oedipa is a “self-described 
young republican”115 who, despite being “politically conservative” also “takes lovers outside 
her marriage, cavorts with The Paranoids – a young, pot-smoking, Beatles wannabe garage 
band”  –  but  who,  ultimately,  “refuses  to  be  part  of  her  Freudian  psychologist's 
experimentations with LSD”.116 However, amid the Tristero as a “metaphor of God knew how 
112 Ibid., 353–355.
113 See above p. 51.
114 Orbań, Ethical Diversions, 151.
115 MacFarlane, The Hippie Narrative, 58.
116 Ibid., 59.
66
many parts” some certainty can be found in the politico-economic implications of the system  
(TCoL49, 75). This most prominently comes to the fore in Oedipa's initial discussion with Mike 
Fallopian, a member of the right-wing Peter Pinguid Society. This passage will be examined in 
order to show the bidirectional oscillation and over-writing that takes place with regard to 
Pinguid's ethico-political situation.
The  fictional  PPS  was,  according  to  Pynchon's  text,  founded to  commemorate  the 
eponymous  captain  of  a  Confederate  man-of-war.  En-route  to  launch  an  assault  on  San  
Francisco,  Pynchon's  Pinguid  encountered  a  Russian  vessel  under  the  command  of  Rear 
Admiral Popov – sent to prevent Anglo-Franco assistance to the Confederacy – and they may  
or may not have fired at one another (32-33).  Much of this historical scenario is accurate;  
Popov really was sent to the West Coast in order to show a Russian presence to the British and  
French. Indeed, along “with his squadron, consisting of the corvettes Bogatir, Kalevala, Rinda, 
and  Novik, the clippers  Abrek and  Gaidamak”, Popov “anchored in San Francisco harbor on 
October 12”, 1863.117 However, as J. Kerry Grant has pointed out, the name Peter Pinguid is a 
barely  disguised substitute for  “greasy  prick”,  which could certainly be a comment on the 
right-wing nature of the organisation.118 Pinguid is firstly cast as a right-wing Confederate with 
an obscenity for a name. Yet, the presentation of political alignments within this organization is 
stratified many layers deep. The first such hint of this is that the “9 th March, 1864” is “a day 
now held sacred by all Peter Pinguid Society members” (32). This date was actually marked in 
Civil War history as the day of Ulysses S. Grant's appointment as Lieutenant-General of the 
United States,119 a crucial legislative move in his subsequent promotion to General-in-Chief. 120 
117 For information on historical sources, see Eve, ‘Historical Sources for Pynchon’s Peter Pinguid 
Society’.
118 Grant, A Companion to The Crying of Lot 49, 59–60.
119 Date confirmed by both Catton, Grant Takes Command, 125–126; and Grant himself Grant, Personal 
Memoirs of U.S. Grant, 2:116.
120 For details on the technical legality of the position, see Catton, Grant Takes Command, 117–123, 
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In  reality,  the date  celebrated by  the PPS  is  a  date  of  significance for  the Union  not  the 
Confederacy. Pinguid's Confederate credentials are cast into historical doubt as his followers 
commemorate a day crucial in the Union victory. Furthermore, this US-Russian situation not 
only implies but directly moves into the communist-capitalist dichotomy that fuelled the Cold 
War.
Economically,  Pynchon  here  equates  “left-wing”  directly  with  Russian  communism. 
This is effected through a conflation of slavery with capitalism and freedom with communism,  
however  simplistic  the  model.  Pynchon  achieves  this  by  stationing  Pinguid  as  the  “first  
casualty” in the “military confrontation between Russia and America”, instead of John Birch 
(“[n]ot the fanatic our more left-leaning friends over in the Birch Society chose to martyrize”  
(33)).  This firmly establishes Pinguid as an American capitalist figure; John Birch, whom he 
replaces, was killed in an exchange with Chinese communists, often regarded, therefore, as the 
first death of the Cold War.121 Pynchon then proceeds to exhibit the “abolitionist” tendencies 
of Russia when Tsar “Nicholas122 [...] freed the serfs in 1861” in contrast to Pinguid who saw “a 
Union that paid lip-service to abolition while it kept its own industrial labourers in a kind of  
wage-slavery” (33). Pinguid is drawn back towards a Confederate stance that promotes slavery,  
but that also critiques capitalism. Indeed, Metzger spots this inconsistency: “that sounds […]  
like  he  was  against  industrial  capitalism.  Wouldn't  that  disqualify  him  as  any  kind  of 
anti-Communist figure?” (33). This mention of communism is abruptly introduced and works 
on the assumption that to be anti-Communist,  one must be pro-Capitalist.  Fallopian states 
that, in actuality, Pinguid was opposed to “industrial capitalism” because “it [led], inevitably, to  
especially 122.
121 A perfect example of the ‘fanaticism’ under fire here is the sensationalist biography: Hefley and 
Hefley, The Secret File on John Birch.
122 Pynchon’s error. This should be ‘Alexander’. See Nicholson and Stevenson, The Crying of Lot 49: York 
Notes, 30.
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Marxism”  (33).  Pinguid  is  cast  as  an  anti-Marxist  who  nevertheless  deploys  a  historical 
materialism,  seeing  industrial  capitalism  as  the  route  to  a  further  stage  in  the  historical  
dialectic.123 Finally, Pinguid is revealed to be anti-“Industrial  anything”. This is a stance that 
purports to go beyond dialectic to reveal an “underlying truth” not predicated on “[g]ood guys  
and bad guys” (33). However, perhaps the industrial impact of Eli Whitney's cotton gin and its 
contribution to the economic viability of slavery must also be considered given the antipathy 
towards slavery that Pynchon will later demonstrate in Mason & Dixon.124
The economics of the free-market system are similarly troubled through the W.A.S.T.E. 
system posited by Pynchon's  novel.  The U.S.  constitution enshrines,  in  Article I,  section 8,  
Clause 7, the right of the government to establish post offices and postal routes. In simplistic 
terms, it is evident that W.A.S.T.E. is affiliated with a right-wing neo-liberal economics that 
encourages competition and diversity of service in a bid to implement trickle-down policies.  
However, in TCoL49, the network is used by those who are either doubly politically affiliated or 
politically outcast: the Peter Pinguid Society; a “facially deformed welder, who cherished his 
ugliness”;  a live child  who longs for his  own pre-natal  abortion; a  black woman who goes  
through “rituals of miscarriage” and a voyeur who does not know the object of his voyeurism,  
among others (85). Each of these instances of W.A.S.T.E. users works by firstly establishing a 
characterisation that is expected and stereotyped: the right-wing Confederate slave holder; 
the self-loathing of the deformed; the happy child skipping in the day time; the voyeur with his  
specific  fetish.  Yet  Pynchon  delivers  images  that  startle  because  they  acknowledge  the 
existence  of  these  stereotypes  and  then  query  their  internal  structural  validity:  a  Young  
Republican who plays fast and loose with supposed Republican moral values; a Confederate 
123 The most compact summary of Marx’s historical modes of production can be found in Marx, A 
Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, 21.
124 Rhodes, History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850, 25–27; a reassessment of this 
stance can be found in Lakwete, Inventing the Cotton Gin.
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society that celebrates a day of historic value for the Union and shuns capitalism because, in a  
historical materialistic sense, it leads to Marxism. W.A.S.T.E. is another political system where  
Right  and  Left  overrule  each  other  so  frequently  that  their  own  constructions  become 
ridiculous; a reductio argument similar to the compromised Whole Sick Crew in V.
As with all the evidence Oedipa uncovers there is an element of contradiction in this 
overwriting. Yet, this perception of hypocrisy comes about from a presumption of linear time.  
Constant  fluctuation  and  over-writing  within  TCoL49 is  an  early  attempt  to  put  forth  the 
assertion raised in Against the Day that perhaps “linear progression [was] not at all the point, 
with everything happening simultaneously at every part of the circuit” (AtD, 112). As with the 
inadequate  definition  of  character  previously  discussed  as  regards  Weissmann,  a  further 
deficiency can be advanced here. It is usually expected that, if characters are to be symbolic or  
significatory, it should be clear as to the ethical and moral positions they represent. While in  
general,  Pynchon's characterization moves away from standard mimesis,  in this  respect he  
approaches, at a tangent, a form of realism. In a distinctly Whitmanesque mode, Pynchon's 
characters and political situations contain multitudes. To arrive at a singularity, a finality, is to 
come to a curious conclusion: linear time, in asserting the existence of a single state of affairs,  
within an always-at-the-end contemporary temporality, must, by virtue of its spatio-temporal  
configuration, insist upon the truth of its unity. All  that is the case. However, to possess a 
feeling of historicity is to understand the complex socio-political circumstances that contribute 
to an environment, no matter how contradictory. Linear time destroys this sense of history.
Mixed Feelings About History
Following from this, the reasons for traditional orthodox scholarship's disquiet with the 
New Wittgensteinian reading can be put a little more clearly: they seek to preserve a linearity  
of thought within a cause and effect paradigm that is incompatible with the New Wittgenstein.  
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However, as Hacker has taken the liberty of pointing out the flaws in Diamond's argument so  
thoroughly, it is only fair to offer a passage from the beginning of  TLP that seems to show 
Wittgenstein dismissing the purely positivist, progressive nature for philosophy that Hacker 
would attribute: “[p]erhaps this book will be understood only by someone who has himself  
already had the thoughts that are expressed in it” (3). The counter-intuitive non-linearity of 
such a statement runs entirely against the notion of a time-knowledge graph wherein each 
delta-T could enlighten.  Instead, a  calculus is  needed that could measure the surface area 
beneath such a line; the historicity hypocritically hidden when the line is the privileged focus.
 This theme is explored most clearly  in Pynchon's latest novel,  Inherent Vice,  which 
presents the theme of political erasure with the greatest clarity. The novel's epigraph, credited  
to “GRAFFITO, PARIS, MAY 1968”, exhibits a chronology of overwriting, echoing the slogans of  
May  '68:  “[u]nder  the  paving  stones,  the  beach!”  As  with  TCoL49,  the  linguistic  trend  of 
forward motion overwritten by a backwards facing reversal  is  emphasised in the very first  
sentence, which moves from “along” and “up”, to “back” and “the way she always used to”:  
“[s]he came along the alley and up the back steps the way she always used to” (1). However,  
the most notorious signal that Pynchon is deploying the same techniques of erasure used in 
TCoL49 is in the treatment of the V.-like125 entity, The Golden Fang; it is “what they call many 
things to many folks” (159).
The Golden Fang begins life in the text as a mysterious schooner, involved in several 
anti-communist operations, originally christened  Preserved as a survivor of the 1917 Halifax 
Harbour explosion (92, 95). However, Doc's certainty on this is soon erased as he learns that, in 
the experience of Jason Velveeta, the Golden Fang is actually an “Indochinese heroin cartel”  
(159). Again lingering on this interpretation for only the shortest of moments, Doc stumbles  
125 The un-italicised “V.” here referring to the eponymous object/person within Pynchon's first novel.
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(via a Ouija board prediction) upon a building bearing an architectural rendition of a golden 
fang  and  purportedly  occupied  by  a  “syndicate”  of  which  most  members  “happen  to  be  
dentists” (168-169). Indeed, Tito Staverou also confirms the Greek translation of Chryskylodon  
– supposedly a private mental healthcare facility – as “a gold tooth” (185).  The inclination 
when reading this is to deduce that, owing to the chronology, the previous source must have 
been mistaken; the voice of Suancho Smilax is superseded by Jason Velveeta, Coy Harlington, 
Tito Staverou or Dr. Blatnoyd. However, as IV puts it: “[q]uestions arose. Like, what in the fuck 
was going on here, basically. […] And would this be multiple choice?” (340). The answer is  
multiple, but it is not a choice.
While these developments, in terms of narrative chronology, overwrite one another, 
Pynchon complicates  the situation by ensuring  that  each entity behind the name “Golden  
Fang” retains its own independent existence. Indeed, one of the final scenes within the novel  
focuses upon the first “definition” of the term: the schooner (357-359). Hence, the voices that 
speak of the Golden Fang speak over one another in only one sense. In another, they speak  
together, in discord, but in a symphony of simultaneous polyphony. Such polyphony provides, 
as Sauncho realises, a deeper truth than a narrative of unity: “but suppose we hadn't come  
out. There'd be only the government story” (359).
It is in this counter-governmental polyphony that Pynchon's texts manage to find terra  
firma – particularly in their treatment of anarchism. At a basic level,  Against the Day makes 
direct reference to a substantial number of prominent historical anarchists; Benjamin Tucker 
(370), Leon Czolgosz (372), Mikhail Bakunin, Peter Kropotkin (373), Jean-Baptiste Sipido (528), 
Gaetano  Bresci  and  Luigi  Lucheni  (739),  among  others.  However,  in  Pynchon's  text  the  
environment serves  not as  a depiction of  the anarchist  West  in  the realist  tradition – the 
absurd conflation of genre parodies reveals as much – but instead as a depiction of a depiction,  
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the  eponymous  contre-jour  photographic technique.  In  this  mode,  Pynchon dispels  Daniel 
DeLeon's “cartoon image of the anarchist as a shaggy-headed Frankenstein's monster with a 
crazed glint in his eyes, loaded down with an armful of bombs” by presenting that very same 
cartoon image and labelling it as such.126 Indeed, Lew Basnight finds himself unable to reconcile 
the “bearded, wild-eyed, bomb-rolling” description furnished by his agency with the people he 
meets in the company of Moss Gatlin, the travelling anarchist preacher (50). The injustice of  
the  social  stereotype  is  finally  driven  home when  Pynchon writes  of  the  betrayal  felt  on 
account of the mainstream representation: “[t]he Anarchists and Socialists on the shift had 
their own mixed feelings about history” (654).
However,  the  presentation  of  anarchism  in  AtD is  directly  tied  to  violent  acts  of 
terrorism,  be  it  in  the  explosive  acts  committed  by  Webb  Traverse  –  the  most  probable 
candidate for the terroristic “Kieselguhr Kid” alter-ego (82) – or the depiction of 9/11 in the  
apocalyptic scene of Manhattan resulting from the ill-fated Vormance Expedition. Indeed, the  
scene is  presented as one of  “fire,  damage to structures,  crowd panic” and “disruption to 
common services” (151). This act of “fire and blood” (152) that is “appropriate […] to urban 
civilization” (151) occurs in a city that, while attempting to “deny all-out Christian allegiance”,  
has become the “material expression of a particular loss of innocence”, its inhabitants now an 
“embittered and amnesiac race” who are “unable to connect” to the “moment of their injury,  
unable to summon the face of their  violator” (153).  As if  to make the allegory as clear as  
possible, Pynchon's city even creates a “night panorama” on “each anniversary of that awful 
event” (154). Under such a contextualisation in which the injustices of destruction are offset by  
the injustices that induce people to destroy, Pynchon's text creates a mythic framework that  
glorifies, or at least vindicates, acts of terrorism, as Kathryn Hume has noted.127
126 DeLeon, The American as Anarchist, 4.
127 Hume, ‘The Religious and Political Vision’.
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This  double  depiction  is  undoubtedly  linked  to  the  confrontation  between,  and 
reciprocal  genesis  of,  capitalism  and  individualist  anarchism.  Stemming  from his  recurrent 
trope128 of the politics of the Sanjak of Novi Pazar almost pre-empting World War I, Pynchon 
highlights that, in the event of Europe-wide warfare, while “corporations, armies, navies, [and]  
governments” would “all go on as before, if not more powerful”, “Anarchists would be the  
biggest  losers”  (938).  Indeed,  the  justification  of  a  crackdown  on  civil  liberties  through 
terrorism is well understood by both contemporary theorists129 and Pynchon, whose villainous 
entrepreneurs in the novel  bomb their  own railway lines for this  very purpose (AtD,  175). 
While  undermining  the  legitimacy  of  the  State  Department's  subnational  conception  of  
terrorism through stereotype, Pynchon presents his anarchists as maligned victims of social 
injustice.
However,  it  would require  a  double  standard  to  accept  the depiction  of  anarchist  
suffering at face value, while insisting that the representation of their violence is self-aware 
caricature. This is because individualist anarchism contains rationales for both socialism and 
the  supply-side,  laissez-faire economic  liberalism  of  the  Reagan  administration;  a  stealth 
implementation of trickle-down theory.130 Indeed, as Iwan Morgan puts it, Reagan believed his 
economic policies to embody “the fundamental values of individual freedom”.131 This stance is, 
purely  in  the  perverse  terminology  of  legislative  taxation,  more  “egalitarian”  than  a  truly 
equalising socialism; everyone is taxed equally. Similarly, in their terroristic capacity, Pynchon's 
anarchists  justify  their  indiscriminate  conflation  of  civilians  and  combatants  through  the 
assertion that there are no “innocent bourgeoisie” (181, 235). When inflicting violence, these 
anarchists are Reaganites who see no reason to target their attacks more specifically; everyone 
128 Explicit reference is made at AtD, 809, 841, 937; GR, 13–14, 16.
129 Schweitzer and Schweitzer, A Faceless Enemy, 231.
130 Jacob, ‘Reaganomics’, 29.
131 Morgan, ‘Reaganomics and Its Legacy’, 105.
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is hurt equally.
Inherent Vice  takes a somewhat different tack to  Against the Day.  Reverting to the 
hippie vibe of  Vineland,  Pynchon pits  his perpetually  stoned protagonists  against cops and 
Reaganites. Indeed, Mickey Wolfmann, the mysteriously vanished Mafioso property mogul, is 
“known to be a generous Reagan contributor” (95) who, in an echo of the lure of romantic 
brutality  seen  earlier,  is  “technically  Jewish,  but  wants  to  be  a  Nazi”  (7).  However,  the  
historicity of the hippie is essentially  anarchist;  there is  a good case for (doper's)  memory  
scepticism to be applied in Doc's case. In fact, Doc Sportello is unable to construct even the  
present as a single moment of unified “truth”, being, on multiple occasions, only “pretty sure”  
about “what he'd said out loud” (207, 212), complicating the already bi-directional temporality  
of the detective frame.132 Yet, in actuality, such a rendering of the present as a fragmented, 
plural and decentralised reality is an ethical statement.
To see Pynchon's history  of  overwriting  as  an ethical  statement  one need look no 
further than the argument within Zygmunt Bauman's celebrated  Postmodern Ethics.  In this 
work, Bauman compares the ethics of Kant and Levinas and shows that the premise of “mutual  
exchangeability of moral subjects” – upon which Kant's categorical imperative rests – cannot 
solve the dilemma of duty in as elegant a way as a subjectivity that willingly lowers itself in an 
act  of  “being  for”  the other.133 Levinas  originally  articulates  this  in  relation to  Heidegger's 
conception  of  Miteinandersein  (being-with-one-another)  in  which  “being-there  […]  would 
appear to be, in its very authenticity, being-for-the-other”.134 
If these theories of ethics could be implemented as fiction on the theme of history, a 
Pynchon  novel  would  probably  be  as  close  an  approximation  as  is  possible.  While  Judith 
132 See Currie, About Time, 36, 87–88.
133 Bauman, Postmodern Ethics, 51.
134 Lévinas, ‘Dying For...’, 213.
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Chambers  has  already  explored,  in  part,  how  “Pynchon's  allusion  to  the  White  Goddess 
resurrects the idea of a language and morality whose fundamental virtue is the acceptance of  
the Other”135 – even touching on Levinas136 – a devolution of history to the demos provides a 
counterpoint to authoritarian structures that would leave only one, authoritative version of 
the present. Hence, Riggs Warbling is right to be worried in Inherent Vice as “[s]omeday they'll 
get Mickey to approve a rocket strike, and Arrepentimiento will be history – except it won't 
even be that, because they'll destroy all the records, too” (251). To expose the narrative of  
one's  own experience to scrutiny  is  a  form of  sacrificial  offering;  particularly  so when the 
narrative  is  contradictory  or  illogical.  As  with  Levinas'  being-for-the-other,  it  expects  no 
reciprocity and it does so purely for the benefit of the other. It is true, as Shawn Smith has 
pointed out,  that it  is  “no longer new or  revolutionary” to state that “history is  a  field  of  
competing rhetorical or narrative strategies”137 nor to see, in Linda Hutcheon's formulation 
that  “the  multiple,  the  heterogeneous,  the  different  […]  is  the  pluralizing  rhetoric  of  
postmodernism”.138 However,  under  this  schema  of  New  Wittgensteinian  over-writing  the 
ethical preservation of multiple narratives emerges once more.
William Plater once wrote that “Pynchon achieves what Wittgenstein means when he 
says  that  there  are  things  that  cannot  be  put  into  words,  things  that  make  themselves 
manifest”.139 Although not in the way he imagined it, this analysis has revealed that there was 
a hint of truth to this. By noting a structural affinity with the New Wittgenstein and equating  
the generous plurality therein to an ethics of alterity, Pynchon's relativism is brought to serve a  
meta-ethical argument. This is not, as Smith would have it, an “anti-structural rhetoric”; 140 it is 
135 Chambers, ‘Parabolas and Parables’, 3.
136 Ibid., 4.
137 Smith, Pynchon and History, 2.
138 Hutcheon, A Poetics of Postmodernism, 66.
139 Plater, The Grim Phoenix, 241.
140 Smith, Pynchon and History, 12–14.
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a rhetoric that queries the totalising form that would result from a uni-directionally structured 
system. In the inverted, re-appropriated words of Frank Ramsey on Wittgenstein: that which  
Pynchon doesn't explicitly say, he could be trying to structurally whistle.
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Naming and Private Language in Gravity's Rainbow (through 
the lens of Vineland)
“the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant”
 – Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations141
This section will  examine the later works of Ludwig Wittgenstein, especially  PI,  with 
occasional  reference  to  BB,  RFM  and  Proto-Investigations, to  show  how  the  critiques  of 
nationalism and national socialism in Gravity's Rainbow – critiques intensified post-Vineland – 
are concepts that can also be derived from Wittgenstein's notions of ostensive definition and 
the  private  language  argument.  By  necessity,  this  analysis  charts  a  highly  specific  course 
through PI, which I readily admit is only one such route.142 As such, it necessarily neglects many 
facets  of  Wittgenstein's  work  that  would  make  for  interesting  further  studies.  Yet,  it  will  
emerge from this  path  that,  in  comparison  to  much  of  the hostility  displayed by  Pynchon 
towards early  Wittgenstein,  the anti-Platonic  conclusions  of  PI sit  in  relative harmony with 
Pynchon's novels, also speaking against, as Wittgenstein calls it, the “darkness of this time” (PI, 
x).
One of the most astute central observations of  Gravity's Rainbow is that the evil  of 
mankind, mirroring nature, “does not know extinction; all it knows is transformation” (2), a 
spatio-temporal  transposition  to  a  new  setting,  persisting  Beyond  the  Pavlovian  Zero  and 
always  collecting  around centres  of  power,  embodied by  the novel's  final,  America-bound,  
141 PI, sec. 293.
142 For a visual map of Baker and Hacker’s perception of all the valid pathways through the 
Investigations, see their indispensable Analytical.
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transatlantic V-2/ICBM; a critique shared with Marcuse.143 Through this impossible moment, 
Pynchon  highlights  that  behind  twentieth-century  America's  technological  and  economic 
supremacy  lie  the  dark  negotiations  of  Operation  Paperclip  and  a  re-embodiment  of  the 
right-wing politics supposedly vanquished in the Second World War. How many of us notice,  
inscribed upon our antibiotics, the second label, permanently hidden beneath the surface-level,  
reading  “sulfonamide”  and  “I.G.  Farben”?  How  many  of  us  see,  when  we  watch  satellite 
television,  the German technician crying:  “Vergeltungswaffe”? While  this  theme is  strongly  
articulated  in  Gravity's  Rainbow,  Pynchon  retrospectively  strengthened  such  political 
interpretations through the lens of Vineland. In this work, Zoyd Wheeler deduces that, in terms 
of American “country fellas”, the parking lot reveals that the “country must be Germany”; a  
political, as well as automotive observation (VL, 7). This shorter, more accessible narrative also 
makes the reference to Wernher Von Braun in Gravity's Rainbow far clearer, with the anti-drug 
squadrons led by Karl Bopp, “former Nazi  Luftwaffe  officer and subsequently useful citizen” 
(221). In Vineland, Frenesi's constant attraction to Brock Vond, the embodiment of the “whole 
Reagan program” to “restore fascism at home and around the world”, shows Pynchon jeering 
at the critics who have missed this self-destructive strand in his earlier work for so many years  
(261). In many ways, this is how Pynchon's allegorical fiction works, partially supported by the 
Wittgensteinian  parallel  shortly  to  be  advanced  here:  it  shows  the  present  environment's 
hereditary debt to, and reconstitution of, regimes of genocide.
The  initial  point  of  contact  that  will  be  raised  between  the  late  Wittgenstein  and 
Pynchon, then, is a superficial, surface connection in the importance of names. This will focus 
primarily on Slothrop's re-naming to Rocketman in Gravity's Rainbow. Taking this in the light of 
Wittgenstein's  remarks  on proper names,  naming and ostensive definition,  it  emerges that  
143 See Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 79–80, 93, 247.
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Rocketman can be seen not only as a clustered definition but, in actuality, a commitment to an 
abstract concept; a Platonic form, made possible only by “the power language has to make 
everything look the same” (CV, 22). Moving forward to an examination of such forms reveals 
that Wittgenstein's  arguments  on private  language and the philosophy of  mathematics are 
incompatible with the existence of such non-spatio-temporal constructs. Having highlighted the  
corresponding reasoning in Pynchon's texts,  the underlying tenets of totalitarianism can be 
shown to exist in this realm of abstraction.
“That's Rocketman?”
Wittgenstein's  later  work,  the  Philosophical  Investigations,  opens  with  a  lengthy 
quotation  from  Saint  Augustine's  autobiographical  Confessions that  paints  a  portrait  of 
language upon a single-reference to single-referent canvas. As Wittgenstein puts it, describing 
this model that clearly runs counter to the liberating plurality exhibited in Pynchon's history: 
“[i]n this picture of language we find the roots of the following idea: Every word has a meaning”  
(PI,  §1).  As  Baker  and Hacker  have  noted,  the Augustinian model  is  also the  fundamental  
principle  underlying  Wittgenstein's  earlier  TLP  (Analytical  1,  57-59). Wittgenstein  plots  the 
fundamental  ideas of  this  system throughout §1-27 of  PI and, within the very first section, 
levels the devastating, yet obvious, critique that not all  words can be reduced to signifying 
names: “what is the meaning of the word 'five'?” Wittgenstein extends this beyond such a 
trivial  refutation  to  show  that  the  Augustinian  system  of  name-picture  correspondence  is 
inadequate  for,  as  an  example,  distinction  between “slab”  as  picture/noun  and  “slab!”  as  
imperative (§6) and that this system does not accurately model reality (§13). Perhaps the key 
formulation of this idea is best encapsulated in §26 where Wittgenstein writes: “[o]ne thinks 
that learning language consists in giving names to objects. Viz, to human beings […] naming is 
something like attaching a label to a thing. One can say that this is preparatory to the use of a 
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word. But what is it a preparation for?” In Wittgenstein's inversion of the Augustinian model, 
the pieces cannot be grasped without an understanding of the whole; how is the structure of a  
sentence to be comprehended without a grasp of all its constituent words? Yet, how are the 
words within the sentence to be understood outside the totalising structure of their use?
Given the critical  heritage of  indeterminacy associated with  Gravity's  Rainbow,  it  is 
unsurprising that it  works from a similar starting point, the text itself  explicitly stating that  
“names by themselves may be empty” (366) and that “the primary problem”, albeit one on  
which we “need not dwell”, is that everything “does after all lie in the region of uncertainty” 
(700). Pynchon had, of course, more explicitly explored the Augustinian picture in his earlier 
work,  V., through,  as  Petra  Bianchi  has  noted,  Paolo  Maijstral's  farcical  attempts  to 
“communicate” to the Whole Sick Crew with a note written entirely in proper nouns (V., 51, 
131).144 In  light of  this,  it  is  highly  probable  that  the underlying vacuity  of  the Augustinian  
conception is another key reason for the aforementioned discord with TLP in Pynchon's work. 
Yet, does the fact that Pynchon, in general, and  PI, in totality, can be seen as rejecting the 
Tractarian and Augustinian models mean that they are unified in this later work? Is Pynchon's 
enemy's enemy his friend?
Pynchon's aforementioned statement on the emptiness of names continues to the next 
ellipsis with a qualifying remark: “but the act of naming...” (GR, 366). To begin an interpretation 
from  an  offhand  similitude  towards  names,  in  Wittgensteinian  terminology,  Pynchon  here 
states explicitly that the act of ostensive definition – assigning a meaning to a name within a  
specific context through demonstrative showing145 (as opposed to the Augustinian concept of 
correlating real names with simple objects (Analytical 1,  163)) – is not an empty gesture.146 
144 See also Bianchi, ‘The Wittgensteinian Thread’, 10.
145 See Bearsley, ‘Augustine and Wittgenstein on Language’, 230.
146 For more on naming in postmodern fiction in general, see Hutcheon, A Poetics of Postmodernism, 
152.
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Given the subsequent  practice  within  which  Rocketman is  located,  this  mode  of  ostensive  
definition appears also to be present in Gravity's Rainbow. The narrative time and location of 
this remark is the beginning of August 1945 in Berlin, where the Potsdam conference is getting  
underway  and  where,  having  been  named  Rocketman  (“Raketemensch”)  by  Emil  “Säure” 
Bummer, Tyrone Slothrop is about to engage in the smuggling exercise dubbed the “Potsdam 
Pickup”.  The  narrative  voice  at  this  moment  is  classic  Pynchon;  the  tension  between  the  
absurdity  of  the  marijuana-infused  situation  and  the  earnest  gravitas  of  the  interlocutor 
couldn't  be  higher.  While  the  passage  is  humorous  the  act  of  naming  is  lent  additional  
significance  because  it  forges  a  link  to  two  of  the  most  serious147 characters  in  Gravity's  
Rainbow: Weissmann and his former lover Enzian. This link is cemented during the relation of 
the suicidal Zone Herero backstory, in which it is remarked that “Enzian knows he is being used 
for his name” and that “[t]here may be no gods, but there is a pattern: names by themselves 
may  have  no  magic,  but  the  act  of  naming,  the  physical  utterance,  obeys  the  pattern” 
(321-322). The exact recurrence of the phrase “but the act of naming” in these twin contexts 
ties Rocketman/Slothrop to Enzian but also to Blicero as, in the antecedent passage, Pynchon 
explicitly reveals the etymology of Weissmann's adopted SS name in honour of the Teutonic  
death-God; Blicero's domain is, once again, delineated.
Proper Names
Within  a  comparatively  small  frame,  Gravity's  Rainbow presents  the  re-naming  of 
Nguarorerue/Otyikondo148 to  Enzian – both gentian flower and a prototype rocket149 –  and 
Slothrop to Rocketman. Certainly, the unveiling of Rocketman fulfils the criteria for a  stricto  
sensu ostensive  definition;  a  deictic  gesture  and  a  verbal  counterpart.  Yet,  any  ostensive 
147 In Pynchon’s context of literary seriousness as death. See Pynchon, ‘Introduction to SL’, 5.
148 ‘One who has been proven’/‘half-breed’, GR, 316.
149 Georg and Colton, Hitler’s Miracle Weapons, 2:89–90.
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definition  is,  according  to  Wittgenstein,  subject  to  misinterpretation  (PI,  §26).  Who  is 
Rocketman,  then?  What  does  Rocketman  mean?  Many  commentators  such  as  Hume  and 
Larsson have assumed a comic book figure from the caped costume incorporating, in Slothrop's  
mind, a “big, scarlet, capital R” (GR, 366). However, while the name conforms to the -man suffix 
pattern so common among comic book superheroes,150 repeated in other works such as China 
Miéville's  King Rat,151 the reference to an extremely short-lived 1940s cartoon character is so 
obscure152 that it could, as easily, be Pynchon's own creation; an  in medias res myth. Such a 
formulation is further troubled when it is considered that, according to Wittgenstein, ostensive  
definition  functions  –  except  in  the  case  of  unique,  proper  names  –  as  an  intersection of  
relativistic,  grammar-based  samples.153 Because  this  moment  is  not  only  one  person  being 
renamed by another, but also a literary device with literary precedents, this act of naming falls  
in a strange situation as a stipulative definition.154 On the one hand, the ostensive definition 
casts the object as a sample; an example of the role played155 by all those dubbed “Rocketman”. 
Conversely, as this is a proper name, it functions as a clustered 156 intersection of descriptive 
attributes “without a  fixed meaning” (PI,  §79).  Furthermore, can this  even be considered a 
proper name? It is is certainly not immutable: “what he should have said at that point was, 'But  
I wasn't Rocketman, until  just a couple hours ago'” (GR,  371). As Wittgenstein queries of a 
“chair” that fluctuates in and out of existence, or at least appearance: “may one use the word 
'chair' to include this kind of thing?” (PI, §80).
The  reason  that  this  naming  is  problematic  is  that  two  voices  are  speaking 
150 See Hume, Pynchon’s Mythography, 99 for a Plasticman/Rocketman comparison.
151 ‘He felt like a superhero. Ratman, he thought as he held her. Doing good with his bizarre rat-powers’. 
Miéville, King Rat, 219.
152 See Larsson, ‘Rooney and the Rocketman’, 114; Weisenburger, A Gravity’s Rainbow Companion, 216.
153 For an excellent overview, see Analytical, 1:184–194.
154 A stipulative definition involves the ‘re-use’, so to speak, of existing linguistic formations to form a 
new definition. Ibid., 1:413–414.
155 See ibid., 1:186.
156 Cluster theories of proper names are well explained at ibid., 1:402–406.
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simultaneously. The first voice is Thomas Pynchon, describing a scene wherein the linguistic  
formation “Säure Bummer” renames the linguistic formation “Tyrone Slothrop” to the linguistic  
formation “Rocketman”. The second voice is diegetic, within the imagined fiction, when the 
character Säure Bummer speaks the word “Racketemensch!”,  which is  understood to mean 
that Tyrone Slothrop is to be renamed Rocketman and that “Tyrone Slothrop” is now equated 
with “Rocketman”. It is only the latter in which “Rocketman” can be seen as a correlative to the  
indexical, ostensive “he↑”. However, this ostensive definition is left in an ambiguous state, for 
the grammatical category of Rocketman has not been satisfactorily clarified.
This twofold situation exemplifies Wittgenstein's example of why proper names are not 
merely designations of a person. In  PI  this  is brought about through the example sentence 
“Moses  did  not  exist”  (§79).  Given  the  context,  it  is  clearly  absurd  to  posit  that  “Moses”  
designates a specific being; the sentence itself states that no such man ever existed. The same  
stance can easily be derived from literature. For instance, Säure Bummer does not exist and 
never has existed. Indeed, “Säure” can refer to no more than the descriptive sum of his parts: a  
“depraved old man” who acts as the contact  point  for Der Springer (436) while boasting a 
history as “once the Weimar Republic's most notorious cat burglar and doper” (365) who refers  
to his  deity as Allah (although this  seems improbable;  a strict observer would certainly not 
approve of his substance ingestion) and a musical connoisseur who favours the Italian Rossini  
over  his  native  Beethoven,  whom he perceives,  in harmony with  previous observations on 
Romanticism and nationalism, as instilling  warmongering  and nationalistic  traits  (440,  685). 
While not unique in the linguistic canon, literary characterisation can be seen as the example  
par excellence of the way in which proper names, rather than designating entities, are actually  
the front for clusters; the intersection of true descriptions regarding the name's bearer.157
157 See van Langendonck, Theory and Typology of Proper Names, 30–33.
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Within  the  scene  itself,  the  act  of  naming  is  both indexical  (contextual  deixis)  and  
ambiguous. What, then, are the clusters designated by “Rocketman”? The character, Tyrone 
Slothrop; a person wearing a green velvet cape, buckskin trousers and a Wagnerian helmet, 
sans horns; the person that Säure wants to “show up”; and the character that, evidently, has 
been promised to Seaman Bodine as the best candidate for the infiltration task (370).  It  is  
apparent, though, that in a failure of communication, each party has only picked up on one  
single strand of the definition. Säure believes, with messianic overtones, that the definition is 
Slothrop; the person who showed up at the pre-ordained hour (“when you're this blitzed and 
you  want  somebody  to  show  up”).  Meanwhile,  Slothrop,  amid  his  reefer-induced  hunger 
cravings,  believes that the insignia of  cape and helmet constitute Rocketman (“this  helmet 
would look just like the nose assembly of the Rocket”) (366).  Bodine, conversely,  sees that 
Rocketman is defined through his power and, upon seeing the convergence of the two previous  
definitions, is in a state of disbelief: “Bodine looks over, skeptical. 'That's Rocketman?'” (370) It  
remains unclear as to whether Slothrop, Säure et al. are supposed to be aware of Scoop/Hello  
Pal Comics' Rocketman (although the reference to “Captain Midnight” strengthens this view 
(375)), but it  is apparent that readers are meant to take this  as a form of what Baker and  
Hacker  call,  in  the  context  of  Wittgenstein  on  proper  names,  “reference-determination” 
(Analytical 1, 420).
Such  a  determination  has  already,  in  part,  been  undertaken;  it  plays,  indeed,  a  
fundamental  role  in  literary  criticism.  For  instance,  Samuel  Cohen  has  seen  Slothrop's  
reconfiguration  to  Rocketman  as  a  precursor  to  his  later  fragmentation158 while  Douglas 
Lannark  believes,  in  a  piece  that  veers  dangerously  close  to  performatively  reconstituting 
elements  of  the  novel's  own  destructive  paranoia,  that  the  “ceremonial  rebirthing”  is  
158 Cohen, ‘Mason & Dixon & the Ampersand’, 281.
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necessitated by Pynchon's astrological reference.159 A further literary resolution might also be 
found in Pynchon's already-touched-upon application for a Ford Foundation grant in which he 
expressed admiration for Ray Bradbury,160 whose  The Illustrated Man contains a short story 
about an astronaut entitled “The Rocket Man”, inflecting Slothrop's persona towards space 
flight rather than warfare; a fact later reinforced by the greeting: “Rocketman! Spaceman!”  
(GR, 438). However, quite clearly, such referential investigation works on the assumption of the 
Augustinian concept of meaning under critique; a word has a meaning. As this has been shown, 
both in the hostility to TLP and from the above discussion, to be untenable, perhaps a better 
explanation of the genesis of Rocketman can be found in the concepts of abstraction, ideals  
and forms.
Abstraction, Ideals and Forms
Without question, one of the most remarkable portions of Wittgenstein's later work is  
the  multi-stranded reasoning commonly referred to as the private language argument(s). In 
Hacker's orthodox interpretation, with which the late Baker disagreed,161 the arguments run 
from  §243-315  and  lead  to  a  refutation  of  abstract  (Platonic)  ideals  and  forms;  the 
mythological elements that constitute the Rocket and on which, it can be seen, many elements  
of “fascist” America are predicated.
What  construction  of  Rocketman  is  relevant  with  respect  to  private  language? 
Rocketman is more than a name; there is a non-real, preconceived, abstract ideal of such a 
being. Of course, Rocketman is nominally declared as a fusion of the rocket with the human,  
just  as  the  Schwarzkommando  Zone  Herero's  insignia  of  the  mandala  (GR,  361) is  a 
159 Lannark, ‘Relocation/Dislocation: Rocketman in Berlin’, 58.
160 On Pynchon’s Ford application, see Weisenburger, ‘Thomas Pynchon’, 696.
161 Baker, ‘The Private Language Argument’, 84–118 (Baker even posits that the very term ‘private 
language argument’ forces an interpretation that would not otherwise be credited).
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superscription of the firing stages of the Aggregat 4/V2 over their traditional village layout 
(563); a symbol absent-mindedly drawn by Slothrop next to the strangely, already-present, 
graffiti  reading  “ROCKETMAN  WAS  HERE”  (624).162 The  Rocket  itself  is  entrenched  in  the 
resurrectional mythology of the ideal rocket: the “00001”, the “second in its series”, brought to 
“Test  Stand  VII”,  the  “holy  place”  (724-725)  through  the  mystical  “festival”  of  the 
“Rocket-raising”  (361).  The  Schwarzgerät's  00000  carrier  and  its  subsequent  (yet  textually 
precedent)  00001  are  attempts  to  realize  such  a  “Perfect  Rocket”  (426),  brought  to  bear 
alongside another Platonic ideal, Blicero's desire to be “taken in love”, to “leave this cycle of  
infection and death” (724).  Others have also seen this  resonance with specifically  Platonic  
forms but only within the context of film. Antonio Marquez believes that the alienation of GR's 
final  moviehouse  scene  is  an  allusion  to  Plato's  cave163 while  Philip  Kuberski  ties  this  to 
Rocketman, alongside von Göll, as a product of a shadow-reality Hollywood.164 Wittgenstein's 
arguments on private language  lead, in addition to their recognised assault on the Cartesian 
divide, to a demolition of such forms and ideals.
The  private  language  argument  is  an  elusive  concept,  not  only  because  it  is 
counter-intuitive,  but  also  because  its  ramifications  are  not  immediately  obvious.  The 
traditional  conception  of  experience  permeating  philosophy  primarily  through  Descartes, 
Hume and the phenomenalists,165 is  that  of  privacy;  only  the subject  can grasp his  or  her 
situation entirely and others can only “understand” through analogy. There is the sensation 
itself, there is the expression of this private experience into approximate language and there is  
the reception of this by another who then translates it into terms compatible with his or her 
own experience. This presupposes the concept of what is termed private language. The sense  
162 See also: Muste, ‘The Mandala in Gravity’s Rainbow’.
163 Marquez, ‘The Cinematic Imagination in Thomas Pynchon’s Gravity’s Rainbow’, 281.
164 Kuberski, ‘Gravity’s Angel’, 143.
165 A lineage set out by Hacker at Analytical, 3:16.
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of this expression is not to designate a language that, coincidentally, has only one speaker (a  
contingent private language) or a language that an individual has made up for themselves 
(“idiolalia” as Pynchon terms it in  Vineland  (263) and  Gravity's Rainbow  (727)). It is instead 
used in the sense of a language that can only ever, by definition, have one speaker because the 
rules, grammar and concepts are inherently inexplicable to another and absolutely personal.  
Wittgenstein saw the possibility of this in the  Tractatus  when he wrote: “[t]he world is  my 
world: this is manifest in the fact that the limits of  language (of that language which alone I 
understand) means the limits of my world” (§5.62). The traditional model of sense experience 
– a domain of privileged access – is reliant upon such a “language”.
Such  Cartesian  duality,  though,  is  dispelled166 in  V.  through  statements  such  as 
Schoenmaker's ironic “[i]nside, outside […] you're being inconsistent” (48) and also in only the  
second episode of Gravity's Rainbow, when Pirate Prentice is revealed as possessing a “strange 
talent for — well, for getting inside the fantasies of others: being able, actually, to take over the 
burden of managing them” (12). Indeed, while the mathematical persona of Descartes is linked 
to the development of the Rocket through the “Cartesian x and y of the laboratory” (400) , 
Pynchon  offers  a  condemnation  of  this  entire  schema  through  its  entanglement  with  the 
Pavlovian, paedophile (50-51) Edward Pointsman, whose sadistic animal experiments position 
“the cortex of Dog Vanya's brain” as the “interface” between “[i]nside and outside” (78-79). 
It is also true that Pointsman is the grandmaster of this view as his colleague, Kevin Spectro,  
a “neurologist” but only “casual Pavlovian” (47) “did not differentiate as much […] between  
Outside and Inside” (141). Indeed, Spectro is led to the conclusion of Wittgenstein's private  
language argument: “'[w]hen you've looked at how it really is,' he asked once, 'how can we,  
any of us, be separate?'” (142). Finally, in case any readers had missed this aspect, Pynchon  
166 As Linda Hutcheon argues is exemplary of historiographic metafiction: Hutcheon, A Poetics of 
Postmodernism, 164.
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hammers the point home at a late stage in Gravity's Rainbow: “why keep saying 'mind and 
body'? Why make that distinction?” (590).
At  the  risk  of  veering  into  lengthy  philosophical  exegesis,  it  is  necessary  at  this  
stage,  owing  to  the  Pavlovian  references,  to  clearly  set  out  some  aspects  and 
interpretations of  Wittgenstein's  thought regarding behaviourism, criteria  and Platonism.  
Firstly, it is worth noting that Wittgenstein explicitly refuted the label of behaviourism; of  
relevance  because  GR so  clearly,  and  perhaps  strangely,  links  Pavlov  to  the  Cartesian 
standpoint  and Pavlovians  to  the aforementioned ethically  suspect  areas  (PI,  §307). The 
grounds for such an alignment are bound up with his demonstration of pain-behaviour as a 
criterion  of pain. Again, the traditional notion is of pain as a private object, expressed in  
order that others may form their own analogous, but equally private, concepts. After all,  
you cannot have my pain. This is the “grammatical fiction” of which Wittgenstein speaks. In 
each case, pain is not a private object that one possesses; it is a sensation, an occurrence. If  
I am suffering and you are suffering, then we are both suffering; we both have  the same  
pain. While some have concluded that Wittgenstein is a logical behaviourist 167 (behaviour as 
a  correlative  to  the  linguistic),  Hacker  convincingly  argues  that  even  this  is  a  mistaken  
interpretation  (Analytical  3,  242).  Wittgenstein's  investigation  is  into  the  grammatical  
relation between the mental and its manifestation.
It  must  also  be  noted  that  the  question  of  private  language  bears  not  only  upon 
Cartesianism but also upon Platonism, for it counters the assertion that public language can be  
assigned to a private sensation, or object,  in  an act  of private ostensive definition. Such a  
structure would only be valid if a grammatical context for usage could be constructed from the  
mental correlative of a real-world sample. Wittgenstein's earliest reference to such a problem  
167 For instance Byrne, ‘Remarks on Ludwig Wittgenstein and Behaviourism’, 56.
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is in the 1936  Language of  Sense Data lectures in which he states that private sensations 
cannot be “pointed” to because it is impossible to preserve a sensation for future comparison:  
“I  can't  say  that  I  am  preserving  here  the  impression  of  red”  (“LSD”,  42).  Thoughts  and 
sensations – whether transitory or persistent – cannot, according to Wittgenstein, be used as 
samples.168 This is the basis for Wittgenstein's claim in PI that, as there can be no consideration 
of a mental “sample” in the case of public grammar, we must “always get rid of the idea of the  
private object” (PI, 177) because “if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation 
on the model of 'object and designation' the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant”; 
its use, though, does not (§293).
Platonic forms and ideals can be shown to be such non-considerable objects. In Crispin 
Wright's (not entirely neutral) words: “Platonism is, precisely, the view that the correctness of 
a rule-informed judgement is a matter quite independent of any opinion of ours, whether the 
states of affairs which confer correctness are thought of as man-made […] or truly platonic and 
constituted in heaven”.169 Much of Wittgenstein's stance on this conception of Platonism is 
concluded  from  his  remarks  on  mathematics  within  the  1937  typescript,  the 
Proto-Investigations and its derivative works. The lineage of this text and Wittgenstein's more 
general  relationship  with  Platonism is  explored in Baker  and Hacker's  Analytical  2 and for 
reasons of space cannot be repeated here (Analytical 2, 3-24). From this work, though, it can 
be seen that Wittgenstein believed that abstract forms, ideals and other non-spatio-temporal 
constructs cannot be construed as other than private objects that cannot, as discussed, play  
any  part  in  any  language  game.  This  is  exemplified  in  mathematical  propositions  that,  
Wittgenstein argues, must be seen not as a description of a formula that explains signs – again,  
168 See Analytical, 3:101–110.
169 Wright, ‘Wittgenstein’s Rule-Following Considerations’, 257.
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a refutation of a referential model – but as instruments, rules for framing descriptions. 170 The 
traditional, Platonist account of mathematics is of an  a priori  formation that is independent 
from experience; a law to be mentally deduced. Pynchon parodies this view in Vineland when 
the mathematician Weed Atman is told that he should “[d]iscover a theorem” (VL,  233). His 
questioner Rex Snuvvle goes on to expound that he “thought they sat around, like planets,  
and...  well,  every now and then somebody just, you know... discovered one”. As Simon de  
Bourcier notes, such a stance is interesting for a perspective on twentieth-century scientific  
practice in relation to philosophies of time: do scientific truths “exist 'independently of time 
and history', 'in eternity', until scientists discover them”?171 Weed's reply to such a proposition 
is short and decisive, though: “I don't think so” (VL, 233). This tension of understanding is well 
put by Silvio Pinto:
The puzzle can therefore be expressed in the following way. If we suppose 
that  mathematical  propositions  are  normative  laws,  and  there  are  good 
reasons  to  assume  that,  then  it  seems  to  follow  that  the  epistemic 
justification for upholding them cannot be empirical. Nevertheless, the fact 
that propositions of  mathematics constitute an indispensable part of our 
scientific  theories  seems to imply  that  our  knowledge  claims concerning 
these  propositions  must  be  justified,  at  least  in  part,  on  the  basis  of 
experience.172
Wittgenstein's  account satisfies both domains  by postulating that the first-person grasp of 
mathematics is rooted in a form of practice-based rule following; a justification that – even 
when layers of complexity are piled upon one another – is grounded in experience. Conversely,  
the third-person perspective on mathematics is rooted in interpretation. Following someone 
else's reasoning requires an interpretation of the behaviour of the speaker from which the  
rules being followed are deduced. In this sense, mathematics is, for the first-person, practical, 
170 I am indebted to Baker and Hacker, Analytical, 2:10 for the concise source list which forms the basis 
of this discussion.
171 de Bourcier, Pynchon and Relativity, 23; see also Middleton and Woods, Literatures of Memory, 
120–126 to which de Bourcier makes reference.
172 Pinto, ‘Wittgenstein’s Anti-Platonism’, 269.
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for the third-person, a priori.173
In this case: as Wittgenstein is to Platonic mathematics and linguistics; Pynchon is to 
Platonic politics. Jeffrey Baker has, I believe correctly, pointed out that Pynchon demonstrates 
an “abiding concern with the radical democratic politics of 1960s America”.174 However, by 
returning to Wright's summary of mathematical Platonism,175 it becomes clear that many of 
the romantic  concepts (“Weltpolitik and  Lebensraum”,176 racial ideals,  manifest  destiny and 
nationalism itself) embraced by both the Nazis and the “Roosevelt, Kennedy, Nixon, Hoover,  
Mafia, CIA, Reagan, Kissinger” (VL, 372)177 octet can all be seen as embodiments of a Platonic 
standpoint:  a  commitment  to  some,  if  not  all,  of  these  totalitarian,  non-spatio-temporal  
abstract precursors.
So far, so good. However, clearly, it is still possible to dispel these concepts through  
the use of other Platonic forms – specifically the notion of transcendence as a noun to be  
acquired through its counterpart verb. As will be argued in the final chapter, Pynchon sees 
within  such  schemes  only  the  potential  for  further,  real-world  damage  from  such 
commitments. This is perfectly encapsulated in Gravity's Rainbow's conversation between Leni 
and Franz Pökler in which the former accuses the latter of “Kadavergehorsamkeit”: corpse-like 
obedience to a system in which he is being used to “kill people” (400). When Franz attempts to 
justify his role, he resorts to a counter-nationalist stance that will be resolved through space 
exploration: “[w]e'll all use it, someday, to leave the earth […] Someday […] they won't have to 
kill. Borders won't mean anything” (400). In exactly the same way in which he had previously  
“dodged” a policeman who “hit an old man instead”, this is merely an attempt to save himself  
173 See ibid., 279; RFM, 268–269.
174 Baker, ‘Amerikkka Über Alles’, 323.
175 See above, p.89.
176 Baker, ‘Amerikkka Über Alles’, 325.
177 Also referenced by ibid., 337.
92
at the expense of others (399). The term he gives to the escape to outer space is “transcend”,  
an  abstract  concept  at  which  Leni  laughs.  This  would  be  the  logical  reaction,  for  Franz's 
positivist supposition of progress through transcendence is ill-placed, highlighted through the 
fact  that  the  term  “transcended”  is  deployed  by  Enzian  to  describe  the  transition  from  
Weissmann  to  Blicero;  he  “may  have  changed  by  now  past  our  recognition  […]  he  has 
transcended” (660-661). Could it really be said, though, that this transcendence is positive?
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Politics, Ethics, Philosophy
As this chapter draws to a close, it should be apparent that a consistent problem has been 
lurking behind these readings of Pynchon and Wittgenstein:  political  analyses of  Pynchon's 
work predominantly land more than “a step leftward of registering to vote as a Democrat” (VL, 
290) while the same cannot be said of Wittgenstein. In Against Epistemology, Theodor Adorno 
astutely notes, of the problematic bind for Wittgenstein, that:
As  long as  philosophy is  no more  than the cult  of  what  'is  the case',  in 
Wittgenstein's  formula,  it  enters  into  competition  with  the  sciences  to 
which in delusion it assimilates itself – and loses. If it dissociates itself from 
the  sciences,  however,  and  in  refreshed  merriment  thinks  itself  free  of  
them,  it  becomes  a  powerless  reserve,  the  shadow  of  shadowy  Sunday 
religion.178
Although Marjorie Perloff believes Adorno to be mistaken in his reading of Wittgenstein, this  
paragraph, which brings competition between the humanities and the sciences to the fore,  
also  has  deep  political  ramifications.179 Early  Wittgenstein  is  here  cast  by  Adorno  as  the 
betrayer  of  left-wing  anti-rationalisation  humanities  projects;  the  Frenesi-like  defector  for  
whom the lure of science is part genetic, part subliminal will to power; a discourse that wills  
itself to be compromised.
There is much other criticism that suggests a conservative, if not actively right-wing, 
bent in Wittgenstein's writing, both early and late. In a sustained, vituperative attack, Ernest  
Gellner famously suggested that, in its insistence on social convention for the determination of 
meaning,  Ordinary Language Philosophy harbours  a bias  towards the normative.180 Indeed, 
Charles S. Chihara has expanded upon this theme to include interpretations of Wittgenstein,  
remarking that:
178 Adorno, Against Epistemology, 42.
179 Perloff, Wittgenstein’s Ladder, 12.
180 Gellner, Words and things, 165.
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Interpretations of Wittgenstein can be classified roughly into left-wing and 
right-wing  varieties.  Left-wing  interpretations  emphasize  Wittgenstein's 
radical  views  about  the nature  of  philosophy:  they  stress  the  ideas  that 
philosophical  problems  arise  from  misconceptions  about  grammar  and 
meaning, and that these problems should be resolved by a kind of therapy 
in which the therapist puts forward no theses, explanations, or theories of  
any kind. Right-wing interpretations emphasize Wittgensteinian doctrines.181
Indeed, Wittgenstein has been seen on both sides of the political fence with Marcuse182 joining 
Adorno against the more liberal interpretation of Crary, among others. 183 While Crary attempts 
to  stand  outside  the  political  spectrum  to  pass  comment  on  how  others  have  locked  
themselves inside various theses, she actually, by Chihara's definitions, undertakes a left-wing  
interpretation.  However,  in  spite  of  this,  Crary  does  a  service  in  her  survey  of  the 
Wittgensteinian political scene, the most telling insight being that most of the conservative 
interpretations rest upon Wittgenstein being “explicitly understood as a relativist”.184
From  the  analysis  undertaken  in  this  chapter,  a  complicated  and  multi-faceted 
relationship  between  Pynchon  and  Wittgenstein  has  emerged.  In  Pynchon's  work,  early 
Wittgenstein  is  situated  within  a  framework  of  totalitarianism,  perhaps  for  its  atomising, 
logical perspective. Conversely, the late anti-Platonic, anti-Cartesian standpoint in PI certainly 
resonates with Pynchon's work against such systems. The most convincing reading of Pynchon,  
though, lurks within the structural affinity to a New Wittgensteinian mode of overwriting. This  
suggests that it  is  only at a level  of interpretation once-removed that Wittgenstein, at any  
career stage, exists harmoniously with Pynchon. These insights are not, though, ladders to be  
jettisoned. Instead, I will  now show that a more convincing framework is seen when these 
thoughts are brought into conjunction with an analysis of Pynchon through Foucauldian and 
Adornian lenses, rather than the explicitly cited Wittgenstein.
181 Chihara, ‘The Wright-Wing Defense of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Logic’, 105.
182 Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 173.
183 Crary, ‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophy in Relation to Political Thought’.
184 Ibid., 121.
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Chapter Three: Whose Line is it Anyway?
On Michel Foucault
“We do know what's going on, and we let it go on”
– Thomas Pynchon, Gravity's Rainbow.1
“The two questions: “What is Aufklärung?” and “What is to be made of the 
will  to revolution?” together define the field of philosophical  questioning 
which bears on what we are in our present-ness”
– Michel Foucault, “Kant on Enlightenment and Revolution”.2
1 GR, 713.
2 ‘KER’, 17.
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Foucault's Enlightenment
As many critics have observed,3 in Pynchon, the birth of modernity is depicted under 
the sign of Max Weber. It is an oppressive rationalisation that banishes and dominates all that  
would stand in its way: “[t]he death of magic” as Jeff Baker puts it. 4 Although such an appraisal 
of  Weber  lacks  nuance,5 the  insertion  of  this  astrological  foretelling  into  the  very  core  of 
America's  political  system  is  no  better  expressed  than  in  Gravity's  Rainbow's  “MOM 
SLOTHROP'S  LETTER  TO  AMBASSADOR  KENNEDY”  (682-683).  This  letter  –  which  depicts 
Slothrop's  mother  writing  to  Joseph  P.  Kennedy,  Sr.  about  her  empathy  for  the  senator's 
parental unease during JFK's Patrol Torpedo boat incident in 1943, her anxiety about the state  
of America and her sexual relations with the future president – echoes with the guilt-ridden 
foreboding style  of  Samuel  Beckett's  Eh Joe?  This  comparative  effect  is  achieved not  only 
through the structural motion from an optimistic inquiry, “[w]ell  hi  Joe how've ya  been” (GR 
682),  parallel  to  Beckett's  “[y]ou’re  all  right  now,  eh?”6 before  becoming  “gloomy  all  so 
sudden”, but also by the frequent comma-delimited first-name appellation to the ambassador:  
“[i]t's every parent's dream, Joe, that it is […] It isn't starting to break down, is it, Joe? […] You 
know, don't you? Golden clouds? Sometimes I think – ah, Joe, I  think they're pieces of the 
heavenly city falling down” (GR 682). While Beckett's piece focuses upon an old man listening 
to  an  ex-lover  holding  him  to  account  for  a  young  girl's  suicide,  Pynchon's  microcosmic 
imitation uses the guilt-tripping voice of a “wicked old babe” to demonstrate that the love-'em 
and leave-'em approach of big business leads to a “terrible fear” and a rightly felt difficulty  
believing  “in  a Plan with  a shape bigger  than I  can see” (682-683);  it  is  an approach that  
3 For instance Slade, ‘Thomas Pynchon, Postindustrial Humanist’, 63; Schroeder, ‘From Puritanism to 
Paranoia’; Schroeder, ‘Weber, Pynchon and the American Prospect’.
4 Baker, ‘Plucking the American Albatross’, 180.
5 Gordon, ‘The Soul of the Citizen’, 293–294; citing Hennis, ‘Max Weber’s “Central Question”’, 138 as a 
figure questioning such totalisation.
6 Beckett, ‘Eh Joe’, 362.
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Pynchon depicts as having “laid”, in Beckett's terms,7 the general populace with its promise to 
use the “WLB” (War Labor Board) to keep the war effort on track and suppress “strike votes”,  
while insidiously profiting from the continuation of the war. Furthermore, it is a project of 
Weberian disenchantment; “Golden clouds” and the “heavenly city” conjure the destruction of  
a thoroughly enchanted, metaphysical nature which is “broken down”. Ultimately, the young 
girl  of  America,  the spirit  made light,  will  face her suicidal  moment but,  in the meantime,  
without seeing the whole plan, Nalline Slothrop can only have faith that Ambassador Kennedy 
is “in the groove” and take the fortune-teller's word – “[h]ow true!” – that the contemporary 
Zodiac will admit but one course: “we've got to modernize in Massachusetts, or it'll just keep 
getting worse and worse” (682).
Having observed that Pynchon's affinity to Wittgenstein plays more along structural  
lines, Max Weber would be an obvious choice for a closer exploration of Pynchon's sociological  
and philosophical themes; particularly on the lines of modernization, rationality and progress.  
However,  alongside  the  relativism that  is  so  crucial  to  Weber's8 project,  uniting  him with 
Pynchon,  this  concept  of  slavish  obedience  or  trust  in  authority  to  think  on  our  behalf  – 
especially when that authority insists that we modernize through technological positivism – is 
central to two essays bearing the same title, “What is Enlightenment?”, the first written by 
Immanuel Kant, the second by Michel Foucault. In Kant's original piece on Enlightenment, he 
describes  unenlightened  humanity  as  being  in  a  state  of  immaturity,  enslaved  to  our  
self-incurred tutelage. For Foucault, Kant represents the “threshold of modernity” (OT, 263), 
the moment when representation began to criticize ideology. Foucault's response to Kant's  
essay is, however, unsure of whether the ultimate maturity that Kant proposed can ever be  
attained.
7 Ibid., 365.
8 Parsons, ‘Weber’s “Economic Sociology”’, 31–32.
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Conversely, in the literary realm, Pynchon has a more variegated, oscillatory stance 
towards  Enlightenment  that  has  borne  substantial  critical  scrutiny  especially  since  the 
publication of  Mason & Dixon. Certainly, Pynchon uses Weber's name as a central device to 
characterize  the oppressive  systems that  occur  in  the formalization of  personal  traits;  the 
“routinization  of  charisma”  that  Andreas  Orukambe  and  Thanatz  deduce  from  Enzian's 
allusions to a Christ-like Weissmann (325) and the Rocket (464) respectively.  Pynchon also 
appears, in the repeated critique of “every street now indifferently gray with commerce, with 
war,  with  repression”  (693), to endorse  Weber's  belief  in  a  societal  “cage”  of  modern 
capitalism.9 As Hanjo Berressem has pointed out, however, while there is no dearth of Pynchon 
criticism that takes the Enlightenment as its backdrop, such studies rarely define the precise  
context  of  Enlightenment  in  which  they  are  situated  and  all  too  often  posit  a  mere 
antirationalist trope in Pynchon's writing,10 while neglecting the fact that a Humanist Pynchon 
must,  in  some  manner,  also  be  credited  to  an  Enlightenment  tradition.11 In  short,  when 
addressing this topic we must, as a prerequisite to an exploration of  the Enlightenment, ask: 
whose Enlightenment? Alongside Mason and Dixon, we must ask: whose Line is it anyway? For  
the  purposes  of  this  chapter,  and  to  begin  plugging  this  gap,  it  will  be  Foucault's  Line,  
Foucault's Enlightenment.
A Foucauldian Overview
What is  Foucault's  Enlightenment? Various classificatory meta-structures have been 
applied to the work of the French “historicophilosophical” (“WC”, 391) thinker Michel Foucault 
[1926-1984] and with each overlying taxonomical grid has come an unavoidable element of  
9 Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, 124.
10 For example Baker, ‘Plucking the American Albatross’, 180; Strandberg, ‘Dimming the 
Enlightenment’, 107.
11 Berressem, ‘Review’, 838.
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ironic hypocrisy. To trace a heredity of thought back to its conception would be to disregard 
Foucault's  earlier  “archaeological”  work,  while  to  excavate  deep  and  diagonally 12 would 
abandon the later turn towards “genealogy”.
The works of Michel Foucault cannot, therefore, be easily summarised without fixing  
an identity that is overly reductive. Broadly speaking, however, Foucault can be seen as: 1.) 
situated  in  a  complex  philosophical13 constellation  consisting  of  a  direct  lineage  from 
Canguilhem (his doctoral supervisor14),  Dumézil and Hyppolite;15 2.) in opposition to Hegelian 
dialectics and the phenomenological approaches of Heidegger, Husserl and Sartre, despite an 
early start in this mode himself16 and 3.) sharing, in his anti-humanist stance, an affinity with 
the thought of Althusser. Of his antecedents, it is the debt to Nietzsche that has been awarded  
the most prominent place, with more than one critic remarking to the effect that “[i]t is his  
[Foucault's] evident wish to leave the extant world in ruins”.17 Foucault's work is also highly 
specific, without always acknowledging itself  as such; the critique levelled in Edward Said's  
prominent obituary rightly points out the almost exclusive Eurocentrism of Foucault's work, 
others have criticised his  historical accuracy18 and he has also been charged with failing to 
adequately engage with feminist concerns.19
As  I  have  already  intimated,  Foucault's  works  are  most  commonly  split  along  a 
methodological axis that divides his early phase – designated “archaeology”20 – and his later 
12 Deleuze, Foucault, 9–10.
13 Foucault renounced the label ‘philosopher’ as late as 1978. See O’Leary, Foucault and the Art of 
Ethics, 141.
14 See Canguilhem, ‘Report’ for Canguilhem’s praise of Foucault’s early work.
15 See Bernauer, Michel Foucault’s Force of Flight, 96–100 for a concise summary of the debt to these 
thinkers.
16 May, ‘Foucault’s Relation to Phenomenology’.
17 Megill, Prophets of Extremity, 183.
18 Well summarised by O’Leary, Foucault and the Art of Ethics, 71–72.
19 Said, ‘Michel Foucault, 1926-1984’, 9–10; Young, Postcolonialism, 395; O’Leary, Foucault and the Art 
of Ethics, 10; Afary and Anderson, Foucault and the Iranian Revolution, 111–120 among others.
20 Edie, ‘Transcendental Phenomenology and Existentialism’, 55 points out that this was also a term 
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writings,  which  are  termed,  with  deliberate  Nietzschean  overtones,  “genealogies”. 
Archaeology consists of an excavation of the surrounding conditions that make an episteme 
possible; an analysis of the historical conditions that make viable a certain way of thinking that  
is no longer comprehensible within a contemporary context.  Genealogy on the other hand  
takes Nietzsche's  anti-positivist  “methodology” – in so far that it  can be thus termed – of 
removing the mask of universality from a specific truth at a localised level in order to show how 
these small fluctuations contribute to a shift in thinking. As Árpád Szakolczai puts it, genealogy 
centres on “the conditions of emergence” while assuming “that reality is not a uniform surface 
but is built of interconnected layers” and also “involves a special relation the investigator has  
to himself”.21 However, genealogy is  not a retraction – it  shares much in common with its 
preceding archaeology – it is rather one of the three “successive layers […] characterizing three  
necessarily simultaneous dimensions of the same analysis”, the others being archaeology and 
“strategy”;  the  overarching  term  that  Foucault  used  for  his  methods  (“WC”,  397).  These 
categories  mark  the  varying  needs  of  Foucault's  project  to  delineate  his  subject  areas  – 
knowledge, power and ipseity22 – while remaining broadly within a methodology that doesn't 
seek an origin and subsequent teleology. As one would expect from this overview, Foucault's 
Enlightenment thinking is,  then,  one of  shift  and flux.  It  is  not a stable entity that can be 
studied  purely  from  his  prominent  monographs  or  the  obligingly  titled  “What  is 
Enlightenment?”, but must instead be evaluated at each point along a historical trajectory. 
Foucault's Absence in Pynchon Scholarship 
In  the  period  spanning  2004  to  2006,  Foucault  remained,  according  to  the  Social  
deployed by Husserl for his own project and could, therefore, have been used antagonistically; 
Foucault maintained, though, that the origin of the term was Kantian: ‘Les Monstrousités (DÉ097)’, 
10; see Djaballah, Kant, Foucault, and Forms of Experience, 10 for a reprint and translation.
21 Szakolczai, Max Weber and Michel Foucault, 45–46.
22 See Djaballah, Kant, Foucault, and Forms of Experience, 20–21.
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Sciences  Citation Index,  the most-frequently cited post-World-War-II  scholar.23 Despite this, 
there  is  a  growing  trend  of  wariness  toward  the  “F  word”,  reflected  strongly  in  Pynchon  
studies: whereas other authors have had hugely specific Foucauldian readings, Pynchon has 
not.  Indeed,  amid  criticism  of  the  “paltry  assaults  of  Foucault  and  the  critical  theorists  a  
generation ago”,24 there are only two journal articles and an extremely small section of Hanjo 
Berressem's book on Pynchon and Theory addressing this topic in any substantial detail. 25 This 
is especially strange given that, according to Michèle Lamont's detailed, bibliometric analysis of 
citations on Jacques Derrida (whose rise to prominence closely mirrors Foucault's) within the 
field  of  Stateside  literary  studies,  the  period  marking  the  true  escalation  in  citations  is  
1970-1973; a precise fit with the publication date of Gravity's Rainbow.26 The notable absence 
of scholarship  on Foucault and Pynchon, especially within a favourable academic climate for  
French theory, raises several questions about the enterprise. One of the primary reasons for  
this  is  accurately  summed up,  however,  by  Jane Flax,  albeit  in  a  non-Pynchonian context:  
“[p]erhaps [an] association of postmodernism and amorality also has something to do with its  
modes of transmission […] Often in literary studies essays were abstracted from their historical  
and  philosophical  contexts  and  turned  into  rather  arcane  and  absolutist  techniques  for 
analysing texts”.27 Put alternatively by Daniel T. O'Hara, both the philosophical work and its  
literary  target  are  reduced to parody by  excessive  deployment  of  “enabling  constraints”. 28 
However, in pivoting away from a mere objectifying link between “theory” and “text” towards 
23 Raffnsøe et al., ‘A New Beginning and a Continuation…’, 1.
24 Strandberg, ‘Dimming the Enlightenment’, 109.
25 Berressem, Pynchon’s Poetics, 55, 207, 215.
26 Lamont, ‘How to Become a Dominant French Philosopher’, 602–604; Lamont’s subsequent work with 
Marsha Witten takes Foucault into account, albeit not in isolation, and fixes a slightly later timeframe 
for his rise to American prominence, around 1980, a more detailed commentary on which can be 
found in François Cusset’s French Theory. See: Lamont and Witten, ‘Surveying the Continental Drift: 
The Diffusion of French Social and Literary Theory in the United States’, 20; Cusset, French Theory, 
76–106.
27 Flax, ‘Soul Service’, 80.
28 O’Hara, ‘What Was Foucault?’, 71.
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an ethical querying, such pitfalls can be avoided.
Among the sparse collection of works that have attempted this correlation of Foucault  
and  Pynchon,  the  earliest  effort  is  made  by  Will  McConnell,  in  whose  assessment,  with 
overtones of Beckett and Wittgenstein, little is left to tell and it is only in the private spaces of  
silence that the two writers can possibly co-exist: “we should leave Foucault and Pynchon to 
their  respective  silences,  and  work  to  produce  our  own”.29 In  the  approach  to  such  a 
conclusion,  McConnell  succinctly  addressed  the  problematic  disparities  of  Pynchonian  and 
Foucauldian models of power; power, in  Gravity's Rainbow, is mostly conceived in terms of 
repression, as opposed to Foucault's contention of power as a productive force.30 Blurring this 
distinction between modalities of power proved somewhat problematic in Hanjo Berressem's 
work when he asserted that Foucauldian power possesses a “specific anonymity” that presents  
a “focus on the subject's tragic inscription within power”, citing Discipline and Punish.31 While 
Berressem accurately summarises Foucauldian power as a discursive network, to describe such 
an inscription as “tragic” does not do justice to Foucault's statement that “we must cease once  
and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms: it 'excludes,' it 'represses,' it  
'censors,' it 'abstracts,' it 'masks,' it 'conceals.' In fact, power produces; it produces reality; it  
produces domains of objects and rituals of truth” (DP, 194). It seems that Berressem's notion 
of the tragically inscribed subject is an inadequate description of Foucault's thought; it is not 
that “Pynchon foregrounds the complicity between the subject and power” in opposition to  
Foucault, but rather that Foucault defines power as a positive and necessary construction that  
underpins  all  social  reality.32 In  spite  of  these  minor  problems,  Berressem's  adept 
demonstration,  from a  Lacanian  perspective,  that  Foucault  is  describing  the  “shift  from a 
29 McConnell, ‘Pynchon, Foucault, Power’, 166.
30 Ibid., 158.
31 Berressem, Pynchon’s Poetics, 207.
32 Ibid.
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politics of the discourse of the master to one of the discourse of knowledge […] from slave to a 
disciplined and normalized surface”, will be furthered here as it is crucial to Foucault's thought  
on Enlightenment, albeit not in a psychoanalytic context.33
Moving out of the nineties and Frank Palmeri asserted that “[j]ust as we can observe  
both continuities in and divergences between Foucault's earlier investigations of regimes of  
truth and power and his late focus on subjectification and ethics, we can see continuities in 
and divergences between the vision of powerful impersonal forces in Pynchon's earlier works 
and in his later Vineland (1990) and Mason & Dixon (1997)”.34 Such a mode accurately traces 
the  structural  development  in  Foucault's  thought,  but  assumes a  parallelism of  enterprise 
between  the  philosopher  and  the  novelist,  masquerading,  perhaps,  behind  an  epistemic 
unconscious  wishing  to  escape  from  the  banner  of  postmodernism  under  which  the  two 
writers are aligned. Finally, the most astute use of the Foucauldian methodological toolbox 
must be ascribed to David Cowart, whose “Pynchon, Genealogy, History” sees affinity between  
the later Foucault's historical method and that of the novelist.35
Methodology and The Treachery of Foucault Studies
First and foremost, it is worth declaring of this chapter: ceci n'est pas Foucauldian, or 
at  least,  not  entirely. This  chapter  will  examine,  through  a  chronological  exploration  of 
Foucault's  and Pynchon's engagements with Enlightenment as event and enlightenment as  
process,  the points of intersection and departure that mark this  relationship. From this  an 
attempt will  be made to understand the different critiques effected, but also the different  
logics pursued where there is overlap. Foucault's writing on Enlightenment varies enormously 
throughout his career and these interactions are situated primarily in his lesser-known articles,  
33 Ibid., 215.
34 Palmeri, ‘Other Than Postmodern?’, 28.
35 Cowart, ‘Attenuated Postmodernism’, 159–188.
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which  to  date  have  not  been  given  the  attention  they  deserve  in  Pynchon  scholarship. 
Foucault's explicit engagement with, and definition of, Enlightenment (indexed on the terms 
“l'Aufklärung”  and  “lumière”,  where  translatable  as  “Enlightenment”,  as  opposed  to  just  
“light”)  takes place predominantly in his later works from 1978 onwards within Dits et  Écrits  
catalogue numbers  219, 266, 281, 279, 291, 306, 330, 339,  351,  353 and 361; with a few 
offhand earlier remarks in DÉ002 and 040; and one additional fleeting mention in CB-16.36
Within  the  monographs  themselves,  which  will  be  infrequently  referred  to  in  this 
study, The Birth of the Clinic  posits the eye as the Enlightenment bridge between a “classical 
clarity” to the nineteenth century (BC, xiv). Areas for further studies to explore in this work 
would  undoubtedly  be  the  incursion  of  death  into  Enlightenment  thought  as  a  source  of  
knowledge (152-154) and Foucault's assertion that Enlightenment thought resulted in moral  
prohibitions morphing into a technical mediation; effaced from the ethical in the service of  
knowledge (200-201). Meanwhile,  History of Madness  passes two comments on the subject, 
referring to the triumph of the Enlightenment forcing  libertinage underground (99) and the 
unity between “a ‘subject of the law’” and “the contemporary experience of man in society” in  
Enlightenment political thought (128). Finally,  The History of Sexuality  project proposes that 
one  of  the  reasons  sexuality  is  deemed  a  subversive  topic  is  a  desire  to  “link  together  
enlightenment, liberation and manifest pleasure” in order to “speak out against the powers 
that  be”.37 Conversely,  many  of  Foucault's  well-known  monographs  avoid  Enlightenment. 
Indeed, The Order of Things deploys the term “Enlightenment” only once, within a quotation, 
while The Archaeology of Knowledge, Discipline and Punish, The History of Sexuality Vol. 2: The  
Use of Pleasure and The History of Sexuality Vol. 3: The Care of the Self do not mention it at all 
(OT,  121).  How,  then,  is  it  possible  to  assert  the  centrality  of  Enlightenment  thought  to 
36 Ewald, Gros, and Meunier, ‘Publications Not Included’, 863, 871; O’Farrell, Michel Foucault, 134.
37 Foucault, The History of Sexuality Vol. 1, 7.
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Foucault's  undertaking?  Put  simply:  the  presence  of  an  engagement  with  Kant's  “What  is  
Enlightenment?” occurs at the beginning and end of Foucault's career in the paratexts; even if  
the monographs do not explicitly situate it as a central motif, it is a strain of thought running 
through all his works in the construction of a genealogical history of the present. It is also, as 
my epigraph indicates, an area that Foucault himself regarded as central to his project.
There are also some preliminary difficulties that should  be discussed regarding the 
level  of  acceptable  abstraction to meta-analysis.  For  instance,  the continuing  relevance of  
Foucault's  historico-social  surface  has  been  addressed  by  Todd  May  who  concurs  with 
Deleuze38 that Foucault never intended his epistemes to stand in historical perpetuity. 39 For 
instance,  Discipline and Punish specifies that the era of disciplinary prisons is, itself, already 
“losing something of [its] purpose” (306), a fact that Baudrillard significantly overlooks in his 
attention-seeking critique.40 Instead, according to May, Foucault's methodologies and practices 
are to be regarded as valid, useful historiographical and cultural tools.41 Conversely, though, 
Timothy  O'Leary  sees,  in  Foucault's  genealogies,  an  identity  between the  historic  and  the 
contemporary, particularly as it relates to Foucault's late writings on ipseic ethics: Foucault's  
histories are “avowedly motivated by present concerns rather than a disinterested curiosity 
about the past”.42 To do justice to Foucauldian methodology these aspects must be treated 
with caution.
The structure of this chapter is threefold. As with the previous work on Wittgenstein, 
the interdisciplinary poles of literary studies will be reconciled by a historicized approach to 
philosophy.  In unearthing a specific  history of  Foucauldian Enlightenment,  the chapter  will  
38 Deleuze, ‘Postscript on the Societies of Control’, 3.
39 May, The Philosophy of Foucault, 134.
40 Baudrillard, Forget Foucault, 34.
41 May, The Philosophy of Foucault, 152–153.
42 O’Leary, Foucault and the Art of Ethics, 82.
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begin by addressing these issues of geographical and temporal specificity, primarily in Mason 
& Dixon. This first section will roughly correspond to what Foucault termed, at the end of his  
life, the axis of knowledge.43 From an uncritical base in Foucault's early works, the primary 
mode of reference is easy to align with a Weberian framework. At this juncture, I will raise  
some queries, however, as to how closely aligned Pynchon truly is to a Weberian mode of  
Enlightenment through a consideration of Kantian ethics; Pynchon is conflicted over the role of  
duty in an ethical system. However, as Foucault's work progresses, the feasibility of so easily  
qualifying the Enlightenment becomes untenable and he moves towards a refusal to ethically 
judge  the  Enlightenment.  This  leads  to  the  second section  of  this  chapter,  which  focuses  
primarily  upon  Gravity's  Rainbow  and  Against  the  Day in  order  to  examine  issues  of 
institutional practice, mythicized abstraction and an increasing dialogue – often antagonistic, 
both from Foucault and Pynchon – with Adorno and Horkheimer's Dialectic of Enlightenment. 
It is this second section that will draw attention to the axis of power. Finally, the last portion of  
this  chapter will  consider Foucault's work on Kant's  “Was ist Aufklärung?” through his two 
articles both entitled “Qu'est-ce que les Lumières?” In examining these pieces, the demands  
that Foucault believed were placed upon the contemporary subject will be made perspicuous, 
both  in  terms  of  determination  through  power  relations  and  the  demarcation  of  ethical 
spheres, which will be primarily explored in  Vineland, Gravity's Rainbow and the essay piece 
“Nearer My Couch to Thee”. This examination will end, therefore, with the axis of ethics and  
the  self;  how  the  self  is  auto-constituted,  in  an  aesthetic  manner,  against  systems  of  
constraint.44
What emerges from this  chapter  overall  –  in  which I  re-appraise  several  canonical  
43 For all subsequent ‘axis’ references see ‘WE’, 316–318.
44 Interestingly, some have seen a resonance with Wittgenstein on the issue of self transformation. 
See: Davidson, ‘Introduction’, xxvi; Cavell, ‘The Availability of Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy’, 72.
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passages  of  Pynchon's  writing  –  is  not  so  much  an  incompatibility  between Foucault  and 
Pynchon, but rather differing intensities of interaction. The discrepancy and hostility that the  
reading herein implies towards existing, closed-down, dismissive interpretations comes about  
primarily because the mode of interrogation in this chapter is itself genealogical on the subject 
of “Enlightenment” in the Foucauldian archive. Before proceeding, I will only finally note the 
Pynchonian aptness of trawling an archive that traces the subdermal, forgotten material – the  
laundry lists of Foucault studies – in an unearthing of the history of the present. For if we are 
to reconstitute scattered meaning that has acquired too narrow a focus, Pynchon clearly tells  
us where to turn: “[b]ut knowing his  Tarot,  we would expect to look among the Humility,  
among the gray and preterite souls, to look for him adrift in the hostile light of the sky, the 
darkness of the sea...” (GR, 742).
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1957-1978: Modernity and Globalisation
“le personnage allemand de l'universitaire ont exercé là-bas une fonction 
que nous imaginons à peine”
– Michel Foucault, DÉ04045
A strange candidate for a best-seller atop the French book charts, Foucault's densest 
work,  The Order of  Things,  can be puzzling to a reader unfamiliar with the works of Kant,  
preoccupied as it is with concepts of “representation”, transcendentalism and empiricism. In 
spite of this, the aligned generic premise of the Kantian strain can be summed up in only a few  
words, derived from a short story by Borges, inscribed in Foucault's preface: “the impossibility  
of thinking that” (OT, xvi). In terms of Foucault's project, this refers to the necessary conditions 
for  the  emergence  of  an  episteme  within  a  historical  context,  while  in  terms  of  Kantian 
philosophy,  it  signals  the  negation  of  a  necessary  a  priori,  for  instance:  “one  can  never 
represent that there  is  no space”.46 Foucault  seeks,  in Timothy O'Leary's  phrasing,  not the 
“Kantian a priori, but the historical a priori”.47 Foucault's stance here is situated in opposition 
to Kant on a point that emerged in the Anthropology, but which is also present in the Critique  
of Pure Reason; it is Kant's internal contradiction or “paradox” of “how I can be an object for 
myself”,48 or  “how  a  subject  can  internally  intuit  itself”,  the  problem at  the  heart  of  the 
transcendental unity of apperception.49 It is notable that this is not confined to the pure realm, 
either, as it clearly crosses over into the realm of the ethical: the Critique of Practical Reason  
and  the  Grounding  for  the  Metaphysics  of  Morals  present,  as  Alenka  Zupančič  sees  it,  a 
45 ‘Une Histoire (DÉ040)’, 546.
46 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 175 (B39).
47 O’Leary, Foucault and Fiction, 83.
48 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 257–259 (B153–156).
49 Ibid., 189 (B68); Szakolczai, Max Weber and Michel Foucault, 81 sees this as the absolute central 
concern of Foucault’s work.
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“legislation  of  reason  [which]  requires  a  rule  that  presupposes  itself”.50 For  Foucault, 
abstracting this to a historical plane, post-Cartesian man – an “enslaved sovereign” that is at  
once a subject that knows and an object of knowledge (OT, 340) – possesses finitude as an 
analytic  a priori: an assertion that the subject “man” contains the predicate “finite”.51 In The 
Order of Things this analytic is justified with a specific Kantian allusion to the Transcendental  
Aesthetic, for the defining qualities that make such a statement analytic are the “spatiality of  
the body” and the “time of language” (OT, 343).
The presence of Kant in Foucault's thought, more so than the actual Kantian content 
perhaps, is of the utmost importance when charting the interaction with Pynchon's novels for,  
according to Foucault, Kant marks the boundary line of modernity, the turning point in our 
history at which Enlightenment and revolution irrevocably fuse (OT, 263). In terms of shared 
precepts,  it  has  been  widely  posited  that  Pynchon  and  Foucault  both  effect  critiques  of  
modernity and that, in one mode or another, these centre around notions of freedom. The 
interrelated  questions,  then,  that  will  guide  the  first  part  of  this  enquiry  are:  what  are  
Foucault's  and  Pynchon's  respective  critiques  of  modernity  and  how  are  these  critiques 
situated in relation to the Enlightenment?; questions that play a significant role from the very  
outset of Foucault's career. Interestingly, however, this line of enquiry cannot be pursued until  
certain facets of the thought of Max Weber have been troubled within Pynchon's discourse.
The three subsections herein deal with issues that are spawned from a parallel reading  
of Pynchon with Foucault's thought on Enlightenment until 1978 while also dealing extensively 
with Max Weber. The first subsection demonstrates the commonality of mathesis as the basis  
of Enlightenment thought between Foucault and Weber, who has been posited as key within 
50 Zupančič, Ethics of the Real, 19.
51 Kant’s original distinction between analytic and synthetic judgements can be found at Kant, Critique 
of Pure Reason, 141 (B10–11).
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Pynchon's  works.  This  then  segues  into  a  querying  of  the  accepted  wisdom  of  this  pure  
“application” of Max Weber to Pynchon's works and reveals, through an exploration of the  
concept of ethical duty within a Calvinist construct, that while the elements of mathesis appear  
to stand strong, the Calvinist strain is far more complex than anticipated and not entirely clear.  
Hence, Foucault and Weber are aligned with Pynchon on mathesis, but not necessarily on the 
social  factors that spurred it;  the mere symbolic overloading of  a text with imagery is not 
sufficient to demonstrate equality of thought. The purpose of this section can, therefore, be  
put with blunt simplicity and without tact: it  is designed to unseat Weber as the  de facto  
framework for Pynchon's anti-rationalist critique of modernity and thereby open a space in  
which Foucault can emerge. The second subsection introduces the more specific Foucauldian 
proposal that Enlightenment took a social turn in Germany and a natural science slant only in 
France. This section explores whether Pynchon's representation of Enlightenment can be said 
to posses the geographical features of Enlightenment history described by Foucault. The third  
and final subsection introduces the staged Enlightenment that Foucault brings into play and  
which culminates, historically speaking, with the Weberian critique. This section also works on 
Mason & Dixon,  positing that the notorious parallactic effect of Pynchon's historical  fiction 
makes  such  progression,  as  Foucault  sees  it,  impossible;  the  narrative  layers  are  too 
intertwined to be extricated and flattened.
Mathesis and Calvinism: Weber vs. Foucault
When thinking about Enlightenment Pynchon, it makes sense to consider one of the  
most significant allusions in  Gravity's Rainbow: Byron the Bulb. In this episode, often cast as 
surreal or bizarre, it is revealed that a light bulb named “Byron” is demonstrably “immortal”, to 
the great displeasure of the multinational cartels who thrive on the inbuilt redundancy of their  
products  and  whose  enterprise  would  be  subversively  undermined  should  news  of  this 
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particular bulb become public (GR, 647-655). Entwined in this allegory of capitalism and power 
is the notion of Enlightenment;  Byron, although nominatively Romantic, is not an agent of  
illumination without reason.  A coherent  reading of  this  Enlightenment context  is  made by 
Patrick  McHugh,  who  asserts  that  Byron's  tale  mirrors  Adorno  and  Horkheimer's 
“enlightenment of the Enlightenment”, acting as the solely clued-up agent against the Phoebus 
system, which although “ostensibly committed to the Enlightenment, to bringing light into the 
world, uncovering truth, empowering freedom and justice”, is actually “no more than a cog in  
a vast cooperate cartel that uses Enlightenment as a ruse in service of social control”. Against 
this intricate network of power – best visually illustrated in Markus Krajewski's piece52 – stands 
Byron, “the dissident intellectual enabled by his position in the social system to perceive the 
repressiveness of the system and dedicated to transforming his role from cultural agent of  
repression to cultural agent of freedom”.53
While McHugh remains sceptical of the capacity of such a figure to mount any effective  
resistance, entwined as it is within the hegemonic, white-guy structure, such an interpretation  
is valuable in this context for its recognition of the Foucauldian entanglement of knowledge 
and power, but neglects an even stronger aspect to emerge from the narrative. As McHugh 
notes,  Byron's  world  of  resistance  gradually  collapses  through  the  aesthetic  movements; 
Romanticism to Modernism to Postmodernism. There are two features of  this  contraction,  
however, that must be foregrounded: firstly, Byron's world shrinks to the point of personal 
betterment with disregard to societal influence, a trope with Voltarian resonance; secondly,  
and more importantly, dominant systems depend upon ignorance and unenlightened states, a 
potential  breakdown in the simple trajectory of  Enlightenment to capitalist  rationality.  The 
state in which Byron finds himself may be an accurate account of Enlightenment's results from  
52 Krajewski, ‘Im Schlagschatten Des Kartells’, 91.
53 McHugh, ‘Cultural Politics, Postmodernism, and White Guys’.
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a sceptical  viewpoint,  but it  is  certainly  a  deviation from Kant's  original  formulation, for it  
appears  that  Byron  actually  exists  in  a  state  of  unenlightened  immaturity;  self-incurred 
tutelage.  In  losing  the  will  to  revolution  and regressing  to  darkness,  is  Pynchon critiquing 
enlightenment, what Enlightenment has become or, in fact, the state in which the bulb has 
gone out: unenlightened humanity?
To begin to investigate this  curious reversal  of  the superficial  surface account that 
comes about through parallel with Kant and Foucault, it is worth turning to the first direct  
instance in Foucault's  writing of the term Enlightenment in one of  his  earliest publications 
(DÉ002, 1957). In this work, Foucault sets out to contextualise nineteenth-century psychology  
as one of the many disciplines seeking to imitate the natural sciences and to find an extension 
of the laws governing natural phenomena in man (“de retrouver en l'homme le prolongement 
des lois qui régissent les phénomènes naturels”). As Foucault sees it, this had limited success 
owing to the persistence of  humanism. According to Foucault,  the imitated factors include 
quantification (“rapports quantitatifs”),  resemblance to mathematical  laws (“élaboration de 
lois  qui  ont  l'allure  de  fonctions  mathématiques”)  and  explicative  hypotheses.54 Such  a 
formation, although deduced by Foucault in a different fashion, is entirely congruent with the 
philosophical/history-of-science  source  posited  by  Habermas  for  Max  Weber's  sociological  
extrapolation: Condorcet's Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind.  
Indeed,  this  work,  in  Habermas'  straightforward  reading,  proposes  that  “'Observation,  
experiment, calculation' are the three tools with which physics unlocks the secrets of nature”. 55 
Foucault's early, uncritical use of the term “Enlightenment”, which even at this stage was being  
framed in the German “l'Aufklärung” and thereby establishing the Kantian reference, proposes 
54 ‘La Psychologie (DÉ002)’, 120.
55 Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, 1:145–150; Foucault also mentions Condorcet in 
passing at HM, 640.
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the natural sciences as the base from which all concepts of the Enlightenment and rationality 
grow and  thereby  presents  a  notion  of  Enlightenment  that  stems from the  same root  as  
Weber, although taking neither the same route nor reaching the same judgemental conclusion 
as the Protestant Ethic.
As asserted at the very start of this piece, Weber has played a key role in Pynchon 
scholarship and, clearly,  the shared ground with early  Foucault on the topic of the natural  
sciences is also solid. To expand upon the Pynchon connection, though, in many ways, such 
transference of the natural sciences' methodologies is central to the environment depicted 
within  Gravity's  Rainbow,  which represents  the transition of  mathematics  into the applied 
realm of instrumental reason. In terms of quantification, Phoebus itself is precisely divided in  
ownership at “29% and 46% respectively” while Byron recognizes his species as living and dying 
in a world of statistics – “a few bulbs, say a million, a mere 5% of our number” (GR, 649) – the 
lifespan measured  out  to  “600  hours”,  with  checks  “every  50  hours  hereafter”  (GR,  650). 
Indeed,  Phoebus  is  the  embodiment  of  all  that  employs  instrumental  reason  in  Gravity's  
Rainbow, its core principle resting upon the etymological prefix of “rationality”, the “ratio”: 
“Phoebus based everything on bulb efficiency – the ratio of the usable power coming out, to  
the power put in” (654). For Phoebus, the rational course of action is to maximize this ratio as  
it will  result in quicker burnout and, therefore, bulb replacement. However, owing to their  
contractual obligations to “the Grid”, this is infeasible; the Grid needs to sell as much electricity 
as possible. In this moment, there is a heightened awareness of subjectivity, for each rational  
agent  finds  itself  in  competition  with  another,  whose  motives  and  agency  must  be  
acknowledged in a return to hostility and pólemos.
Crucially, though, this mode of rationality is not one of self-reflection and free-will. It  
is,  instead,  an  effort  of  rule-following.  Phoebus  has  its  “routine”  (650),  its  “procedure  to 
114
follow” (651). In this rule-following, there is no need to act in any way that does not accord  
with the logic; it is a technique that deprives those acting under it of agency. The bulbs, in their  
“terror” have the “common thought”: “we can't help […] there's never been anything we could  
do” (650). As has been ably demonstrated by Karl Löwith in his influential Max Weber and Karl  
Marx, this is specifically not a depiction of Weberian rationality, which, conversely, associates 
rationality with “freedom of action” through self-consciousness.56 Instead, it is the irrational 
consequence of  the process  of  rationalization.  If  in  some ways this  is  beginning to  sound 
Foucauldian,  though,  the  anti-Foucauldian  proposition  from  Pynchon's  narrator  that 
knowledge does not equal power must also be considered: “[s]ome do protest, here and there,  
but it's only information, glow-modulated, harmless, nothing close to the explosions in the  
faces of the powerful that Byron once envisioned” (650-651). Furthermore, any thinking on 
this must also raise the primary critique levelled at Foucault's work: in an environment that  
dictates the possibility of thought, what room is left for actual, or ethical, thinking? 
Since Pynchon consistently deploys metaphors of the Holocaust, it is worth noting the  
resonance with the defence used by Adolf Eichmann at his trial. Eichmann must, in part, be the 
inspiration for Pynchon's Blicero; geographically situated, in the final days of the war, on the  
Lüneburger Heide, as was Eichmann,57 he is described as the “highest oppressor” of the 175s 
(GR, 666). Interestingly, though, Eichmann's famous claim at his trial was that he had been 
following  the  Kantian  precept  of  the  categorical  imperative.58 For  this,  Hannah  Arendt 
denounced  him  as  representative  of  a  banal  evil59 that  consists  of  a  lack  of  thinking,  or 
imagination.60 The  problem  here,  as  Carsten  Bagge  Lausten  and  Rasmus  Ugilt  point  out, 
56 Löwith, Max Weber and Karl Marx, 45.
57 Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, 236.
58 Ibid., 135–137.
59 Ibid., 252.
60 Ibid., 287–288.
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following Žižek,61 is that the Categorical Imperative is not some manner of tool that can be 
applied in a logical cascade. Rather, a critique of practical reason must be an interrogation into  
the limits of subjectivity; the thinking subject must constantly mediate between the universal 
and the specific, for no imperative agent is likely to tell you, in their commands, whether they  
are good or evil.62 If, then, the disempowered defeatism of the bulbs is being used as an excuse 
to adopt the norm as moral right, to behave as “pastures of sleeping sheep” (GR, 650), it can 
be seen as the logical, easy way out.
Representations  of  this  absence  of  thought  and  Foucauldian 
determination-by-environment leading to complicity with systems vary throughout Pynchon's  
works. In Gravity's Rainbow, those who act in hegemonic complicity through “terror” are the 
would-be, futile subversives: light bulbs and The Counterforce act inside the pre-structured 
norm of Phoebus and its ilk. As such, they are not sufficiently empowered to effectively resist  
it. It must also be noted, however, that they do not act for the system, merely not against it. 
Jeff Baker puts this well: “participation in the system for whatever reason is tantamount to 
tacit  acceptance  and  even  approval  of  the  system's  horrible  effects”,63 a  reformulation  of 
Weber's notion that “Social Action […] includes both failure to act and passive acquiescence”. 64 
In  Against the Day, the most thematically similar of Pynchon's novels to  Gravity's Rainbow, 
there is a much clearer example of the flip side: “not an insignificant bureaucrat who thinks he  
is God but, rather, the God who pretends to be an insignificant bureaucrat”; those who have 
awareness  of  their  complicity,  but  choose  to  think  of  themselves  as  coerced. 65 Although 
61 See Žizěk, ‘Kant with (or Against) Sade’, 296–297 where it is argued that the Kantian moral Law 
cannot be identified with the Freudian superego and thus, Sade cannot be the whole truth of Kantian 
ethics.
62 Laustsen and Ugilt, ‘Eichmann’s Kant’.
63 Baker, ‘Plucking the American Albatross’, 182.
64 Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, 112.
65 Zupančič, Ethics of the Real, 97; cited in Laustsen and Ugilt, ‘Eichmann’s Kant’, 11.
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equally  a  facet  of  Mason  &  Dixon,  Against  the  Day's depiction  of  an  obsessionally 
mathematicized world66 exhibits its duty-bound moral agents, and also a further allegiance to a 
basic Weberian conception of Enlightenment, with exceptional clarity in the frame structure of 
the dime-novel, balloon-boy parody figures, the Chums of Chance.
While in more than one sense fulfilling the meta-textual trademark for which Pynchon 
is famed, in several ways the Chums also represent the progression that humanity makes from  
Enlightenment through to obedience. For instance, while they hover above a world hurtling  
headlong into ceaseless quantification, Pynchon plays up the hegemonic implications of Cold 
War rhetoric  by having  the Chums encounter,  at  multiple  points in the novel,  the Russian 
airship, the  Bol'shaia Igra.  Furthermore, when the Chums are ordered to Venice, they once 
again  encounter  the  Igra,  confirming  their  suspicions  that  “quite  beyond  coincidence, 
everywhere they had gone lately […] the inexorable Padzhitnoff, sooner or later, had appeared 
on  their  horizon”  (AtD,  245).  The  constant  “shadow” of  the  Russians  leads  the  Chums to 
speculate that their governmental body is conspiring to maintain the conflict between the two, 
as with Marvin Lundy's  observations in Don DeLillo's  Underworld,67 and the only means by 
which  such  a  conspiracy  could  be  overthrown  is  through  disobedience.  Thus,  the  Chums 
become aware that they are “being used to further someone's hidden plans” (442) and that 
their hegemony contributes towards such a conspiracy. More crucially, though, Randolph St.  
Cosmo posits that the device holding them in this complicity is “fear” (246).
While  the  Chums  experience  their  moment  of  self-realization,  they  are  ultimately  
swept up in a tide of capitalism and “contracts” that grow “longer and longer” while the “good 
unsought and uncompensated” in the world grows harder to locate, thus binding the social  
66 For examples: songs about quaternions (534), jokes about complex variables (589), discussion of the 
Riemann Zeta function (604), famous mathematicians (239, 458), mathematical metaphors (903).
67 DeLillo, Underworld, 170–171.
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and economic spheres. Even their own ship “has grown as large as a small city”, incorporating  
“slum conditions” and her engines profiting from a “favorable darkness” (1084). For Pynchon, 
though, it looks as though there is no agency in this presentation of Enlightenment because it  
was pre-ordained from the outset. While the Chums maintain their positivism and belief in  
progress as a linear concept, Pynchon returns, with supreme irony, to his Calvinist theme of 
predestination and concludes, as the final line of Against the Day, that it could not have been 
any other way: “[t]hey fly toward grace” (1085).
There is, then, a twofold depiction of the Chums of Chance as moral agents. On the 
one hand, they are bound in a, perhaps Kantian, duty by their multiple codes of conduct and  
act in blind obedience for the system. On the other, they are enmeshed in Calvinist doctrine, 
the brutal system under which nobody can know of their preordained fate determined by the 
malicious being who has decreed that most will  burn for all  eternity. Max Weber was also  
preoccupied with Calvinism and devotes almost half of The Protestant Ethic to a discussion of 
this system,68 describing it  as above all  responsible for the spirit  of capitalism69 and deeply 
connected to the trajectory of  Enlightenment.70 Calvinism, too, is  a duty-based system for, 
although  there  is  nothing  one  can  do  to  better  one's  own  situation  (it  has  been 
predetermined), worldly activity and prosperity is a sign of self-assurance and is, therefore, the  
correct behaviour to demonstrate one's own faith in being elect; a perverse optimism in the 
face of probable eternal torture.71 In short: to revolt is to have insufficient faith in one's own 
election, to work for the system does not guarantee election, but does at least demonstrate  
the only hope to oneself and faith in God that one could be elect. Yet, does Pynchon truly see  
68 I counted 55 pages mentioning Calvinism in this edition: Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of  
Capitalism.
69 Ibid., 10.
70 Ibid., 11.
71 Ibid., 67.
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this as the way of the world? Gravity's Rainbow is in agreement with Weber72 on the brutality 
and  inhumanity  of  Calvinism but  the  depiction  in  Against  the  Day  is  somewhat  different. 
Firstly, the outcome of Calvinist predestination is inverted: the majority will achieve Grace, but  
this is actually the hell of World War II where “the world you take to be 'the' world will die” 
(AtD, 554). In this obscene reversal, Gravity's Rainbow shows us the grace of Against the Day: it 
is  the  “mass  slaughter”  (GR,  234)  “the  putrefaction  of  corpses”  that  will  dominate  the 
landscape to come (GR,  235)  in a repeat of  the First  World War's  catastrophe.  There are, 
however, two readings of this irony. It can, of course, be read as a confirmation of the Calvinist 
state: the Chums have faith in their own election, as all must, but are really to encounter their  
nightmare; “they fly towards grace” is Pynchon's dark humour resurfacing. In a second reading, 
however, it would be the doctrine of Calvinism that is questioned here, confirmed by a final  
aspect  of  Pynchon's  fiction:  the  result  is  actually  known  in  advance.  There  can  be  no 
unknowable  predestination  in  a  postmodern  historical  novel,  only,  in  a  rare  moment  of  
certainty for the genre, absolutely known historical outcomes that induce further dramatic  
irony for the reader, even if they have taken “years to reach anyone who might understand 
what [they] meant” (AtD, 444). The narrator, the author and the reader, then, must sit outside  
the  predestined  sphere  and,  in  looking  back  on  history,  assume  the  role  of  the  Calvinist  
divinity. The narrator/author predetermines and the reader knows the outcome. These figures  
in Pynchon's writing, at least, sit outside the predetermined, unknown, Calvinist sphere and  
freedom again becomes a possibility.
Within the few articles in which the early Foucault writes on Enlightenment, there is a 
presentation  of  a  historical  progression  towards  an  instrumental  reason  predicated  on 
scientific  logic,  which  is  shared  with  Pynchon.  As  was  clear  from the  investigation  above,  
72 Ibid., 60.
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however, it  is very difficult to deal with these elements of mathesis in isolation; Pynchon's  
imagery  is  overwhelmingly  weighted  towards  concepts  that  feature  in  the  works  of  Max 
Weber. While this is mostly rooted in Calvinism – even Scarsdale Vibe's line “money will beget 
money” (AtD, 1001) is in actuality a quotation from Benjamin Franklin cited by Weber early in 
his argument73 – the conclusion that can be drawn from this thinking is that the Weberian  
Pynchon, assumed to be so solidly rooted in his works, is less secure than might be imagined. If  
Pynchon  is  seen  as  undertaking  a  dual  critique  of  the  duty-based  ethical  codes  and 
paradigmatic constraints upon the subject that derive simultaneously from Calvinism and legal  
structures – a condemnation of “unreflective participation” (AtD, 407) – then it is incredibly 
strange that the ironic inversion of Calvinist grace at the close of  Against the Day  deploys a 
post-determined  epistemological  certainty  to  achieve  its  metaphorical  effect.  In  short,  
although the environment depicted from Gravity's Rainbow through Mason & Dixon to Against  
the Day abounds with Weberian prospects, the narrative voice must speak from somewhere 
else, outside the lock-in of these systems. In its omniscience, it knows who is preterite and who 
elect by virtue of history, rather than by divinity.
There  are  many  grounds  on  which  Pynchon  and  Weber  could  also  be  seen  as 
fundamentally misaligned. For instance, further critique will examine the fact that Weber sees,  
in Talcott Parsons' words, “very narrowly limited” opportunities for the co-emergence of slave 
labour with a high level of economic rationality,74 an observation that clashes with  Gravity's  
Rainbow's depiction of camp Dora. Also: is the following statement from The Theory of Social  
and Economic  Organization truly  compatible with  Pynchon's  Luddite essay:  “[b]ut however 
fundamental it has been, this economic orientation has by no means stood alone in shaping 
the development of technology. In addition, a part has been played by the imagination and 
73 Ibid., 15.
74 Parsons, ‘Weber’s “Economic Sociology”’, 43.
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cognitation of impractical dreamers, a part by other-worldly interests and all sorts of fantasies,  
a part by pre-occupation with artistic problems, and by various other non-economic factors”? 75 
Indeed, it would be possible, no doubt, to critique  ad infinitum the areas in which Pynchon 
diverges  from  Weber,  particularly,  given  Gravity's  Rainbow's  apparent  distaste  for  causal 
science, Weber's assertion that “[s]ociology […] is a science which attempts the interpretative 
understanding of social action in order thereby to arrive at a causal explanation of its course  
and effects”.76 Conversely, as others have noted,77 later in his career, Foucault seriously studies 
Weber's work, the coincidences in their thinking having been merely fortuitous until that point.
To return to this subtle, yet critical, destabilization of the Weberian Pynchon, though, it  
is important to note that the elements of mathesis upon which Weber's thesis was grounded 
do remain solid in Pynchon's work. However, these elements of Weberian mathesis that do  
hold are also raised by Foucault, but with an interesting geo-specificity at play. While  DÉ002 
makes a sweeping generalisation as to the inevitable uptake of mathesis, in his 1966 review  
DÉ040  praising  Ernst  Cassirer's  neo-Kantian  perspective  in  La  Philosophie  des  Lumierès,  
Foucault  juxtaposes  the pan-European institutions  of  learning  in  1933 with  the impending  
backdrop of  National  Socialism to show the incomparability:  “France has had its  teachers,  
England  its  public  schools,  Germany  its  universities”  (“La  France  a  eu  ses  instituteurs, 
l'Angleterre ses public schools, l'Allemagne ses universités”), in which, “[t]he character of the 
German  university  had  a  function  there  that  we  can  scarcely  imagine”  (“le  personnage 
allemand de l'universitaire ont exercé là-bas une fonction que nous imaginons à peine”). 78 
While Foucault's conclusion that German universities fostered a moral conscience at that dark  
75 Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, 163.
76 Ibid., 88.
77 By way of a brief bibliographic overview, the following all discuss this topic: Dean, Critical and 
Effective Histories, 58–73; Gordon, ‘The Soul of the Citizen’; O’Neill, ‘The Disciplinary Society’; Owen, 
Maturity and Modernity; Szakolczai, Max Weber and Michel Foucault.
78 ‘Une Histoire (DÉ040)’, 546.
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time is  incidental to the argument here, what is striking is the delineation of each European 
nation. It is here that the early Foucault's correspondence with a quantifying Pynchon must be  
rigorously interrogated. According to early Foucault, this phenomenon of transference from 
the natural  sciences in the Enlightenment project, taken as a non-geographically determined 
given in most accounts of a Weberian Pynchon, is only applicable to one region: it is specifically  
French.
France, Germany, America: Geo-Specificity of Enlightenment in 
Mason & Dixon
Although  in  terms  of  direct  reference  to  the  Enlightenment  DÉ040  is  followed  by 
DÉ219,  the  pieces  are  separated  by  a  substantial  chronological  break,  as  were  Gravity's  
Rainbow and Mason & Dixon, via Vineland. Nevertheless, in 1978 the Enlightenment resurfaces 
at the heart of Foucault's enterprise with an introduction to Georges Canguilhem's piece The 
Normal and the Pathological  (DÉ219). This  work marks the beginning of an ever-increasing 
number of references to the Enlightenment in Foucault's oeuvre and could perhaps be seen as 
the delimiter of a middle period in his thought on this theme. However, for the topic at hand, 
two significant aspects arise from this piece. Firstly,  Foucault calls for an investigation into 
“why this question of the Enlightenment […] has such a different destiny in Germany, France 
and the Anglo-Saxon countries”, the primary distinction that Foucault draws being the German 
lineage of a “historical and political reflection on society” evidenced by “the Hegelians to the 
Frankfurt  School  […]  and  Max  Weber”,  whereas  in  France,  it  was  the  history  of  science,  
“through Duhem” and “Poincaré” in which the philosophical stakes of the Enlightenment were 
invested.79 For this reason, it is problematic when scholars such as Aída Beaupied assert that  
79 Foucault, ‘Introduction to The Normal and the Pathological’, 10–11.
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“Foucault's  views  on  the  Enlightenment  can  be  readily  used  in  any  analysis  of  Spanish 
America”;80 for Foucault, Enlightenment becomes, at this stage in his career, geographically 
specific.81 Secondly, at this juncture in Foucault's thought he delineates three Enlightenment 
movements within different eras: the coming-into-being of “scientific and technical rationality”  
as  a  component  of  “productive  forces”  and  “political  decisions”;  rationalism  as  a  utopian 
“hope” for a predestined “revolution”; and the final movement in which Enlightenment is seen  
“as  a  way  to  question  the  limits  and  powers  it  has  abused.  Reason  –  the  despotic 
enlightenment”. The term “Enlightenment” has internal temporal specificities.82
According to Foucault, then, the critique of Enlightenment in historical and social terms  
is primarily a German trend, while the French have explored this topic through the natural 
sciences. Foucault himself  proposes to bridge the two. To begin to explore this geographic 
specificity and look for overlap between Foucault and Pynchon, it is prudent to examine the 
novel that comes closest to intersecting the Enlightenment and geo-diversity: Mason & Dixon  
with  its  “latitudes  and departures”,  its  “there  and  back  again”s  and  its  mechanical  ducks. 
Indeed,  David  Cowart,  among  many  others,  has  highlighted  this  theme,  calling  Pynchon's  
Enlightenment  epic  “a  773-page  extension  of  the  sentiments  previously  articulated  in 
Pynchon's 1984 article 'Is It  O.K. To Be a Luddite?'”83 Furthermore, aspects of geographical 
specificity have played a major part in the history of Pynchon's writing and this  cannot be 
underplayed. In early Pynchon criticism that charge was led by William Plater whose work on 
the Baedeker guides placed them centrally for an understanding of V.84 In addition, with regard 
80 Beaupied, ‘From Liberty to Fatherland’, 125. Some level of awareness of this problem is signalled by 
the presence of the word ‘appropriations’ in this book’s subtitle.
81 See also Gordon, ‘Question, Ethos, Event’, 20; this is also a theme expounded in the 1978 lecture 
Foucault, ‘WC’, 388–389.
82 Foucault, ‘Introduction to The Normal and the Pathological’, 10–11.
83 Cowart, ‘The Luddite Vision’, 344.
84 Plater, The Grim Phoenix, 64–134.
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to the  later  texts,  David  Seed  has  made  a  good case  for  the  postcolonial  interrelation  of  
cartography and imperialistic economics.85
Regardless  of  the  justice  or  otherwise  of  these  appraisals  the  political  climate  is 
admittedly difficult for Pynchon's astronomers. France and Britain have fought the Seven Years 
War  and  France  is  on  the  brink  of  covertly  supporting  the  Americans  in  their  separatist  
enterprise. For this reason, a justified early onset of Anglo-American Francophobia is merited 
within the work when Bongo, the olfactory prodigy aboard the Seahorse, announces from the 
“windward side”, with “a look of Savage Glee”, the imminent approach of the “Frenchies”. 
Crucially,  this  nasal  approach  towards  detecting  the  French  is  a  deviation  from the  usual 
rationality on board; it is depicted as an outmoded tribal ritual (“Savage”), one of the “ancient  
Beliefs” that will “persist” despite the assertion of the Captain Smith to Mason and Dixon that  
“You'll note how very Scientifick we are here, Gentlemen” (37).
Indeed,  the  multiple  juxtapositions  of  the  French  in  regard  to  scientific  advances 
throughout  this  work  –  which  superficially  lend  credence  to  a  parallel  with  Foucault's 
conception of Enlightenment specificity  – can be neatly encapsulated in the novel's  stance 
towards the Jesuits and in Vaucanson's mechanical duck. The overly satirized 86 Jesuits who 
appear throughout Mason & Dixon are reputed, by Pynchon's Dr. Franklin, to have constructed 
a laser-based system of geostationary satellite relay, which Elizabeth Jane Wall Hinds believes 
“[undermines] chronology”87 through its translation into eighteenth-century terms as “giant 
balloons” deploying “Mirrors of para- (not to mention dia-) bolickal perfection” to achieve their  
“d–––'d Marvel of instant Communication” (287). In  Mason & Dixon, the Jesuits are framed 
through an awkward moment wherein Dixon is  suspected of harbouring Jesuit sympathies.  
85 Seed, ‘Mapping the Course of Empire in the New World’.
86 Cowart, ‘The Luddite Vision’, 354; Ostrowski, ‘Conspiratorial Jesuits in the Postmodern Novel’, 98.
87 Hinds, ‘Introduction’, 12.
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This takes place through a complex context of diverse geo-political interaction.
The suspicion laid on Dixon at this point turns upon his recognition of Chinese writing 
on the obverse of one of Céléron de Bienville's lead plates (MD, 285-287). While Bienville's 
lead-plate expedition was less overtly  violent than his war against the Chickasaw Indians,88 
Dixon's  casual  dismissal  of  the  “Royal  Seal  of  France”  further  aggravates  his  companions'  
suspicions to the point where he is only redeemed through pointed dropping of the “Masonick 
password”. The culmination of this is an explanation that they specifically suspected Dixon of 
being a Jesuit from “up North in Quebec” who had “cross[ed] the border in disguise, to work 
some mischief down here” (287). Interestingly, this section is effecting an intricate conjunction  
of France, the Jesuits and technology, the latter of which, given the Luddite essay, is a key  
component, if not the definition, of Enlightenment for Pynchon. This is achieved, in the first  
instance, by the situation of the Jesuits' base in Quebec, the historical capital of New France.  
Secondly,  though,  Pynchon presents the aforementioned French imperialistic  expedition of  
Céléron de Bienville,89 the inscription on whose plates were referred to by an unidentified 
Indian replying  to  Col.  William Johnson as  “Devilish  writing”,  although in  reference to the 
French, rather than any Chinese.90 However, it must also be considered that it is hardly just the 
French who form the locus of this technological drive.
In regard to the former of these observations, it should be noted that France was not  
always a refuge of tolerance for the Jesuits, but only during this colonial phase before the 
Seven Years  War.  For  example,  in  1554 the order  met  with  stern opposition from Bishop  
Eustace du Bellay and the French Parliament on theological and political grounds and it took 
them until 1562 to establish themselves legally in France,91 a good deal later than in many 
88 See Atkinson, Splendid Land, Splendid People.
89 Crumrine, History of Washington County, 23–28.
90 Ibid., 27.
91 O’Malley, The First Jesuits, 287–296.
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European nations,  the society having met with Papal  approval  as early  as 1540. 92 As such, 
Pynchon's representation of a conflated Franco-Jesuit establishment is historically specific to  
the explicit time-frame of  Mason & Dixon and does not appear interested in exploring the 
Jesuit movement's complicated history within France. The situation is also historically accurate  
for  the  New  World  settlers,  however,  and,  as  Carl  Ostrowski  points  out  in  his  piece  on 
conspiratorial  Jesuits  in  Mason  & Dixon  and DeLillo's  Underworld,  this  exhibits  an  English 
nationalism that was primarily reflected through an anti-Catholicism, of which the Jesuits were 
the most convenient embodiment.93
On the second point, Mason & Dixon does not restrict its technological innovation to 
the French. While it is true that the most notable techno-entrepreneurial incident in the novel,  
Jacques de Vaucanson's mechanical, invisible, erotic duck (371-381), is the product of both a 
“Frenchy” (371) and a Jesuit94 and it is also true that, according to James J. Walsh, the Jesuits  
were among the upper echelons of technological innovation at this time, 95 were Pynchon to be 
entirely aligned on his conception of Enlightenment with the Foucault of 1978, one would also 
expect his depiction of Germany to be one of social, as opposed to technological, reform. This  
does not appear to be straightforwardly the case. Indeed, in the frame narrative section of the  
novel in which the Reverend Wicks Cherrycoke relates the tale of Mason and Dixon to his  
captive audience of youngsters, they are visited by a certain “Dr. Nessel, the renown'd German 
Engineer”, one of only a handful of references to that country in the novel and worth bearing 
in mind as a parallel to the German engineers depicted in Pynchon's earlier work. Far from  
focusing his critique in a Foucauldian “historical and political reflection on society”, however,  
92 Ibid., 284.
93 Ostrowski, ‘Conspiratorial Jesuits in the Postmodern Novel’, 93–95; see also Marotti, ‘Southwell’s 
Remains’, 37.
94 Doyen and Liaigre, Jacques Vaucanson, 12.
95 Walsh, American Jesuits, 10; cited in Ostrowski, ‘Conspiratorial Jesuits in the Postmodern Novel’, 96.
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Dr. Nessel  adds a new planet and knowledge thereof – no matter how “domesticated”, in  
Timothy Parrish's reading96 – to the “numerous Orreries” he had built across America (95). 
Other references to Germany are also framed by the natural, as opposed to social, sciences; 
the mix of Laudanum offered to Mason is “compounded according to the original Formulae of 
the  noted  Dr.  Paracelsus,  of  Germany”  (267)  and  Dixon  receives  the  “latest  Declination 
Figures” by means of the “German Packet” (299). This last example, which, as Dave Monroe 
has pointed out97 actually refers to a boat,98 has further resonances with technological systems 
for  delivering  data  in  the twentieth century,  most  notably  packet  switching  networks,  the  
German version of which (the “German packet” network) came under sustained attacks in the 
1980s by crackers who could intercept the data sent over the system.99 The conspiratorial 
nature of the communications in the passage that follows – “Hush […] No one ever speaks of  
that aloud here” – suggests that this reading is merited and, as a consequence, the depiction of  
Germany is once more dragged into the techno-scientific arena.
Yet,  there is  an alternative presentation of  Germany in Pynchon's work that would 
show that country as a force for social critique; the German aligned as a religious and mystical  
entity, presenting an argument against techno-rationality. The foremost example of this is the 
“German of Mystickal Toilette” who “advises the Astronomers” against the “Folly”, permitted 
by “Cities”, that:
daily  Living  upon  the  Frontier  will  not  forgive.  They  feed  one  another's 
pretenses, live upon borrow'd Money as borrow'd Time, their lives as their 
deaths put, with all appearance of Willingness, under the control of others  
mortal  as  they,  rather  than  subject,  as  must  Country  People's  lives  and 
deaths be, to the One Eternal Ruler. That is why we speak plainly […]. Our 
Time is much more precious to us”. (344)
96 Parrish, From the Civil War to the Apocalypse, 163–164.
97 Monroe, ‘Germany’.
98 There are also references to the “Falmouth packet” (96) and the “Halifax packet” (704).
99 Goggans, ‘Packet Switched Network Security’.
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Such a stance, wherein one sees a critique of the division of labour in society as a specific  
reaction to the Enlightenment rationality that permitted such an economic setup, is extremely  
interesting  in  Pynchon's  urban  context.  The  reason  for  this  is  that  the  aforementioned 
depiction  of  Manhattan  in  Against  the  Day shows  September  the  11th 2001  to  be  an  act 
“appropriate […] to urban civilization” (AtD, 151). In short, the social critique of the division of 
labour – on its trajectory through the Enlightenment – culminates in a mode of resistance that  
posits terrorism as just retribution.
To  return  to  geo-specificity,  however,  the  ultimate  balance  of  the  presentation  of 
Germany in  Mason & Dixon  lies  more to the natural  sciences  and this  infects  even those 
instances where a German social or even metaphysical critique is at play. The best example of  
this  is the German “Dieter” encountered by Maskelyne early in the novel.  In this  scenario,  
Dieter begs Maskelyne to use his influence with Clive to release him from the bond of military  
service into which he felt press-ganged. While this could be viewed as an element of social 
critique, it is tempered once more by a scientific rationality, for the pull that Maskelyne feels is  
described as one of  “no escape”, a  pull  then described, as Strandberg has noted, 100 in  the 
language of science: “the Logic of the Orbit, the Laws of Newton and Kepler constraining” (MD, 
162).
Of course, much of Pynchon's novel is speaking of America; it is for good reason that  
the  largest  section of  Mason  & Dixon bears  that  nation as  its  title.  Yet,  as  with  much of 
Pynchon's  work,  such  as  Gravity's  Rainbow,  the  European  setting  serves  as  the  backdrop 
against which America was formed, from which it was supposed to diverge. This is echoed in  
Mason & Dixon  under the most  heavily  quoted review passage wherein  it  is  asked “Does 
Britannia, when she sleeps, dream? Is America her dream? […] serving as a very Rubbish-Tip for 
100 Strandberg, ‘Dimming the Enlightenment’, 107.
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subjunctive Hopes, for all that may yet be true” (345). The Foucault of 1978 does not give any 
detail on the English and American stakes of Enlightenment, he merely points out that they are 
different, which makes any direct reading with Pynchon difficult at this stage. From what has  
been seen, however, it looks more likely that Pynchon's nationalities do not reflect a specific  
form of engagement with the Enlightenment, but rather adopt the earlier Foucault's stance on 
the natural sciences and mathesis as the basis for all geographically non-specific Enlightenment 
discourse. This said, a 1975 interview with Foucault could offer material for further work on  
this  topic  in  its  revelation of  an interesting,  specifically  American fascination with  Nazism,  
asking: “[w]hy these boots, caps, and eagles that are found to be so infatuating, particularly in 
the United States?”101 However, the aspect to which I will now move my focus is, again, the  
curious novelistic form with which Pynchon plays in terms of temporality, for Foucault, it will  
be remembered, also posited a specificity of the Enlightenment to various stages. With this in  
mind, how are we to frame this concept when Pynchon's novels collapse conventional notions 
of novelistic time-progression?
Time and Time Again
As  stated,  the  Foucault  of  1978  divides  the  phases  of  Enlightenment  into  the  
coming-into-being  of  “scientific  and  technical  rationality”  as  a  component  of  “productive 
forces”  and  “political  decisions”;  rationalism  as  a  utopian  “hope”  for  a  predestined 
“revolution”;  and  then  Enlightenment  “as  a  way  to question  the  limits  and powers  it  has 
abused. Reason – the despotic enlightenment”.102 However, Pynchon's work (as explored in the 
initial  survey on non-linear time in  the previous chapter)  does not obey a straightforward 
progression through historical  phases.  Indeed,  much of  the structure of  Mason & Dixon  is 
101 Foucault, ‘Sade: Sergeant of Sex’, 226.
102 Foucault, ‘Introduction to The Normal and the Pathological’, 10–11.
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intended to thwart such linearity, such as the sub-narrative, metaleptic folding of the Ghastly 
Fop episode  to seamlessly  integrate  with  its  own frame text;  a  para-text  inscribed at  the 
threshold of immanence and transcendence (536).103 Instead, Pynchon's novel is designed to 
constantly disrupt its own historicity, such as with the Jesuit telegraph which parallels modern  
communication  technology.  This  being  the  case  –  that  Pynchon's  novel  is,  in  effect,  a 
metatextual  representation  of  the  very  simultaneity  described  throughout  his  work  –  if 
Pynchon even remotely shares some aspects of a phased Enlightenment with the Foucault of  
1978,  then  it  would,  most  likely,  be  reflected  in  the  novel  containing,  at  diverse  levels,  
elements of each of these definitions of Enlightenment.
The first of these temporal phases is comprehensively covered by the aforementioned 
discussion of the natural sciences. Certainly, for Pynchon, the Enlightenment is situated at the 
locus  of  politics  and  technology  mediated  by  production  and  consumption.  The  second,  
however, is more difficult to cover. Evidently, a utopian hope must imply both of its Greek  
homophonic prefixes, the best and the impossible, conflated into one. It is also evident that  
there is a moment in  Mason & Dixon  where such a hope is  situated, within an overriding 
framework of subjunctive possibility yet undermined by its impossibility. This is, of course, the  
purported tale wherein Dixon is reputed to have snatched the whip from the hands of a slave 
driver (695-700).  Rather  than attempting to,  yet  again,  re-cast  this  scene as a moment  of  
ethical agency in the work – a view that Brian Thill has persuasively problematized 104 and to 
whose work I will refer several times – I will examine the episode and its subject matter as they  
could  interact  with,  or  diverge  from,  Foucault's  1978  account  of  Enlightenment  temporal 
specificity.
103 For more, see McHale, ‘Pynchon’s Postmodernism’, 105–106.
104 Thill, ‘The Sweetness of Immorality’.
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This episode and its theme of slavery, which Charles Clerc has called that for which 
Pynchon “saves his greatest wrath”105 and which other critics have regarded as utterly central 
to  Mason & Dixon106, is presented within a much-commented-upon anachronistic structure. 
Indeed,  Dixon's  assault  on  the  slave-vendor  is  pointedly  contextualised  from  the  reader's  
knowledge of the later significance of the Line for the Civil War, liberal values and slavery: “'Go 
back to Philadelphia,' someone shouts at Dixon” (699). This moment of abolitionist hope for  
Dixon  represents,  as  Jeffrey  Staiger  puts  it  in  his  rebuff  to  James  Wood  with  allusion  to  
Griffith's  infamous  1915  film,  an  “alternative  space  of  imaginative  and  ultimately  political  
possibility, an America without inequality and injustice that hovered like the ghost of an ideal  
over the birth of a nation”.107 However, this boundless possibility is tempered, twofold, by the 
narrative situation whereby the certainty of Dixon's interference is questioned: “'No proof,'  
declares Ives” (695); and, for Staiger, in its fictional boundaries: it “exists only as a conjecture 
in  Mason & Dixon”.108 The action is, then, situated at the junction of three temporal points: 
Dixon's  supposed  1755  attack,  Wicks  Cherrycoke's  1786  (MD,  6)  post-revolutionary  war 
storytelling  and  Pynchon's  late-twentieth-century  perspective,  the  convergence  of  which 
Christy L. Burns has called Pynchon's “parallactic method” and the effect of which Mitchum 
Huehls  has  dubbed a  ventriloquizing  “Chinese-boxed”  style.109 For  a  Foucauldian  temporal 
specificity, this has interesting consequences.
In one sense, this episode can be seen to present Enlightenment's utopian hope for a  
predestined revolution through the fusion of ante- and post- bellum perspectives. Mason and  
Dixon's antipathy towards slavery is on track as the winning side, apparently strengthened  
105 Clerc, Mason & Dixon & Pynchon, 103–104.
106 Hinds, ‘Introduction’, 14; Parrish, From the Civil War to the Apocalypse, 185; Thill, ‘The Sweetness of 
Immorality’, 49.
107 Staiger, ‘James Wood’s Case’, 641.
108 Ibid.
109 Burns, ‘Postmodern Historiography’; Huehls, ‘The Space That May Not Be Seen’, 32–40.
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through the layered twentieth-century viewpoint. Foucault's mid-stage Enlightenment appears 
confirmed: the teleology of progress, for the inhabitants of  Mason & Dixon, wends its way. 
However, Pynchon's narrative is not so straightforward; the overlayed parallax effect makes 
perspicuous the fact that inequality is not eradicated, but rather masked in the contemporary  
era, often still across racial bounds. As Rousseau puts it in  Emile: “[t]here is no subjection so 
perfect as that which keeps the appearance of freedom”.110 This is, for instance, explored in 
Against  the Day through Hop Fung, the owner of the white slave simulation industry with  
which Dally Ridout becomes involved (AtD, 339-340). This parody on slave “colour” was also 
posited in Gravity's Rainbow where Claude Gongue the “notorious white slaver of Marseilles” 
encounters problems with his quarry who wish to be green and magenta slaves (GR, 246) and 
in Vineland where Zoyd watches “Say Jim”, a parody of Star Trek “in which all the actors were 
black except for the the Communications Office” (VL,  370). By highlighting the absurdity of 
racial  division,  Pynchon  reveals  the  injustice  of  that  representation  and  the  artificial  
boundaries across which empathic identification must, but often fails to, traverse: “whites in  
both places are become the very Savages of their own worst Dreams” (MD, 301). Furthermore, 
this middle-phase Enlightenment is problematic in Pynchon because of the interdependence of  
the narrative layers. If, even at one level, a positivist, ethical, abolitionist teleology is proposed, 
the  sceptical,  contemporary  voice  still  protests  that  Enlightenment  rationality  was  
instrumental  in first creating slavery for,  and then turning slavery to,  its  own ends; first it  
conquered  and  then  deployed.  Thill  puts  this  one  way  when  discussing  the  astronomers'  
fantasies  of  using  slave labour (MD,  69):  “slavery  leading the charge to  Enlightenment”.111 
Pynchon puts it another: “Commerce without Slavery is unthinkable”, a slavery that depends 
upon the “gallows” (MD, 108).
110 Rousseau, Emile, 120.
111 Thill, ‘The Sweetness of Immorality’, 73.
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Foucault's transitory, positivist Enlightenment has a limited place in Pynchon's fiction, 
primarily because it is established in the novels as a straw man to be savagely beaten aside by 
the dramatic irony of the later voice. Yet, in other areas, the historical context takes primacy.  
In fact, it is this historical inflection that empowers the genealogical strain of Pynchon's work; it  
becomes  possible  to  read  connections  between  the  hegemonic,  guilty  complicity  of  the  
fictionalised Mason and Dixon and twentieth-century capitalism.112 At a point where the critical 
reflection of Enlightenment has come about, from within its own target of critique, Pynchon's 
structure reverses the historical  progression that Foucault  sees.  It  is true that the voice of 
critique  is  framed  from  a  twentieth-century  perspective,  but  it  is  routed  through  the  
antecedent  eras.  Pynchon's  means  of  questioning  the  limits  and  powers  that  reason  has 
abused is to put a contemporary, yet disturbed, Weberian critical voice positing “[r]eason – the 
despotic enlightenment” into a two-way dialogue with its historical counterpoints.
In Foucault's first 1978 piece it was posited that Enlightenment possessed a character 
that was both geographically and temporally specific. Interrogating these concepts and looking  
for traces and ruptures in Pynchon's work yields several conclusions. At first glance, Pynchon's  
techno-Franco-Jesuits certainly appear, superficially, to endorse a Foucauldian stance of France 
as the privileged site of an Enlightenment whose stakes are invested in the Natural Sciences.  
Closer inspection reveals, however, that the parallel ends here. Pynchon's Germans, although 
perhaps more esoterically mystical than his French, do not correspond to Foucault's model of a 
socially critical Enlightenment. Furthermore, at this point Foucault remained silent on issues  
that  would  allow  an  engagement  with  the  prominent  theme  of  American  exceptionalism 
presented in  Mason & Dixon. On issues of historical  specificity and phased enlightenment, 
Pynchon's narrative is woven far closer to Foucault's. In the parallactic narrative perspective, 
112 See Baker, ‘Plucking the American Albatross’, 168.
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the  techno-rationality-production  triad  is  fused  with  an  ethical  utopianism  and  an  arch 
scepticism. In the interactions between these layers, however, Pynchon outdoes Foucault as 
the master of anti-teleologies. Pynchon's simultaneous Enlightenment stances, within each of 
the tiered frame structures, collapses the historical progression that Foucault articulates at this  
stage. Through collapse and shrinking of historical distance, Pynchon paints a fuller, broader 
genealogical canvas of the multiple geographies and times of Enlightenment than Foucault's  
discourse could picture.
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1978-1983: Nothing to do With Guilt or Innocence
Quant à l'Aufklärung, je ne connais personne, parmi ceux qui font des 
analyses historiques, qui y voie le facteur responsable du totalitarisme.
– Michel Foucault, DÉ279113
Foucault's  trajectory  of  thought  on  the  Enlightenment  is  one  that  oscillates,  best 
demonstrated at this juncture by a problematic 1978 interview first published in 1980 (DÉ281). 
Perhaps as a consequence of the flux in his thought at this point, Foucault essentially reverts  
here to a straightforward repetition of the Weberian-inflected, early Frankfurt School mantra:  
“[c]ouldn't it be concluded that the Enlightenment's promise of attaining freedom through the  
exercise of  reason has been turned upside down, resulting in domination by reason itself,  
which increasingly usurps the place of freedom?”114 Clearly, this view has a strong resonance 
with Foucault's earliest, unproblematized stance on the Enlightenment, but is now entwined 
within a fluctuating field of geographically and temporally specific complications.
As  Foucault  does  not  himself  further  pursue  these  complications,  this  section  will  
partially  leave  them aside  also  in  order  to  explore  Foucault's  next  assertion,  namely  that  
reason cannot be put on trial. As shall be seen, much of the logic supporting this proposition is  
centred around its implied negation; what would be the virtue of an unreason unchecked? 
However, there is also a strange notion of statehood emerging here that becomes critical to 
Foucault's Enlightenment. This point of Foucault's journey takes a sharp swerve away from 
seeing rationality as, in and of itself, a malignant presence and instead veers towards a critique  
of its mechanisms of operation when entwined with a political system.
113 ‘Postface (DÉ279)’, 36.
114 Foucault, ‘Interview’, 273.
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“Je n'ai en aucune manière cherché à mener la critique du 
rationalisme”
From  Foucault's  round-table  discussion  in  1978  (DÉ279),  his  multiple  visions  of 
Enlightenment begin to converge, even if they do not assume coherence. From this moment  
onwards he claims that “for three reasons”, he “in no way” further seeks to critique rationality.  
Of these three reasons, the first is a shaky justification in which Foucault claims that rationality  
never truly recovered from the high praise it received from the orthodox Marxists. Secondly,  
moving to stronger ground, for reasons of “method”, a critique of rationality would incorrectly 
presuppose  the  moral  victory  and  indefeasible  rights  [“droits  imprescriptibles”]  of  the 
irrational, which would make little sense [“Cela n'aurait pas beaucoup de sens”] when studying  
the  implementation  of  specific  forms  of  rationality  within  institutional  practices.  Finally, 
Foucault ends with a defensive plea that for reasons of principle, the respect for the ideal of 
rationalism  should  never  be  abused  to  prevent  the  analysis  of  rationality  actually 
implemented.115 As a parting note from this summary, the transience of this phase should be 
noted; by 1984, in his “Interview with Actes” (DÉ353), Foucault had reverted to judgemental 
statements: “[t]he Enlightenment is not evil incarnate, but it isn't the absolute good, either,  
and certainly not the definitive good”.116
As  when  Foucault  had  previously  situated  his  thinking  on  Enlightenment  at  
geographically and temporally specific targets, here the focus is once again shifted. While it is  
likely  that  Pynchon  would  agree  with  the  sentiment  of  the  first  point,  Gravity's  Rainbow 
exhibiting little love for Karl Marx – referring to him as a “sly old racist” (GR, 317) and siding, 
more generally, with Marcuse's revisionist critique of automation in Marx117 – the argument 
115 ‘Postface (DÉ279)’, 36.
116 Foucault, ‘Interview with Actes’, 399.
117 Marcuse flags up that, in Marx, ‘the proletariat destroys the political apparatus of capitalism, but 
retains the technological’. Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 22–23.
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presented here as a precursor to a defence of rationalism is slight. The second issue, while 
being more sound, is not unproblematic. Indeed, the difficulty here is how Foucault can state,  
without  irony,  that  it  would not  make  much  sense  to  prescribe  indefeasible  rights  to  the  
irrational, for the negative tautology is obvious: it would be illogical to strengthen the illogical;  
using rationality to defend rationality. As Derrida's prominent critique of  History of Madness 
accused  Foucault  of  describing  a  transcendental  history  from  a  debilitated  immanent 
position,118 so here the same charge could be levelled that Foucault is motivated to defend 
rationality from too far within that very structure.
That said, and assuming that a rational standpoint can have validity when assessing the  
irrational, it is possible to see a limited interaction with several key Pynchonian aspects. As I  
have already noted, Pynchon has written in essay form: “A Journey Into the Mind of Watts”, “Is  
it O.K. to be a Luddite?” and “Nearer my Couch to Thee”, among others. These pieces work 
differently  to  his  fiction,  positing  direct  action  (for  instance:  resisting  the  machine)  –  as 
opposed to a work such as Gravity's Rainbow in which the direct opposition, The Counterforce, 
achieves only limited success in urinating over a table of executives (636). Indeed, it is referred 
to  in  the  context  of  Roger  Mexico's  dream as  “the  failed  Counterforce”  (713)  and  Stefan 
Mattessich summarizes it thus: “[t]he Counterforce produces no coherent program for undoing 
the structures of death that menace civilization in the novel”.119 However, in both forms – one 
couched in the formal, rational language of argument, the other deploying the miraculous in a  
limited wish for otherwiseness – a direct critique of a specific form of techno-rationality, as  
opposed to all  forms of  rationality,  remains.  Furthermore,  in  “Nearer  my Couch to Thee”,  
Pynchon  writes  of  “technology's  good  intentions”,  thereby  intimating  that  it  is  specific  
deployments – as Foucault calls them: “institutional practices” – that pervert an otherwise 
118 Derrida, ‘Cogito and the History of Madness’, 69.
119 Mattessich, Lines of Flight, 72.
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benign course (“Nearer”, 23).
It  is  right,  therefore,  to  ask:  what  is  Gravity's  Rainbow  if  not,  to  an  extent,  an 
exploration of these institutional practices, a re-casting of the familiar narrative of World War  
II's  political  aggression and genocide in the shady realm of  corporate cartels  and fiscalized 
power-relations? Although this  genealogical resituation of the dominant historical  narrative 
has also been demonstrated by Victor Strandberg with respect to Mason & Dixon,120 this tenet 
is  best  illustrated  in  Pynchon's  plastic,  Imipolex  G,  which  forms  a  crucial  component  of 
Gottfried's  shroud in  the  launch  of  Rocket  00000.  Described  as  an  “aromatic  heterocyclic  
polymer”,  it  is,  tellingly,  “nothing more – or  less – sinister  than a new plastic” which was 
“developed in  1939”  by  “L.  Jamf  for  IG Farben”  (GR,  249).  IG Farben  was,  of  course,  the 
company responsible for the manufacture of Auschwitz's requisite Zyklon B gas – for which the 
directors were convicted at Nuremberg of war crimes and slave labour – and thus, once more,  
Pynchon connects  the narrative of  technological  progress  with the institutional  practice  of  
industrial support for genocide. Within the specific context of World War II, this forges a link 
between techno-rationalism and totalitarianism.
This  poses  a  problem, however,  for  a  Pynchon-Foucault  alignment  as,  immediately  
after the aforementioned remarks  from the 1978 round-table  DÉ279,  Foucault  goes on to 
state:
Quant  à  l'Aufklärung,  je  ne  connais  personne,  parmi  ceux  qui  font  des 
analyses historiques, qui y voie le facteur responsable du totalitarisme.
[As for the Enlightenment, I do not know anyone, among those undertaking 
historical analysis, who see it as the factor responsible for totalitarianism]121
This development in Foucault's thought persists in his Enlightenment thinking through a veiled 
120 Strandberg, ‘Dimming the Enlightenment’, 105.
121 My translations. ‘Postface (DÉ279)’, 36.
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critique of the Frankfurt School, Adorno and Horkheimer having insisted that “Enlightenment is  
totalitarian”  (DoE,  4).  Furthermore,  although  Dreyfus  and  Rabinow  miss  this,122 Foucault 
appears to falsely praise the Frankfurt School as being “most important and valuable”, in order  
to then distance himself from their “Marxist humanism”123 to “another way”124 to analyse the 
formulation  of  state  power  through  the  pastoral  modality,  concluding  that  his  method of  
specificity  is  “more  effective  in  unsettling  our  certitudes  and  dogmatism  than  is  abstract  
criticism”.125 This  criticism is  further  heightened (paradoxically  given  the  affinity  that  shall 
become increasingly apparent between the thinkers) in the last piece to be examined in this  
chapter, “What is Enlightenment?”, when Foucault remarks that: “we do not break free of this  
blackmail by introducing 'dialectical' nuances while seeking to determine what good and bad 
elements there may have been in the Enlightenment” (“WE”, 313).
This apart, Foucault continues this stance on historicity and totalitarianism in his 1979 
lectures at Stanford University (DÉ291). There remains here the insistence that it is senseless 
to put reason on trial as the absolute arbiter of truth because “the field has nothing to do with  
guilt or innocence”,126 alongside the formulation that it is not rationalism that is the problem 
but rather its involvement with “excesses of political power”127 – a notion revisited by Foucault 
in a 1984 interview (DÉ353).128 
While it is true, then, that Pynchon is aligned with Foucault in presenting a critique of  
specific institutional practices, this does not hold in all circumstances owing to the sweeping,  
pluralistic  metaphorical  connections  that  his  fiction  makes.  For  instance,  the enterprise  of 
122 Dreyfus and Rabinow, Michel Foucault, 165–166.
123 Foucault, ‘Interview’, 274.
124 Foucault, ‘Pastoral Power and Political Reason’, 136.
125 Ibid., 151.
126 Ibid., 136.
127 Ibid., 135.
128 Foucault, ‘Interview with Actes’, 399.
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drawing the Line in Mason & Dixon can certainly be seen as a specific critique of cartography,  
implying  that  the  quantification  of  geographical  space  cannot  be  separated  out  from 
domineering power relations, but it has far more frequently been read as a metaphor for all  
Enlightenment, attempting to “find a form of fictional resistance to the relentless advance of 
the Line”, as Pedro García-Caro puts it in reference to the Frankfurt School's proposal of a “line  
both of destruction and civilization”.129 Despite its multiple levels of progressive temporal, if 
not geographical, specificity with regards to Enlightenment, Pynchon's historicity, outside of  
the  California  cycle,  is  formed  on  the  basis  of  trans-temporal  metaphor  and  relativizing  
connection: the Herero with the Holocaust in V. (245); World War II with Vietnam130 and the 
Cold  War  threat  of  Mutually  Assured  Destruction  (GR,  739,  760)  in  Gravity's  Rainbow; 
Enlightenment  taxonomy  and  mathesis  with  contemporary  hegemony  towards  unethical  
conduct in  Mason & Dixon;131 and the Anglo-Russian conflict over Central Asia with the Cold 
War via the translation of Bol'shaia Igra as “The Great [великий (vyeliki)] Game” in Against the  
Day (AtD, 123), to name but a few examples. These metaphorical leaps across time and space 
would potentially exclude Pynchon from the group Foucault terms “ceux qui font des analyses  
historiques” because the inductive reasoning implicit in his novels negates the archaeological,  
nominalist  specificity  of  institutional  practices  upon  which  Foucauldian  genealogy  is  
predicated, despite the fact that Foucault's own work is predominantly used in exactly this  
relativizing, trans-epochal fashion. In short: no matter how much Foucault calls his works a 
history of the present, they are a very different type of genealogy to the Frankfurt School,  
which  relies,  as  Colin  Gordon  puts  it,  upon  “apocalyptic  meta-narratives”;  Foucault,  in  
opposition to Pynchon, does “not warn of an impending catastrophe”.132
129 García-Caro, ‘America Was the Only Place...’, 110; in relation to DoE, 73.
130 See also: Slade, ‘Religion, Psychology’, 160; Smith, Pynchon and History, 59.
131 Thill, ‘The Sweetness of Immorality’, 55–56.
132 Gordon, ‘Question, Ethos, Event’, 27.
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While  Foucault's  stance  on  Enlightenment  at  this  stage  self-consciously  asserts  its 
desire to avoid value-judgements on rationalism vs. anti-rationalism, is is imperative to note,  
as shall now be shown, the emphasis that Foucault places upon notions of statehood and the  
police. Crucially for Pynchon, if the Holocaust is an absent centre of Gravity's Rainbow, surely 
as much could also be said – with some important qualifications – for the State. After all, “the  
true war is a celebration of markets” (GR, 105), not States.
Governmentality: Composite Markets, Mythical States
This  interrelation  of  States,  markets  and  economies  is,  in  parallel  to  the  strain  of 
thought on the Enlightenment, an area within which Foucault was increasingly situating his  
ideas: “Governmentality”; the ways in which the populous become positioned in a triangle of  
sovereignty, discipline and government. In fact, Foucault's conclusion on this phenomenon is  
that the “essential issue in the establishment of the art of government” is the “introduction of  
economy into political practice”.133 Pynchon's notions of statehood and police, corresponding 
to Foucault's notion of upwards and downwards government, are most explicitly explored in 
Vineland and Inherent Vice in which the neo-liberal governments deploy heavy-handed police 
tactics to quash the hazy hippies. However, it is only at these points of free-market-devoted 
government that the State appears with any prominence as an entity in Pynchon's works. This  
suggests an underlying affinity with Foucault's stance for, in “Governmentality”, Foucault notes  
that  “[m]aybe,  after  all,  the  state  is  no  more  than  a  composite  reality  and  a  mythicized 
abstraction, whose importance is a lot more limited than many of us think”.134
In relation to the Enlightenment strain,  Foucault's view is  further developed in the  
aforementioned 1979 lecture (DÉ306) in which, turning the table on “whether aberrant state 
133 Foucault, ‘Governmentality’, 207.
134 Ibid., 220.
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power is due to excessive rationalism or irrationalism”, Foucault instead examines the “specific  
type of  political  rationality  the state produced”,  formulated twofold across the “reason of  
state  and the  theory of police”.135 The eventual outcome of this lecture is a clarification on 
Foucault's stance on rationalisation and totalitarianism: “[i]ts [political rationality's] inevitable 
effects are both individualisation and totalisation”;136 as with the split between population and 
family in “Governmentality”,137 there is a mode of the “police” that at once ensures a “live, 
active, productive man” but also increases the state's strength through totalisation.138
Such a problematized dualism is also reflected in Gravity's Rainbow wherein Pynchon 
presents the alarming situation in which contemporary power structures operate but does so 
without succumbing to a straightforward critique of a government or State. Indeed, the novel  
contains much textual play on the capitalization of s/State to indicate both a reality (s) and a 
centralized power structure (S): “this war, this State he’d come to feel himself a citizen of”  
(75), “the War-state” (76), “[t]he improvidence of children ... and the civil paradox of this their  
Little State” (99), “with each one the Lord further legitimizes his State” (139), “the cartelized  
state” (164), “the proliferation of little states that’s prevailed in Germany for a thousand years”  
(265), “Slothrop, though he doesn’t know it yet, is as properly constituted a state as any other 
in the Zone these days” (291), “black juntas, shadow-states” (315), “believing in a State that 
would outlive them all […] There is  that kind of state […] a mortal State” (338), “a corporate 
State” (419), “a State begins to take form in the stateless German night” (566), “a state of near  
anarchy” (755); the list goes on. It is crucial to note that, in each of these instances, it is the 
linguistic play that effects an ontological-governmental conflation; ways of being that would be 
peculiar to a living organism, specifically human, are melded to ways of ruling by abstract,  
135 Foucault, ‘Pastoral Power and Political Reason’, 145.
136 Ibid., 152.
137 Foucault, ‘Governmentality’, 215–218.
138 Foucault, ‘Pastoral Power and Political Reason’, 149.
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incorporated  entities.  Indeed,  while  the  war  brings  about  the  destruction  of  innumerable  
irreplaceable human lives, it also has consequences for the State as a living entity, for as Pökler 
notes  on  his  discharge  letter:  “[i]t  was  the  usual  furlough  form,  superseded  now  by  the 
imminent death of  the Government” (432),  which suggests not just  the death of  the  Nazi 
government, but the death of the government as a power structure in Pynchon's post-national 
constructs.139
This is, of course, the reason why selectively throughout Pynchon's works, the focus of  
Pynchonian paranoia rests upon the non-specific “They”. In The Crying of Lot 49 it may indeed 
be “The Government” who will read your mail, in  Vineland  it is certainly “The Government” 
who exercise “control” (VL, 220) and in Inherent Vice, it is quite clearly the police who are after 
Doc's stash. In V.,  Gravity's Rainbow, Mason & Dixon and Against the Day, however, no such 
easy target is presented. Indeed, in Against the Day Pynchon even goes so far as to describe 
“government buildings”, alongside “temples”, as “ancient mysteries” (AtD, 310). However, in 
opposition to the economies of resistance presented by Samuel Thomas in  Pynchon and the  
Political – under which “invisibility is to assume some kind of utopian function against the 
power cells of Enlightenment”140 – it is also true that the power mechanisms are themselves 
visually  elusive,  therein  residing  the  dystopian  function.  The  structures  of  domination  in 
Pynchon's nondescript “They” are as diffuse as the structures of resistance. As can be seen 
even  from  this  brief  survey,  while  McConnell  has  read  Pynchon's  mode  of  power  as  
dominant-submissive rather than discursio-productive,  the breakdown of  centralized States 
into states, the diffuse nature of They and the disciplining collusion within which individuals 
work for the system, albeit unknowingly, all begin to query the wisdom of such an assessment. 
Pynchon's  State  becomes,  in  its  relation  to  the  market,  Foucault's  “composite  reality  and 
139 See the extremely convincing Pöhlmann, Pynchon’s Postnational Imagination.
140 Thomas, Pynchon and the Political, 50.
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mythicized abstraction”, countering the traditional conception of an all-too-visible mechanism 
of power.
One such example of this composite, mythicized abstraction can be found through a 
closer  reading  of  the  Vormance  expedition  in  Against  the  Day.  Already  noted  on  several 
occasions for its clear allusion to the terrorist attacks of September 11 th, 2001, the centrality of 
this episode becomes ever clearer as so many of Pynchon's concerns find their locus in this 
section of the novel. Proleptically introduced under the foreboding teleology of “a fate few of  
its  members  would  willingly  have  chosen”  (AtD,  118),  the  Vormance  expedition  has  been 
commissioned  by  Scarsdale  Vibe  to  recover  a  mysterious,  ancient  and,  in  its  unspecified,  
abstract nature of colossal power, mythically structured, entity from the Icelandic wastes. It is  
an object over which capitalist forces of “uncritical buoyancy”, “borne along by submission to a  
common fate of celebrity and ease” wish to gain control, for the “Vibes will sell it, whatever it  
is,  the  minute they  see  it”  and  members  of  the expedition,  given the hardships  they  are  
undertaking, express that they are “[g]lad we've all got our contracts” (142). The capitalists'  
desire to control, own and then sell the myth – and the myth's resistance to such treatment –  
is manifested in the operation designed to transport the sentient meteorite: “[t]rying to get it  
to fit  inside the ship,  we measured,  and remeasured,  and each time the dimensions kept  
coming out different – not just slightly so but drastically” (144). 
While Kathryn Hume has conducted an extensive survey of the mythological aspects of  
Gravity's  Rainbow  –  after  all,  Pynchon's  writing  corresponds  to  Northrop  Frye's 
pronouncement that “[i]n the mythical mode the encyclopaedic form is the sacred scripture”141 
–  her  analysis  fails  to  make  reference  to  a  seminal  Leftist  theorisation  of  myth  and  
141 Frye, Anatomy of Criticism, 53 [56]; also pointed out by Cowart, ‘Pynchon in Literary History’, 90; on 
Frye in relation to Hayden White and for further back cataloguing of bibliography, see Elias, ‘History’, 
132–133.
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Enlightenment; Adorno and Horkheimer's  Dialectic of Enlightenment.142 Indeed, the insertion 
of  this  strange  creature  into  Pynchon's  novel  resonates  with  Adorno  and  Horkheimer's 
understanding  of  the  Homeric  epic.  Consider,  for  instance,  the  fact  that  here  a 
counter-realistic, metaphorical entity is used to disintegrate “the hierarchical order of society 
through the exoteric form of its depiction, even and especially when it glorifies that order”  
(DoE,  35).143 To  clarify  this,  the  composite  nature  of  the Vormance entity  can  be  twofold  
defined.  As  an  ancient  being  of  long-entrenched  power,  it  works  in  the  same  way  as  a 
government State, the extant hierarchical order. When this structure is compromised, thereby  
becoming hybrid, and brought back to America as a newly transfigured form of State conjoined  
with  market,  the  eventual  outcome  is,  surely,  the  regression  to  myth;  the  terroristic  
destruction that Pynchon's texts claim America has brought upon itself.
In and of itself a composite reality, Pynchon's work forbids any direct metaphorical 
association – a straight mapping of State to Vormance Entity can hardly hold – yet in the  
swirling  centrifuge  of  myth,  capitalism,  domination  and  Statehood,  it  is  now  clear  that 
Pynchon's notion of resistance through myth in “Is it O.K. to be a Luddite?” is overly simplistic.  
Resistance  through  myth  exhibits  the  same  problem  as  resistance  through  invisibility;  a  
negative, polarised-opposite function of resistance; the badass is myth, but so is his enemy,  
the badass is invisible, as is the State.
As the members of the Vormance expedition slowly begin to realise the full horror of  
their mistake, they come to an understanding that “some fraction of the total must necessarily 
have escaped confinement”, which “was equivalent to saying that no part of it had ever been 
contained”  (AtD,  145).  The  mythicized  abstraction  here  comes  to  break  free,  while  never  
142 Hume, Pynchon’s Mythography.
143 See also Porter, ‘Odysseus and the Wandering Jew’.
145
having been contained. Interestingly, it is perhaps this de-centring that most resonates with 
Foucault's  downplaying  of  State  centrality.  With  Pynchon,  who  places  most  of  his  major 
concerns in a hurricane with the Vormance Entity at its eye, it is necessary to question how 
Foucault can underState the importance of the elusive S/state: “is no more than a composite 
reality and a mythicized abstraction”? Composite realities and mythicized abstractions are the 
power structures that co-opt their  subjects,  they are the entity that appears as the State.  
However, they are also, for Foucault, those aspects that make the State falsely appear central.  
Thinking  on invisibility  and resistance in Pynchon leads to  a disjunct  with  Foucault  on the  
underestimation of the power that these twin concepts bring, but a disjunct of intensity, not of 
type.
Growing Enlightenment
Moving  towards  the  end  of  Foucault's  career,  the  density  of  reference  to  the 
Enlightenment increases exponentially. In his 1983 interview with G. Raulet (DÉ330), Foucault 
situates explicitly, for the first time, the centrality of Enlightenment to his project when he 
states that: “I wonder if one of the great roles of philosophical thought since the Kantian 'Was 
ist Aufklärung?' might not be characterized by saying that the task of philosophy is to describe  
the nature of the present, and of 'ourselves in the present'”.144 Obviously, this is Foucault's 
exact undertaking, as was also previously highlighted in the short 1979 essay “For an Ethic of 
Discomfort” (DÉ266):  even the “most fragile  instant has roots”.145 From this  piece and the 
trajectory  that  came  before  it,  Foucault  is  set  on  a  view  of  Enlightenment  that  fuses  
Merleau-Ponty's sentiment to never “be completely comfortable with your own certainties”146 
with a fragmentation in which “no [single] form of rationality is actually reason”, while there is  
144 Foucault, ‘Critical Theory/Intellectual History’, 126.
145 Foucault, ‘For an Ethic of Discomfort’, 127.
146 Ibid.
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also “no sense at all to the proposition that reason is a long narrative which is now finished,  
and  that  another narrative  is  under  way”.147 At  the end of  Foucault's  life,  he  turned back 
towards the Kantian thought that had dogged his thinking.
This  section  has  explored  several  further  aspects  of  Foucault's  Enlightenment  as 
opposed  to  Pynchon's.  From  this  it  has  become  clear  that  Pynchon's  works  hold  a 
Frankfurt-school  trajectory  of  Enlightenment  that  sees  in  it  direct  responsibility  for 
twentieth-century totalitarianism, a view to which Foucault is opposed. On the other hand, it  
has also emerged that the treatment of the State in Pynchon has important repercussions for 
theorisations  of  his  power as a  purely top-down domination model;  aspects of  complicity, 
invisibility and dispersal render it far closer to a Foucauldian discursio-productivity that must 
have implications for any further work on resistance in Pynchon's novels.
147 Foucault, ‘Critical Theory/Intellectual History’, 125.
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1984- :Was ist Aufklärung?
In Kant's answer to the question “What is Enlightenment?” Foucault sees 
the origin of an “ontology of contemporary reality” that leads through 
Hegel, Nietzsche, and Max Weber to Horkheimer and Adorno. Surprisingly, 
in the last sentence of his lecture Foucault includes himself in this tradition.
– Jürgen Habermas, “Taking Aim at the Heart of the Present”148
It is in 1984 – a year to which Pynchon has made reference on many occasions, mostly  
in relation to Orwell's novel, but also in the setting of Vineland – at this late stage in Foucault's 
career that one encounters his most significant writings on Enlightenment; the two pieces both  
entitled “Qu'est-ce que les Lumières?” [What is Enlightenment?]: one an essay (DÉ339, English 
translation same year), the other an extract from a Collège de France lecture course (DÉ351, 
English translation 1986). These two pieces, which cover broadly the same themes surrounding  
Kant's  minor  work,  “Was  ist  Aufklärung?”,  centre  upon  the  non-teleological,  constantly 
contemporary  philosophical  reflexivity  that,  Foucault  claimed,  was  inaugurated  by  Kant's 
article.  In Foucault's reading, this Enlightenment raises, in many ways, the same paradoxical 
formation that sits at the heart of The Order of Things; recursive knowledge structures, the 
“empirico-transcendental doublet”.149 However, in Foucault's later thoughts on Enlightenment 
it is the relationship of the individual to the broader context, between what is given to the 
individual and what the individual contributes back, it is “the present as a philosophical event 
incorporating within it the philosopher who speaks of it”,  that becomes important. In short, 
“one  sees  philosophy  […]  problematising  its  own  discursive  present-ness”,  casting  the 
philosopher within a group “corresponding to a cultural ensemble characteristic of his own 
148 Habermas, ‘Taking Aim at the Heart of the Present’, 150.
149 May, The Philosophy of Foucault, 53; OT, 330–373.
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contemporaneity” (“KER”, 11). Foucault is, by this account, despite Habermas' scepticism, not 
so far from the Frankfurt School's definition of philosophy: the attempt to bridge the chasm 
between intuition and concept (DoE, 13).
Qu'est-ce que les Lumières? I: Reason and Revolution
In relation to the works of Thomas Pynchon, the English translation of the second of 
the two Foucault pieces under discussion possesses the more provocative content with the less 
endearing title; it is simply “What is Enlightenment?”  as opposed to the exotic, “Kant on 
Enlightenment and Revolution”, the name of the latter carrying far greater potential for 
readings on critique and resistance.  As a  necessary  precursor  to  an  examination  of  the 
interaction with Pynchon's fiction, a small amount of digressive exegesis is necessary; both of 
these works are best explained through their clear communal origin in Foucault's 1978 lecture, 
“What is Critique?”
Among Foucault's many retractions and retrospective amendments to his trajectory, 
the statement of his overarching purpose in “What is Critique?” sounds particularly  genuine: 
“[t]he question […] I have always wanted to speak about, is this: What is critique?” (“WC”, 
382). This  rings  true  because,  despite  the  opposition  to  the  anthropological  theme,  the 
intuitive-conceptual divide of the empirico-transcendental doublet was awarded primacy of  
place in The Order of Things. Although Foucault uses much of this lecture to provide another 
foundation  for  his  historicophilosophical  method,  he  also  here  brings  together  two of  his  
previous topics in order to construct a history of the critical attitude: governmentality and the  
Christian pastoral tradition. It is, in Foucault's account, the desire to be governed in specific  
ways that leads to a questioning of the underlying truth claims of the dominant mentality:  
“[w]as Scripture true?”, “[w]hat are the limits of the right to govern?” (“WC”, 385). At this  
stage, critique for Foucault is “the movement through which the subject gives itself the right to 
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question truth concerning its  power effects and to question power about its  discourses of  
truth” (386). Perversely, Foucault notes, this is not critique as Kant would describe it but is,  
instead, in line with Kant's definition of Enlightenment (387). Foucault claims that it is now  
necessary to reverse this motion and re-situate critique within the Enlightenment structure; 
the relation between knowledge and domination. Foucault concludes: “[y]ou see why I was not  
able to give, to dare to give, a title to my paper which would have been 'What is Aufklärung?'”  
(398). The reason Foucault could not “dare” is that this piece boldly suggests Enlightenment as 
the practical implementation of critique;  the “virtue” in  the “exposure of  the limit  of  the 
epistemological field”.150
Yet dare he did. Taken in order of authorship,  the first  of  the two pieces Foucault  
produced under the same title “Qu'est-ce que les Lumières?” (DÉ351) has been translated as 
“Kant on Enlightenment and Revolution” and was originally given as a 1983 Collège de France 
lecture;  the  published  version  is  a  mere  fragment  of  the  whole.  In  this  lecture,  Foucault  
ascribes to Kant – in a reading that Colin Gordon calls “altered” from Kant's original meaning 151 
–  the  first  instance  of  direct  philosophical  reflexivity  upon  a  specific  aspect  of  the 
contemporary:  “[w]hat  is  there  in  the present  which can have contemporary  meaning for  
philosophical reflection?” (“KER”, 11). Foucault claims that this “interrogation by philosophy of  
this present-ness of which it is part […] may well be the characteristic trait of philosophy as a 
discourse of and upon modernity” (11). It is at this point that an engagement with Pynchon's 
themes can begin to be tabled.
In the pre-release blurb to Against the Day, Pynchon wrote, with supreme irony: “[n]o 
reference  to the  present  day  is  intended or  should  be  inferred”.  Yet  Pynchon's  writing  is  
150 Butler, ‘What is Critique? An Essay on Foucault’s Virtue’, 215.
151 Gordon, ‘Question, Ethos, Event’, 20.
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directly  centred  on  such  notions  of  present-ness  through  historical  specificity  and 
trans-temporal  metaphor.  If it is accepted that Foucault's conflation of critique and 
Enlightenment is an acknowledgement of the very problem for which he was criticised by 
Derrida –  an immanence that nonetheless seeks totalising critique –  this would also apply 
equally to Pynchon's writing, rendering his anti-rationalism as a distinct product of 
Enlightenment thought; and why not? While Gravity's Rainbow warns – as almost every piece 
of high-postmodernist criticism on the text notes – of the hermeneutic heresies that would  
lead to “a good Rocket to take us to the stars, an evil Rocket for the World’s suicide, the two 
perpetually in struggle” (GR, 727), the co-mingling of truth, authority, questioning, governance 
and contemporaneity that  are bracketed under acceptance or rejection of an Enlightenment 
framework does not have to be a binary choice in which one judgement is jettisoned.
While critics have noted the aversion to binary conditions in Pynchon's work –  in 
keeping with much theoretical thought around this period –  this  is  usually  reduced  to 
narratives of alterity, an ethical act in itself. However, Pynchon's depiction of the draw towards 
the dark side of humanity, Nazism and right-wing systems (perhaps best seen in the 
essentialist  appeal Frenesi feels for Brock Vond in Vineland) suggests that this is  embedded 
within humankind in an analogous conception to the Dialectic of Enlightenment's reciprocity of 
myth and Enlightenment. Simply put: despite the negating movement towards destruction, it 
is within the other that the self finds its genesis.  To begin, then, it is worth posing an ethical 
problem that comes to the fore in Pynchon's work when this paradigm of mutual germination,  
raised by Foucault's notion of critique/Enlightenment, is considered. It may be, as Against the 
Day's Thelonious epigraph tells us “always night or we wouldn't need light”,  but it is only 
through such a juxtaposition that light is valued.152 This is well demonstrated in Gravity's 
152 I cannot be the only writer hoping that future opportunities arise for the use of “Thelonious” as an 
adjective.
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Rainbow, for, textually adjacent to Weissmann's introduction of the terrible modifications to 
the 00000 (GR, 431), Pökler demonstrates his worth as a human being:
Pökler found a woman lying,  a  random woman.  He sat  for half  an hour 
holding her bone hand. She was breathing. Before he left, he took off his  
gold wedding ring and put it on the woman’s thin finger, curling her hand to  
keep it from sliding off. If she lived, the ring would be good for a few meals,  
or a blanket, or a night indoors, or a ride home...
Humanity salvaged, perhaps, but only, it must be noted, in the place “[w]here it was darkest 
and  smelled  the worst”  (433).  This relativistic, almost structuralist dialectic of Pynchonian 
ethics presents a world that differs sharply from, for instance, David Grossman's prayer for the 
Children of the Heart at the close of See Under: Love. In this novel, another that  radically 
represents the Holocaust through magical realist tropes such as the Jew who cannot die, a 
positivist utopia is craved in which a child could live from birth to death and “know nothing of 
war”.153 One of the more disturbing conclusions of Pynchon's Enlightenment-rooted discourse 
upon the contemporary, though, at the first point of ethical crossover in this parallel reading, is 
that it is all too easy to see a world in which there is a requisite need for war and misery so 
that virtue may become apparent or, of course, the inverse: were vice not inherent, there 
would be no need for virtue.
This ethical problem, situated at Adorno's terminus of the enlightenment project, the 
concentration camp, begs the question: how can the modern subject effectively resist, rebel or 
revolt? If this initial query into Pynchon's stance on contemporary ethics came about through a  
consideration of Foucault's reading of the central problem in Kant, it is worth turning to his  
work again to begin the quest for a solution, for in Foucault's against-the-grain reading of Kant 
on revolution, “it is not the revolutionary process itself which is important”. Indeed, Foucault 
goes on: “[n]ever mind whether it succeed or fail, that is nothing to do with progress or a sign 
153 Grossman, See Under: Love, 452.
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that there is no progress”. In Foucault's interpretation of Kant, “[w]hat matters in the 
Revolution is not the Revolution itself, it is what takes place in the heads of the people who do 
not make it or in any case are not its principle actors, it is the relation they themselves 
experience with this Revolution of which they are not themselves the active agents” (“KER”, 
15). As Colin Gordon points out, Foucault's earlier remarks on revolution were optimistic.154 By 
this late stage – most likely tempered by his ill-fated comments on the Iranian revolution155 – 
the hope for tangible change in an instant of “event” had faded; it is now to come to gradual 
fruition through a democratically driven paradigm shift.
Pynchon's stance towards revolution and resistance has been insightfully probed by 
Samuel  Thomas  in  the  most  influential  publication  of  Pynchon  criticism  of  recent  times:  
Pynchon and the Political. In his chapter on u-/dys- topian alterity in Vineland, Thomas troubles 
a  reading  of  the  Kunoichi  ninja  sisterhood  through  Schmitt's  friend/foe  politics  by  
demonstrating the unbridgeable divide between violence as idea or alienated representation, 
and violence as lived reality.156 I would like to draw attention, however, to the quotation that 
Thomas uses in his synopsis of the ninja episode as it has major implications for Pynchon's  
interaction with this late-stage Foucault: “'[t]hose you will be fighting—those you must resist—
they are neither samurai nor ninja. They are sarariman, incrementalists, who cannot act boldly 
and feel only contempt for those who can'” (VL, 127).157
This  statement  at  once  takes  polemic  aim  at  the  proletarian  wage  slaves  while 
simultaneously recognizing them, in their description as “incrementalists”, as the people who,  
in Foucault's reading of Kant, truly hold the key to the revolution. Indeed, the dual senses  
154 Gordon, ‘Question, Ethos, Event’, 22–23.
155 The best example of which is Foucault, ‘What Are the Iranians Dreaming About?’; a summary of 
literature on this controversy can be found in Afary and Anderson, Foucault and the Iranian 
Revolution, 6–10.
156 Thomas, Pynchon and the Political, 141–142.
157 Ibid., 139.
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deployed across author and theorist here on the term “incrementalist” mirror that of freedom 
in the constraint/neo-liberal (or “freedom to” vs. “freedom from”) dichotomy. In one reading – 
taking Pynchon, inadvisably given Thomas' work, literally – incrementalism is a stuttering of  
praxis,  a  cowardly  inability  to  act.  On  the  face  of  this,  the  only  alternative  lies  in  the 
“enlightenment through asskicking” (VL,  198) of the ninjettes. The literal Pynchonian voice 
yields the masses as the voice of hegemony. The second, Foucauldian reading of an ironic 
Pynchon, to move dialectically, runs counter to this but not antithetically. The masses still hold 
sway but here it is by the incremental introduction of the will to revolution –  rooted in the 
Enlightenment freedom from self-incurred minority – that change will come about. In Vineland 
this mode of revolution is well understood by Hector Zuñiga who demonstrates how real 
change works when he tells Zoyd Wheeler: “this ain't tweakín around no more with no 
short-term maneuvers here, this is a real revolution, not that little fantasy hand-job you people 
was into, it's a groundswell, Zoyd, the wave of History” (VL, 27). Although Zuñiga is an ethically 
conflicted character, a precursor of Bigfoot in the later Inherent Vice, and is here describing the 
movement  of  right-wing  government,  in  the  context  of  the  failure  of  the  countercultural  
movement to effect long-term change, his view on the definition of real “revolution” holds.  
Under  this  reading, the violent approach is clearly reactionary and acting against its stated 
purpose  – surely also of importance for any work on terrorism in Against the Day. In a 
compare-and-contrast scenario, it is easy to see that, fundamentally, there is a democratic 
strain at play here. The former of these readings effects a self-effacing critique of democracy, 
following through the overwriting logic of: 1.) positing a revolutionary force against a 
hegemonic mass; 2.) undermining the authority of that revolutionary force through the 
mimetic/reality violence split posited by Thomas. The latter reading begins with enlightened 
democracy as its petitio principii, but with no guarantee of eventual praxis; the classic 
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Foucauldian freedom paradox of environmental constitution against free will that  leads 
Foucault to narrow the ethical sphere to the self.  As  Isaiah  Two Four,  another  conflicted 
character who plays in a band called Fascist Toejam, puts it: “[w]hole problem 'th you folks's  
generation […] is you believed in your Revolution […] but you sure didn't understand much 
about the tube” (VL, 373).
For Foucault's Kant, then, Enlightenment is not the event, the revolution that  causes 
change; it is the spark kindled among the damp tinder of the populous that merely smoulders. 
It exists with only the forever-deferred future hope of fire. Is Pynchon, the Slow Burner 
perhaps, so very far away from such a stance? As Thomas points out, it is foolhardy and 
impractical to read Pynchon as straightforwardly endorsing a revolutionary event; the 
boundaries between the representation and reality of violence forbid this. Yet, conversely, 
there is a degree of permeability between mimesis and its object that runs through all 
Pynchon's novels in the form of hope. Consider von Göll's “seeds of reality”  in Gravity's 
Rainbow, or the debate in Vineland's 24fps: “'Film equals sacrifice,' declared Ditzah Pisk. / 'You 
don't die for no motherfuckin' shadows,' Sledge replied” (VL,  202). Such an appraisal lends 
itself to viewing Pynchon's novel as one that takes a post-utopian frame in which, according to 
Marianne DeKoven, the utopian project is constantly “defeated and discredited” but continues 
in its “desire for elimination of domination, inequality and oppression”,  an aspect also ably 
explored by Madeline Ostrander whose couching of Vineland as post-utopian brings the 
hopeful hopelessness of Pynchon's work to the fore.158 In this persistent hope, despite the 
failure of modernity, despite the failure of America, despite the failure of fiction, Pynchon 
begins to finally align (more closely than might have been supposed) with Foucault's 
will-to-revolution, which perhaps itself holds out a form of refuge from the failure of theory. 
158 DeKoven, ‘Utopia Limited’, 75, 91; cited in Ostrander, ‘Awakening to the Physical World’, 124.
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Enlightenment and revolution constitute at once event, permanent process and unrealistic 
hope that appears, in its positivity as a utopian regulative idea, to rescue Pynchon's work from 
a world that requires evil. If the regulative idea can be thought in a perfected state, the 
dialectic can foresee its own finality, even though this remains impossible.
Qu'est-ce que les Lumières? II: The Modern Ēthos and Ipseity 
The second of Foucault's Enlightenment pieces presents  a complement to the first, 
providing the promised close reading of Kant's article, which, although acknowledged as a 
“minor text” (“WE”, 303), is still not quite on a par with Nietzsche's laundry list in the lowbrow 
stakes.159 By way of broad synopsis, Foucault's article is structured into two sections and a brief 
conclusion. The first of these sections is very much a restatement of the notion of philosophy 
found in the preceding text; Kant as the threshold of modernity wherein all post-Kantian 
philosophical thought possesses a degree of historicity and reflexivity upon the present. The 
second portion of Foucault's essay is still derived from the lecture but is substantially more 
interesting for both its extension and refinement of terms.
In this second section, Foucault seeks to define “modernity as an attitude rather than 
as a period of history”, a statement clarified as a way “of acting and behaving that at one and 
the same time marks a relation of belonging and presents itself as a task”. It is, in short, “a bit 
like what the Greeks called an ēthos”, beginning to make explicit the ethical connotations that 
had lain implied throughout the preceding piece  (“WE”,  309).  Foucault then extends this 
period of modernity under Kant into the notions of modernity as he sees them relayed by 
Baudelaire in The Painter of Modern Life. Under this schema, Foucault sees an ironic 
heroization of the present, in which the contemporary is consecrated so that, in its elevation, it 
becomes possible to imagine it otherwise. This reimagination of the present moves from ēthos 
159 See Foucault, ‘What Is an Author?’, 207.
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to ethic when the modern subject, in this mode of creative refashioning, is redefined as one 
who undertakes “to face the task of producing himself”. This is a production that can only take 
place “in another, a different place, which Baudelaire calls art”,160 but it is also, as Judith Butler 
points out, not a production from a void. Instead, it is “the practice of critique” that “exposes  
the limits of the historical scheme of things” and by which we can know the limits of our  
freedom.161 Negatively defining the Enlightenment, Foucault still seeks, at this point, to effect a 
critical relation that avoids what he terms the “Enlightenment blackmail” – under which one is 
forced to judge the Enlightenment as good or evil – and that does not conflate humanism and 
Enlightenment. In positive terms, though, Foucault situates the Enlightenment ēthos as the 
transformation of Kantian critique into a lived exploration of “limit-attitude”, to change it “into 
a practical critique that takes the form of a possible crossing-over”. This leads to the necessity 
for a historicized  critique, to avoid the universal values that are bestowed by criticism that 
seeks atemporal formal structures, a critique that must also be experimental: “I shall thus 
characterize the philosophical ethos appropriate to the critical ontology of ourselves as a 
historico-practical test of the limits we may go beyond, and thus as work carried out by 
ourselves upon ourselves as free beings” (“WE”, 316).
Much of Pynchon's historicity lends itself to a reading in this vein. A way of 
re-conceptualising the anachronistic mode in Mason & Dixon, for example, would be to situate 
the characters as possessing a heightened sense of their modernity at the dawn of that 
modernity. Furthermore, several of Pynchon's novels end on an ironic heroization of the 
present,162 mostly because the present, or future, is apocalyptic, be it in Gravity's Rainbow's 
faux optimistic “Now everybody–”, Vineland's and Inherent Vice's elegiac fogs for the Sixties, or 
160 ‘WE’, 310–312; for more on an aesthetics of the self see Foucault, Fearless Speech, 166.
161 Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself, 17.
162 Not unlike the description by Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory of the introduction of 
irony into the modern consciousness by World War I.
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Against the Day's airborne sailing towards the “grace”  of World War II and contemporary 
capitalism, an element that  symmetrically parallels the earlier nautical climax/disaster in V. 
However, one of the most prominent critiques that could be levelled at Pynchon's work is that 
such an ironic heroization is not deployed to imagine otherwise, but to nihilistically mourn and 
nostalgically lament for a repeated cycle of failure. This is presented most clearly in Slothrop's 
disintegration in Gravity's Rainbow:
Slothrop, as noted, at least as early as the Anubis era, has begun to thin, to 
scatter. “Personal density,” Kurt Mondaugen in his Peene-münde office not 
too many steps away from here, enunciating the Law which will  one day  
bear his name, “is directly proportional to temporal bandwidth.” 
“Temporal bandwidth” is the width of your present, your now. [...] The more 
you dwell in the past and in the future, the thicker your bandwidth, the 
more solid your persona. But the narrower your sense of Now, the more 
tenuous you are (509).
This is, of course, one of the most frequently cited passages in Gravity's Rainbow; in the period 
between 1975 and 1981 alone, no fewer than six critical articles found  it symptomatic of a 
dis-empowered contemporary subject. To present but a selection, Tony Tanner remarks upon 
it  that “[a]lthough there is an excessive proliferation of names in Pynchon's work, there is a 
concomitant disappearance of selves”, citing Pynchon's novels as places in which we are “likely 
to find a study of not just failure and loss, but the radical disassembling of character”.163 Others 
such as Lance Ozier, following in the footsteps of Joseph Slade, remark upon the problems in 
reading Slothrop's disassembly either positively or negatively; in its conflation with preterition 
it only embraces alterity at the cost of the subject, although Ozier eventually concludes that 
this loss “opens Slothrop to the possibility of pure Being”.164 Finally, Steven Weisenburger 
points out the aesthetic importance for Pynchon of keeping one's temporal bandwidth as wide 
as possible and, for this, Slothrop should be judged; the Fool, indeed. It is also crucial to note, 
163 Tanner, ‘Paranoia, Energy, and Displacement’, 145.
164 Ozier, ‘The Calculus of Transformation: More Mathematical Imagery in Gravity’s Rainbow’, 195–199.
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however, that Weisenburger writes: “[o]ne's grasp of the Now as a moment having links to the 
past and future is, in Pynchon's view, a willed action, and quite free”.165
Although this passage has been debated ad nauseum in Pynchon studies, its 
importance for thinking on freedom and ethics within an Enlightenment context will continue 
to merit critical attention. Through a consideration of Pynchon as depicting a being on the true 
edge of limit-existence alongside the initial complication of Pynchon as a product of modernity 
in the Enlightenment telos, comes a stunning resonance with late Foucault's aforementioned 
statement on philosophical ethos: “a historico-practical test of the limits we may go beyond, 
and thus as work carried out by ourselves upon ourselves as free beings” (“WE”, 316). The 
relationship one has to oneself, which the late Foucault re-situated as the true sphere of ethics 
in his  analysis  of  classical  thought, is the area with the greatest scope for agency for the 
historically contingent subject. As shall be seen, in Pynchon this is  intricately bound to sloth. 
Given also that Pynchon has written in praise of sloth – with particular reference to Melville's 
Bartleby as a refusal of the capitalist paradigm  (“Nearer”,  18) –  it would appear hugely 
inconsistent for Pynchon to judge his nominatively assonative protagonist for refusing to work, 
even if that work is on the relationship to himself through time. However, it must be asked 
whether Slothrop's “sin” that turns him to betrayal and to disregard his “obligations” (GR, 490) 
is in fact a refusal to work upon himself against the disintegration of the subject in a blindness 
to history.
It would seem at first, from his essay on sloth – “Nearer my Couch to Thee” – that a 
Pynchonian ethics cannot regard inaction as unethical. Pynchon begins this work with an 
examination of Thomas Aquinas' concept of acedia as sorrow in the face of God's good. 
However, Pynchon quickly moves through the historical progression to see, in Franklin's Poor 
165 Weisenburger, ‘The End of History? Thomas Pynchon and the Uses of the Past’, 64.
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Richard, a transformation of sloth from a sin of sorrow in the face of God's good, to one of 
sorrow in the face of capitalism's good:
Spiritual  matters  were  not  quite  as  immediate  as  material  ones,  like 
productivity!  Sloth was no longer so much a Sin against  God or spiritual  
good as against a particular sort of time, uniform, one-way, in general not  
reversible – that is, against clock time, which got everybody early to bed and 
early to rise (“Nearer”, 16).
Sloth here becomes a transgressive act that violates the compulsion to productive action and 
is, therefore, a form of resistance. Of course, such a stance is troubling from our contemporary 
viewpoint of sloth as a failure to act against political evil, and Pynchon understands this:
In this century we have come to think of Sloth as primarily political, a failure  
of public will allowing the introduction of evil policies and the rise of evil 
regimes,  the  worldwide  fascist  ascendancy  of  the  1920's  and  30's  being 
perhaps Sloth's finest hour, though the Vietnam era and the Reagan-Bush 
years  are  not  far  behind.  [...]  Occasions  for  choosing  good  present 
themselves in public and private for us every day, and we pass them by.  
Acedia is the vernacular of everyday moral life (“Nearer”, 19).
As one might expect, then, Pynchon does not present a unified stance on sloth. In one 
capacity, or perhaps at one historical moment, sloth offered an escape from linear time; it was 
the resistance. Somewhere along this line of thought, however, the process was reversed and 
sloth became seen as complicit. The only linking factor between these historical periods has 
been a moral disdain by authority towards sloth. However, in Pynchon's view sloth in itself 
cannot be a universal sin because it turns upon an evaluation of the contingent underlying 
moral concept. This is, in fact, the same argument that Aquinas deployed for a universal 
injunction against sloth and with which Pynchon begins in apparent antagonism: “[f]or sorrow 
is evil in itself when it is about that which is apparently evil but good in reality, even as, on the 
other hand, pleasure is evil if it is about that which seems to be good but is, in truth, evil”.166 
Yet, the actual alignment here can be seen even in the working title of Gravity's Rainbow, 
166 Aquinas, ‘Summa Theologica: Sloth’.
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“Mindless Pleasures”, in which there is the conflation of Aquinian thinking/confusion 
(“mindless”  / “which seems to be”) with ascetic morality (“pleasures”). In short, the stance 
that can be derived from the sloth essay is that Pynchonian morality comes down to 
judgement of a contingent action's validity while Aquinian morality proposes a universal action 
as a safeguard against misjudgement.
Understanding Pynchon as one who disavows universally valid moral action, this 
reading moves a step closer to a Foucauldian “historico-practical test of the limits we may go 
beyond” but with an important inflection. First, it should be carefully noted that this brand of 
relativism is diametrically opposed to the conventional genealogy of morals; it is not the 
underlying moral precept (opposition to Fascism, opposition to oppression) that  is relative – 
indeed, this is still an open possibility, but not explicitly touched upon in Pynchon's essay – but 
instead, the action one should take (it is wrong to be slothful when sloth will permit Fascism, 
but it is not wrong to be slothful if sloth counters oppression/works against linear time). In this 
sense, Pynchon does not present the conventional and oft-critiqued, although not entirely 
accurate, version of a Foucauldian contingent subject but rather the later Foucauldian subject 
of modernity who fashions himself and for whom there is limited personal agency. As Judith 
Butler puts it: “[t]his ethical agency is neither fully determined nor radically free”.167
 Yet, the second half of Foucault's proposition – the imperative to work upon oneself 
as a free being –  is not an area in which Slothrop excels.168 While in  his  scattering  and 
disassembly  Slothrop  does indeed transcend the human's limits, his realm of agency is 
seriously limited: he is “sent into the Zone”, his fate as determined as Weissmann's by the 
tarot and his subconscious; “to help him deny what he could not possibly admit: that he might 
167 Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself, 19.
168 Perhaps, in another Foucauldian reading, he lacks the requisite social privilege. See Foucault, The 
Hermeneutics of the Subject, 112.
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be in love, in sexual love, with his, and his race's, death” (GR, 738). This portion of Gravity's 
Rainbow is, however, enveloped in an exceedingly complex narrative structure. The voice 
proclaiming that Slothrop's fate was bound up in esoteric tarot systems cuts, across the 
ellipses, to “world-renowned analyst Mickey Wuxtry-Wuxtry” for the restriction of agency via 
psychoanalysis, before moving to an unexpected format, an interview with a “spokesman for 
The Counterforce”  with the Wall Street Journal. This relegation of Slothrop to third party 
discussion is in keeping with the high frequency of low level linguistic transitivity – a feature 
examined by M. Angeles Martínez in Pynchon's “Under the Rose” and V.169 – and, therefore, 
agency throughout GR. Consider, for instance, the famous passage:
The letters:
MB DRO
ROSHI
appear above the logo of some occupation newspaper, a grinning glamour 
girl riding astraddle the cannon of a tank (693-694).
Rather than presenting this as a statement actively read by Slothrop, the sentence contains 
only an affected object  intransitively appearing; certainly an apt representation for such a  
brutal event as an atomic bombing.
However, it is not necessary to resort to such formalist transitivity analysis to see this 
constriction of agency. In  as  parodic  a  fashion  as  though  it  were,  itself,  named 
“Wuxtry-Wuxtry” The Counterforce has been styled as childlike throughout Gravity's Rainbow. 
Furthermore, although Terry Caesar has linked the “suck hour” in V. and the “Gross Suckling 
Conference” (706)  in Gravity's Rainbow to maternity, it is in fact the flip-side of this 
relationship that is being explored, with all its implications for Kantian Enlightenment and 
169 Martínez, ‘From “Under the Rose” to V.’
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immaturity: the state of childhood.170 This is clearly seen in the linked context of Against the 
Day where Darby Suckling is described in the opening pages as the “baby” of the crew (AtD, 3), 
leading to the more likely conclusion that “Gross Suckling”  is less of a reflection on the 
maternity and more a statement on the immaturity, or baby-ness, of The Counterforce, further 
confirmed by the German rendition: “Der Grob Säugling” (GR, 707). In its childlike autocritical 
ignorance, The Counterforce is as ill-placed to comment on Slothrop's limitations as any other, 
for “[t]hey are schizoid, as double-minded in the massive presence of money, as any of the rest 
of us”; they have not come of age in the sense of Kantian maturity (712). In Pynchon's terms 
human beings are psychologically incapable of mounting a resistance in the face of external 
temptation: “[a]s long as they allow us a glimpse, however rarely. We need that” (713). While 
this  in no sense precludes agency in the relation to one's  self,  it  does encroach upon the 
impact such a self-fashioning could ever have; we are as alligators in Pynchon's sewers: “[d]id it  
ever occur to you that they want to be shot?” (V. 146).
The final portion of Foucault's last Enlightenment piece is a pre-emptive rebuff to a “no 
doubt entirely legitimate” objection to his mode of enquiry: “[i]f we limit ourselves to this type 
of always partial and local inquiry or test, do we not run the risk of letting ourselves be 
determined by more general structures of which we may well not be conscious and over which 
we may have no control?”  To this, Foucault gives two responses. We must, firstly, “give up 
hope of ever acceding to a point of view that could give us access to any complete and 
definitive knowledge [connaissance] of what may constitute our historical limits”. From here, 
“the theoretical and practical experience we have of our limits, and of the possibility of moving 
beyond them, is always limited and determined”. However, “that does not mean that no work 
can be done except in disorder and contingency”, it must instead be probed in the question: 
170 Caesar, ‘Take Me Anyplace You Want’, 194.
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“how can the growth of capabilities [capacités] be disconnected from the intensification of 
power relations?”  This can only be studied by analysing concrete practices consisting of the 
“forms of rationality that organize their ways of doing things” (“their technological side”) and 
the actions of subjects that  reflexively modify this techne (“their strategic side”). This is to 
explored through “relations of control over things”  (“the axis of knowledge”), “relations of 
action upon others”  (“the axis of power”) and “relations with oneself”  (“the axis of ethics”) 
(“WE”, 316-318).
This brings focus, then, to the aporetic final structure upon which Pynchon's works 
come to rest. Even if we are able to fashion ourselves as subjects on the ethical axis, partial 
control  on the axis of  knowledge means there is always the potential for larger, unknown 
structures to impinge upon that determination along the axis of power with little opportunity 
for feedback. What place is there, as Foucault sees it in Seneca and Marcus Aurelius, for a  
progression from mathesis to askesis wherein we could develop the techniques to fully know 
ourselves?171 Amid ever narrowing opportunities for the “good unsought and uncompensated” 
(AtD, 1085) – for how would we know them? – which technologies of the self are possible? Is a 
Voltairian hortensial contraction  or  αναχώρησις  [̓ anakhoresis  (withdrawal)]  even viable?172 
Foucault suggests that a positivist approach is feasible, on condition that an effort to decouple 
progress from the amplification of power relations remains. On the other hand, Pynchon's 
intrinsic linkage of the spheres of identity and concrete practices, that Foucault here separates, 
is clear from his closing remarks in “Nearer My Couch to Thee”: “what now seems increasingly 
to define us – technology” (“Nearer”, 22). This has the effect of extending the sphere of the 
ethical beyond the Foucauldian axis of an “aesthetic”,173 self-fashioning ethics; ipseic relations 
171 Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 311.
172 A succinct summary of anakhoresis and other ancient Greek technologies of the self as described by 
Foucault can be found at ibid., 46–48.
173 See O’Leary, Foucault and the Art of Ethics.
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are not disentangled from, but progressively knotted into the world, to paraphrase Gravity's 
Rainbow. Furthermore, the strategic elements, the failed Counterforce, the Chums of Chance, 
Mason and Dixon are not foiled because they are unaware that  overarching structures 
determine them but because from Pynchon's psychological, humanist essentialism  it is 
deduced that they are intrinsically incapable of non-complicity: “[w]e do know what's going 
on, and we let it go on” (GR, 713).
Closing Remarks
Foucault's work on the Enlightenment was, increasingly, coming to the fore, but the 
project remained incomplete. On the 25th June, 1984 – Orwell's, Foucault's, Pynchon's year – 
Michel Foucault died in Paris of a severe AIDS-related infection. Although it is, therefore, apt  
that one of Foucault's final publications should deal with the Enlightenment, the text of “Life:  
Experience and Science” (DÉ361), deposited with the  Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale  
shortly  before  his  death,  is  extremely  similar  on  its  Enlightenment-based  content  to  the 
introduction he had penned for Canguilhem six years earlier (DÉ219).174
In this chapter, I have demonstrated the ways in which an openness to critical alterity –  
a very Pynchonian ethic – can yield fruitful readings, even when going against the grain. In  
conducting a revisionist appraisal of parallel readings of Foucault and Pynchon on a genealogy  
of  Enlightenment,  it  has been shown that  the two cannot be deemed as irreconcilable as 
previously thought. Pynchon's interaction with this late-stage Foucault is far more nuanced 
than casual dismissals would credit. This engagement highlights troubling ethical aspects in 
Pynchon's fiction, but also allows for a more detailed analysis of Pynchon's utopianism as a 
regulative idea. In moving beyond Pynchon as a mere antirationalist and situating the 
production of his works in an Enlightenment tradition that has dialectically resolved towards 
174 Foucault, ‘Life: Experience and Science’.
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irrationality, supposed outright support for violent resistance can be further queried, an aspect 
that has important future implications for work on Pynchon and democracy. Coming finally to 
counter the early protests and resistance to Foucault in Pynchon criticism, in regard to the 
seamy underside of the Enlightenment and the sphere of ethics pertaining to the self, the 
divide between Pynchon and Foucault hinges on what we can know about ourselves and not 
necessarily, as has always been supposed, on who, or how, we can dominate. Pynchon's stance 
on revolution and resistance runs broadly in line with late Foucault's remarks on 
incrementalism; any change that can come about will, and should, be incremental while 
remaining pessimistic towards meliorism. The narrowing of the sphere of ethics to ipseity that 
Foucault introduces to dampen  the problems of agency that this entails, however, is  not 
shared by Pynchon.175 For Pynchon, to an even greater extent than for Foucault, work upon the 
self is intrinsically contaminated and cannot be clearly delineated from the wider, impinging 
systems; Pynchon's gnothi seauton (know thyself) and epimeleia heautou (care of the self) are 
not portrayed as relating purely to the self.176 In this consideration of a different Enlightenment 
tradition, it is necessary to ask whose Line is it anyway, and what is happening in that specific 
tradition? With apologies, then, to Thomas Pynchon, it is fair to say that when reading 
Pynchon in the Foucauldian Enlightenment tradition: we do know what's going on (to some, 
perhaps ingrained and inescapably limited, extent), and we let it go on, imagining in sorrow 
how it could (never) be otherwise.
175 O’Leary, Foucault and the Art of Ethics, 58–68 convincingly demonstrates that Foucault neglects the 
axis of power in his late works.
176 See Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 461.
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Chapter Four: Mass Deception
On Theodor W. Adorno
“The revolution is breaking out on the street? Too bad – I can't miss 
Adorno's lecture”
– Anecdotal student joke1
1 Weber Nicholsen and Shapiro, ‘Introduction’, xviii.
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Locating Adorno
Samuel Beckett's penultimate novella,  Worstward Ho, is framed “atween”2 the twain 
of being and void, crawling in absolute steadiness of rhythm “[t]ill nohow on”. 3 It is also a piece 
that brings the complex interrelations of microcosmic linguistics and macroscopic form to the 
fore. Respect would be, indeed, due to the critic who could extract a comprehensive reading 
that  reflected  the  whole  from  a  single  of  Beckett's  phonically  playful  sentences,  without 
reference to another. It could be, then, that Beckett's malignant void-dweller, never content 
with “merely bad”,4 is entwined (atwained atweened) within a Hegelian structure: the whole is  
the true. Superficially, this is convincing. Certainly the question-answer cadence of the piece 
points towards a dialectical structure ensconced in negation. However, Beckett's overarching 
presentation of  spirit  is  hardly  compatible  with  the metaphysical  onto-theology of  Hegel's  
Absolute;5 as succinctly phrased by Hamm in  Endgame: “[t]he bastard! He doesn't exist!”6 It 
looks,  for Beckett, as if  the same might apply to “the whole”.  The rescue of  Hegel  that is 
needed  for  a  Beckettian,  and  subsequently  Pynchonian,  dialectic  could,  as  a  provisional  
hypothesis, come through the work of Theodor W. Adorno, although this rescue would save a  
new dialectics only at Hegel's expense.7 This said, if Foucault's philosophical endeavour was 
underpinned by an often antagonistic relationship to the work of Kant, in the case of Adorno  
and  the  Frankfurt  School  the  interaction  with  German  Idealism  is  marked  through  an 
2 Beckett, Worstward Ho, 41.
3 Ibid., 7.
4 Ibid., 23.
5 For a blunt summary of the theology of idealism see Engels, Feuerbach, 31; see also Guyer, ‘Absolute 
Idealism and the Rejection of Kantian Dualism’, 37.
6 Beckett, ‘Endgame’, 119.
7 For Adorno, ‘Hegelianism is part of a bourgeois constellation’. See Tischler, ‘Adorno: The Conceptual 
Prison’, 111; for a critique of Adorno’s interpretation of Hegel, see Rose, ‘From Speculative to 
Dialectical Thinking - Hegel and Adorno’; Rose’s argument is well summarised in Caygill, ‘The Broken 
Hegel’, 21: ‘[t]he speculative element at work in Adorno’s view of mediation consists in its refusal of 
identity; its dogmatic aspect is that it frames the issue of identity/non-identity in terms of the 
theoretical dichotomy of “subject and object”.’
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engagement  with  Kant  and  Hegel.8 This  Hegelian  lineage  was  most  prominently  mediated 
through the work of  Karl  Marx and much of  the School's  output was an attempt to undo 
positivist Marxist interpretations (“a debased form of Marx”9), best seen in Marcuse's Reason 
and Revolution but also in much of Adorno's writing. While there is a remnant of theology in 
Adorno's works, his re-envisaged materialism casts, as Robert Hullot-Kentor puts it, “the image  
of divine light not to behold the deity as its source above, but to illuminate a damaged nature  
below”.10
Adorno sees at  once that the whole is,  in  some senses,  the true:  “[t]he dialectical 
method as a whole is an attempt to cope with this demand by freeing thought from the spell of  
the instant and developing it in far-reaching conceptual structures”;11 but that also “the whole 
is the untrue” (MM, 50), a paradoxical formulation most thoroughly dealt with by Neil Larsen.12 
However, Adorno himself explains this statement, which first occurred in Minima Moralia,  in 
his later “The Experiential Content of Hegel's Philosophy”: 
'The whole is the untrue,' not merely because the thesis of totality is itself 
untruth, being the principle of domination inflated to the absolute; the idea 
of  a  positivity  that  can  master  everything  that  opposes  it  through  the 
superior  power  of  a  comprehending  spirit  is  the  mirror  image  of  the 
experience of the superior coercive force inherent in everything that exists 
by virtue of its consolidation under domination.13
The capture of all moments consolidated into spirit is an untruth born of domination that does  
not admit the inherent contradictions of which it is comprised. As Dwight Eddins perceived in  
his 1990  The Gnostic Pynchon  in reference to symbiotic readings: “[a]n equable synthesis of 
this  sort  usually  has,  however,  as  Hegel's  basic  paradigm suggests,  an  ancestry  of  violent  
8 Weber Nicholsen and Shapiro, ‘Introduction’, ix.
9 Adorno and Horkheimer, Towards a New Manifesto, 37.
10 Hullot-Kentor, Things Beyond Resemblance, 200; see also Wilson, Theodor Adorno, 98.
11 Adorno, ‘Skoteinos, or How to Read Hegel’, 108.
12 Larsen, ‘The Idiom of Crisis’, 267.
13 Adorno, ‘The Experiential Content of Hegel’s Philosophy’, 87.
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dialectic”.14
Adorno  is  a  useful  figure  through  which  to  advance  the  study  of  Pynchon's  
philosophical location because, as shall be seen in this chapter, their writings share much in  
common.  As  David  Cowart  has  recently  put  it:  “Pynchon's  narrative  at  once coheres  with  
machined precision and subverts or betrays that wholeness”15 while  Gravity's Rainbow asks: 
“what  is  the real  nature  of  synthesis?  […]  what  is  the real  nature  of  control?”  (GR,  167). 
Furthermore, it is upon the work of Adorno that this entire study has, in one way or another,  
rested. It was the Frankfurt School's criticism of the reification inherent in early Wittgenstein 
that made possible an explanation of Pynchon's juxtaposition of Nazism and logical positivism.  
Indeed,  Adorno directly  states  in  “Skoteinos,  or  How to  Read  Hegel”  that  “Wittgenstein's 
maxim 'whereof  one  cannot  speak,  thereof  one  must  be  silent,'  in  which  the  extreme of  
positivism spills over into the gesture of reverent authoritarian authenticity, and which for that  
reason exerts a kind of intellectual mass suggestion, is utterly unphilosophical”.16 On the other 
hand, critics, alongside the philosopher-historian himself, have argued that Foucault's stance is  
not entirely alien to that of the Frankfurt School.17
Of the three philosophers/theorists featured in this work, Adorno remains the most 
consistent  over  the  course  of  his  life.18 This  renders  difficulties  for  a  continuation  of  the 
chronological  approach  taken  in  previous  chapters  as  the  thoughts  from  each  distinct  
time-frame in Adorno's oeuvre relate more to subtle, thematic shifts than tectonics of opinion.  
Adorno is also a difficult philosopher to deploy in a literary context. His methodology is not  
portable and his lexicon is, if not quite Heideggerian, hardly self-explanatory;  constellations,  
14 Eddins, The Gnostic Pynchon, viii.
15 Cowart, Thomas Pynchon & the Dark Passages of History, 46.
16 Adorno, ‘Skoteinos, or How to Read Hegel’, 101.
17 McCarthy, Ideals and Illusions, 43–48.
18 See Buck-Morss, The Origin of Negative Dialectics, xii.
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determinate negation,  negative dialectics,  cognitive truth-content being perhaps among the 
best,  or  worst,  examples  of  such  obscurantism.  This  said,  Adorno's  thought  can  be 
summarised, as does Susan Buck-Morss: it is a rejection of the Hegelian notion of history as 
progress;  there  is  a  structural  equivalence  between  scientific  knowledge  and  art;  and  an 
insistence upon “the nonidentity of reason and reality”.19
Before  proceeding,  some  basic  aspects  of  terminology  must  be  outlined,  the  very 
process of which will unavoidably do violent damage to Adorno's thought, but necessarily so in 
order  to  undertake  any  theoretical  consideration;  my  own  counter-signature  to  Adorno's 
singularity.20 As Pynchon puts it in Gravity's Rainbow: “by the time you get any summary, the 
whole thing'll have changed. We could shorten them for you as much as you like, but you'd be  
losing so much resolution, it wouldn't be worth it” (GR, 540-541). It is also necessary to warn 
that this chapter does not attempt to put a literary-critical system of negative dialectics into 
play itself, but rather to examine the degree to which Pynchon's works project a world-view 
sympathetic to aspects of Adorno's thought. As such, at several points herein, this work could 
be read as coercively dominating its object through subjective synthesis.  Furthermore, this  
approach  is  not  compatible  with  Adorno's  theories  of  aesthetics  which  see  theoretical  
enterprises  as  not  only  dominating,  but  doomed  to  critical  self-affirmation:  “[a]pplied 
philosophy, a priori fatal,  reads out of works that it  has invested with an  air  of concretion 
nothing but its own theses”.21 Whether this is the end-result, after extensive discussion below, 
I will leave to the reader, but it can be justified twofold. Firstly, Adorno was hardly immune 
from such an approach himself,  using Ibsen's  The Wild Duck as  an extended example of a 
problem in moral philosophy despite being “fully conscious of the problematic nature of using 
19 Ibid., xiii.
20 See Attridge, Reading and Responsibility, 4, 29.
21 AT, 447; this issue is clearly explicated and explored in Wilson, Theodor Adorno, 53.
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literary works to illustrate moral problems”.22 Secondly, though, I think we need not be overly 
worried about critically dominating Pynchon's work; his texts are more than capable of fighting  
back.
Constellations, Determinate Negation and Negative Dialectics
Adorno's  conception  of  the  purpose,  or  task,  of  philosophy  is  most  clearly  and 
succinctly outlined in the piece, “The Actuality of Philosophy”, his 1931 inaugural lecture at the  
University of Frankfurt (“TAP”, 23). In this lecture, Adorno called for a simultaneous conflation  
and diremption of philosophy and science. Critiquing both phenomenology for its ontological 
fixation, resulting in a reason that attempts to coerce nature into its own structures (26), and  
logical  positivism,  under  which  “philosophy  becomes  solely  an  occasion  for  ordering  and 
controlling the separate sciences”, Adorno suggests that the question faced by philosophy is  
whether “there exists an adequacy between the philosophic questions and the possibility of  
their being answered at all” (29). Werner Bonefeld puts this well when he says that “thought's  
critical quality does not rest on the answers it gives, but on the questions it asks”, for Adorno  
believes that philosophy has been asking the wrong questions.23
The questions that should be asked and the way they could be answered came instead 
from the concept of the constellation put forward by Walter Benjamin in the “Epistemo-Critical 
Prologue” to his  Trauerspiel study: “ideas are not represented in themselves, but solely and 
exclusively in an arrangement of concrete elements in the concept: as the configuration of 
these elements [...] Ideas are to objects as constellations are to stars”.24 Adorno concludes that 
the  proper  activity  for  philosophy  is  a  form  of  configurational  permutation,  stating  that 
“philosophy  has  to  bring  its  elements,  which  it  receives  from the  sciences,  into  changing  
22 Adorno, ‘Lecture Sixteen: 23 July 1963’.
23 Bonefeld, ‘Emancipatory Praxis’, 127.
24 Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, 34.
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constellations [...] into changing trial combinations, until they fall into a figure which can be  
read as  an answer”  (“TAP”,  32).  From this,  the distinction between the empirical  and the 
conceptual  can  be  outlined  thus:  “the  idea  of  science  is  research;  that  of  philosophy  is  
interpretation” (31). Philosophy is to unpick the riddle of reality for “the task of philosophy is 
not to search for concealed and manifest intentions of reality, but to interpret unintentional  
reality” (32), it is “to light up the riddle-Gestalt  like lightning and to negate it, not to persist 
behind the riddle and imitate it” (31).
The means by which the riddle form is to be shattered lies in the Adornian conception 
of determinate negativity. Determinate negation is a Hegelian construct used extensively in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit but concisely summed up in The Science of Logic as “the negation of 
its [the concrete object's]  particular  content”.25 As would be expected, Adorno's use of the 
term is enmeshed in his conflict with idealism but the gist is well summed up by Buck-Morss:  
“[i]f  language  could  no  longer  presume to  rectify  reality,  it  should  not  abandon its  more  
modest power, the critical power to call reality by its right name, making manifest the truth 
within appearance”.26 Adorno's determinate negation is a call for philosophy to find a specific,  
historically  contingent  truth  that  does  not  derive  from  an  underlying  metaphysical  
presumption that is to be uncovered. Philosophy is to abandon large scale abstractions, for  
“the mind (Geist) is indeed not capable of producing or grasping the totality of the real” but  
must instead “penetrate the detail, to explode in miniature the mass of merely existing reality”  
(“TAP”, 38). 
Such a stance serves to justify critical negativity and Adorno recognized this, stating 
that “I am not afraid of the reproach of unfruitful negativity” because “the first dialectical point 
25 Hegel, The Science of Logic, sec. 21.38.
26 Buck-Morss, The Origin of Negative Dialectics, 175.
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of attack is given by a philosophy which cultivates precisely those problems whose removal  
appears more pressingly necessary than the addition of a new answer to so many old ones”  
(“TAP”, 35). This fusion of the constellation with determinate negation leaves only Adorno's 
notion of negative dialectics to be explored here. Adorno's 1966 book of this title begins with a  
provocative introduction that sets out a justification for theoria over praxis while rendering his 
philosophy incompatible with Marxist politics. Describing the failure of the proletariat to effect  
the revolution, Adorno sees a continuing need for theory and negativity because, after the  
failure  of  Marxism to obtain,  a  critique of  philosophy's  passivity  becomes  an  anti-rational  
stance: “[t]he summary judgment that it  had merely interpreted the world [...]  becomes a  
defeatism of  reason after  the attempt to change the world miscarried”.  The role,  now, of 
philosophy is to “ruthlessly criticize itself” (ND, 3).
With this  justification for a  theoretical  approach put aside, Adorno reveals  what is  
meant by the term negative dialectics. To state it precisely but in a way that requires further 
explication, negative dialectics is the primacy of the object. To explore this, it is necessary to 
trace Adorno's argument. As a subject thinks under an idealist system, he or she conceives an 
equality between the concept in the subject's mind, and the reality that is subsumed under  
that concept: “[t]o think is to identify” (ND, 5), or from Hegel: “[j]udgment joins subject and 
object in a connection of identity”.27 However, the inherent imperfection of the concept means 
that reality is always more than the concept can hold: “objects do not go into their concepts 
without leaving a remainder” (ND, 5). This remainder, then, is the part of reality that makes it  
non-identical with a mental concept. Traditional dialectics gives one, in Adorno's phrase, “the 
consistent sense of nonidentity”, but this nonidentity (the remainder of reality) is dealt with by  
branding  the  incompatibility  as  contradiction  with  the  concept:  “[s]ince  that  totality  [the 
27 Hegel, The Science of Logic, sec. 21.78.
174
concept] is structured to accord to logic [...] whatever will not fit this principle [...] comes to be  
designated a contradiction” (5).  Adorno sees,  therefore, that in the usual  mode of identity  
thinking, for which dialectics is frequently blamed rather than our “[striving] for unity”, the 
subject is given priority as those aspects of reality that do not fit with the subject's concept 
“will be reduced to the merely logical form of contradiction” (5). In this sense, contradiction is  
no more than “nonidentity under the aspect of identity” or, as Hegel puts it  in his earliest  
formulation of this position in The Science of Logic: “the identity of identity and nonidentity”.28 
To give the object primacy is to respect the unique, rather than to dominate through identity  
thinking or exclude through contradiction.
28 Ibid., sec. 21.60.
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Reason, Reality, Synthesis and Control: Gravity's Rainbow and 
Negative Dialectics
“what is the real nature of synthesis? […] what is the real nature of control?”
 – Thomas Pynchon, Gravity's Rainbow29
The investigation into resistance, revolution and ipseic ethics that came about through 
a reading of  Foucault  with  Pynchon concluded that  revolution,  in  Pynchon,  functions  as  a 
utopian  project  that  cannot  be  enacted,  but  is  rather  instilled  incrementally  with  little 
possibility  of  materialisation.  This  may  yet  prove  to  be  true  but  it  certainly  merits  closer 
scrutiny given Adornian thought on utopianism.
As Sam Thomas enacts methodologically in  Pynchon and the Political, for Adorno the 
utopian drive is embodied in the particular. As Buck-Morss and Jarvis see it, this was a concept 
that Adorno derived from Ernst Bloch, with another debt to Walter Benjamin's “microscopic  
analysis”, consisting of two primary features: the transitory nature of the particular promising 
a different future; and the nonidentity of the particular with the categorical superstructure, an  
immanent defiance of that very structure.30 
This theme will initially be explored through the critique of synthetic dialectics played 
out  in  Adorno's  Negative  Dialectics.  Beginning  with  an  appraisal  of  the  components  of 
Adornian utopianism in Pynchon, this will then feed into an analysis of the depiction of idealist  
and  materialist  traditions  in  Gravity's  Rainbow  to  begin  to  more  thoroughly  address  the 
essential questions of synthesis and control posed by Pynchon's work.
29 GR, 167.
30 Buck-Morss, The Origin of Negative Dialectics, 76; Jarvis, Adorno, 7.
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Utopian Possibility, Dystopian Marginalities?
One of the key problems encountered in the previous analysis of Pynchon's utopianism 
was that,  as a regulative concept, it  was dependent upon some form of linear time for its 
(non-)  realisation.  Pynchon,  clearly,  is  sceptical  about  linear  time.  Sam  Thomas'  view  on 
Pynchonian utopia is different and informative;  Mason & Dixon  could be considered, in Tom 
Moylan's  sense,  as  a  “critical  utopia”  emphasising  autonomy  and  marginal,  “micrological 
activity” (ND, 28).31 This is crucial for this study because, in Moylan's phrasing, critical utopia is 
“'[c]ritical'  in  the  Enlightenment  sense  of  critique  –  that  is  expressions  of  oppositional 
thought”.32 Linking  this  back  to  Adorno  and  Bloch,  Thomas  demonstrates  a  different 
utopianism in which the particular and marginal are utopian because they are not the system;  
it  sits  within,  contributing  to  the  make-up  of  the  whole,  but  resists  subsumption  by  the  
superstructure. This mode of utopianism is important but also problematic, for given that it is 
“suspicious of transcendence”, Pynchon's fiction also “retains a legitimate impulse towards 
immanent  transcendence”.33 This is a view of Adorno's utopianism reiterated by Jarvis, with 
clear resonances for a Pynchonian, negatively regulative standpoint,  for “[i]f  this  notion of  
utopia  is  indeed a  'regulative  idea'  as  Kracauer suggested,  it  is  clearly  unusually  internally 
differentiated” as “it in no way seeks to assure us that the great day must come, nor even that  
it is likely to”.34 The question that must arise, though, moving from the unboundedly relativistic  
back  towards  some  grounding  is:  how  is  it  clear,  given  the  factors  inhibiting  knowledge 
explored in the previous chapter, which instances of transcendence contribute to the system 
and which, in their immanent success, resist domination? How can immanent transcendence 
be distinguished from escapist transcendence?
31 Thomas, Pynchon and the Political, 61.
32 Moylan, Demand the Impossible, 10.
33 Thomas, Pynchon and the Political, 37.
34 Jarvis, Adorno, 222.
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There is an additional problem in relation to Adorno's notion of nonidentity at work  
here:  “[t]he  general  concept  of  particularity  has  no  power  over  the  particular  which  the 
concept means in abstracting” (ND, 174). If a moment of utopian marginality can be isolated 
and  posited  in  opposition  to  the  dominating  categorical  superstructure,  it  assumes  the 
negative function of the nonidentical but fleetingly, for it is then too easy to proceed to a new  
positivity or even just to hypostatize the notion of “particularity”.35 As a result, the utopian of 
the determinate negation is always in danger of synthesis to a new form of dominance: “the  
negation of negation would be another identity, a new delusion” (ND, 160). Indeed:
[w]hat makes a dialectical impulse of the particular – its indissolubility in the 
cover concept – is treated as a universal state of facts, as if the particular  
were its own cover concept and indissoluble for that reason. This is precisely  
what  reduces  the  dialectics  of  nonidentity  and  identity  to  a  mere 
semblance: identity wins over nonidentity (173).
This also poses exceptional difficulties in a literary context. Consider, for instance, that many of  
Adorno's  examples  of  conceptual  non-identity  are  predicated  upon  the  identification  of  a 
subjective immanence that screams at the injustice of a category: “[f]or instance, a contraction  
like the one between the definition which an individual knows as his own and his 'role,' the  
definition forced upon him by society when he would make his living” (152). To find such a 
declaration anywhere but in the most committed, didactic fiction36 is unlikely, particularly in 
Pynchon's writing, for there will be no outright howl, it must be inferred and read, it will be 
both “striking and secret at the same time” (ND, 153). Instead, therefore, of establishing new 
categorical dominance through positivity, a non-identitarian approach would remain critical, it 
would not “construe contradictions from above” and “progress by resolving them” but would  
rather “pursue the inadequacy of thought and thing, to experience it in the thing” (153). The 
35 See Tischler, ‘Adorno: The Conceptual Prison’, 113; see also Eagleton, Walter Benjamin, 117–118.
36 Although note that Hutcheon, The Politics of Postmodernism, 63–65 sees a didacticism in Pynchon’s 
historiography.
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extent to which Pynchon's fiction explores this notion will be the primary focus here.
The instance best suited to begin an exploration of this phenomenon is episode nine of  
Gravity's Rainbow's “The Counterforce” in which, after recounting Geli Tripping's search for  
Tchitcherine,  Gottfried  kneels  before  Blicero  who  gives  his  infamous  speech  on  escape, 
transcendence, Europe, America and death (717-724). The narratives of these two plot-lines 
both focus on issues of transcendence. Blicero wants to “break out – to leave this cycle of  
infection and death” in an era that maintains “only the structure” of  imperialism with the 
“savages of other continents” persisting, rather than being exterminated (GR,  722). On the 
other hand, Geli Tripping's effort to find Tchitcherine, initiated in this episode, is one that turns 
the latter from his  destructive quest to hunt down and kill  his  half-brother Enzian.  Critical  
readings of these passages have clearly identified Tchitcherine's redemption as aligned with 
the immanent transcendence suggested by Thomas, while Blicero's is nearly always cast as one 
of escape and read in extremely negative terms.37 Yet why is this so? As Mark Siegel points out, 
“the narrator himself rarely condemns either Blicero or the rocket explicitly, as he does, for  
instance,  Pointsman”.38 Indeed,  both  of  these  sub-plots  present  autonomous,  one-time 
marginal  acts  undertaken  by  individuals,  thus  fulfilling  (at  least  in  theory)  the  criteria  for 
Adornian determinate negative utopianism. However, one apparently succeeds while the other 
is distinctly dystopic, with “no humanity left in its eyes” (GR, 486), regardless of how far both 
can be regarded as episodes of “final madness” (GR, 485).
Adorno: “objects do not go into their concepts without leaving a remainder” (ND, 5); 
Eddins: “there may exist an unaccounted-for remainder”.39 It is necessary, then, to examine 
the crudity of the concept, distilling the breadth of experience into succinct thought, that is the 
37 For just one such reading among many of Tchitcherine in a positive light, see Strehle, Fiction in the 
Quantum Universe, 56–57.
38 Siegel, Pynchon: Creative Paranoia in Gravity’s Rainbow, 41.
39 Eddins, The Gnostic Pynchon, viii.
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cause  of  this  overspill.  Rather  than  Adornian  utopia  resting  purely  upon this  determinate 
marginality's  resistance,  it  also has  to  be open to possibility,  for  the “means employed in 
negative dialectics for the penetration of its hardened objects is possibility – the possibility of 
which their reality has cheated the objects and which is nonetheless visible in each one” (ND, 
52).  The  “perennial  aim”  of  this  Adornian  possibility,  as  Jarvis  sees  it,  “is  to  resist  the 
liquidation of the possibility of really new experience”.40 Thinking in this light helps to begin 
reworking the case of Blicero, for his escape is  not merely a breaking out,  but a series of  
regressions,  or  as  Thanatz  terms  them,  “reversions”  (GR,  465).  Indeed,  with  echoes  of 
Slothrop's “Eurydice-obsession, this  bringing back out of...” (472) here Weissmann asks “[i]s 
the cycle over now, and a new one ready to begin?”, seeking a “new Deathkingdom” 41 and 
“ways for getting back” wishing to “recover it all” and failing that, to “bring you back the story” 
having “wired his nerves back into the pre-Christian earth”, all phrases that indicate not the  
possibility  of  the  truly  new,  but  recovery  of  the  old,  with  even  the  “new”  of  “new 
Deathkingdom” functioning as the antonym “another” in the metaphor of cyclicality (GR, 465, 
723).  This  repetitive  past-ness  recurs  throughout  and  is  far  more  sinister  than  either  the 
“comic vision” or revelatory  “spiritual  insight” suggested by Raymond Olderman;42 Thanatz 
sees  Blicero's  eyes  “reflecting  a  windmill”  even  though  “nope,  no  windmills”  are  present,  
“[b]ut it was reflecting a windmill […] reflecting the past” (GR, 670).
Joseph Slade has seen this return as part of the romantic nostalgia already covered in 
the preceding Wittgenstein chapter, but in this instance Slade claims direct influence upon  
Pynchon by Adorno's  fellow Frankfurt  School  member,  Herbert  Marcuse.43 Others,  such as 
40 Jarvis, Adorno, 222.
41 Interestingly, this could be another previously unspotted allusion to the Nazi death camps. As Jay 
Winter points out, the phrase ‘univers concentrationnaire’, which refers to these camps, roughly 
translates as ‘Kingdom of Death Camps’. See Winter, Dreams of Peace and Freedom, 145.
42 Olderman, ‘The New Consciousness and the Old System’, 211–212.
43 Slade, ‘Religion, Psychology’, 163.
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Tony Tanner, unquestioningly assert that “the organizing question of the book” is “[i]s there a  
way back?”, without evaluating the ambivalent moral judgement cast upon such repetition.44 
While such an issue has since been taken up critically  – for instance in the clash between  
Thomas Moore and Mark Siegel over the positivity of Blicero's transcendence in which the 
argument  turns  upon whether the repudiation of  “cycles”  constitutes  an “active  denial  of  
life”45 – cycles, repetition and uniqueness are enmeshed in a far more nuanced treatment in  
Gravity's  Rainbow  than  a  distillation  to  the  “essence  of  fascism”  will  allow.46 Consider, 
stemming  from  this  episode,  that  the  purported  immanent  transcendence  of  Vaslav 
Tchitcherine is also not a one-time event. This is evident as the sexual “magic” cast by Geli  
Tripping, which is “not necessarily fantasy”, leads to the anticlimax in which Tchitcherine “has  
passed his brother by, at the edge of an evening”, described as an event occurring, however,  
“[c]ertainly not [for] the first time” (GR, 735). It is also through this phrase, “the edge of an 
evening”,  repeated at  the close  of  Gravity's  Rainbow  and previously  seen in  relation to  a 
séance (145) (the ultimate form of cyclical recovery) that the two narratives demonstrate their 
co-dependence. For at this moment, Blicero is wired-in to Tchitcherine's redemptive mode,  
“last  word from Blicero:  'The edge of  evening [...]'”  (759).  Furthermore, Blicero's  desire to 
recover existing experience would not demonstrate his conformity with the They system, but 
rather his opposition to it for although this line does have an affirmative side, “[o]nce, only 
once” is also “[o]ne of Their favorite slogans” (413) and ties in to Pointsman's notion that  
“[t]here is only forward – into it – or backward” (89).
This ambivalence emerges as a function of the text's polyphony. To demonstrate this, it 
is  merely  necessary  to  gesture  towards  the  Kekulé  dream  sequence  that  announces  the 
44 Tanner, Thomas Pynchon, 85.
45 Moore, The Style of Connectedness, 76–77; see also Siegel, Pynchon: Creative Paranoia in Gravity’s 
Rainbow, 66–67, 114–117.
46 Slade, ‘Religion, Psychology’, 163.
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organicism of creation. In this passage it is declared that “[t]he World is a closed thing, cyclical,  
resonant, eternally returning”, delivered up to despoiling “profit”, to those who seek only to 
“violate the cycle” (412). However, the interpretation of this passage rests upon whether one 
accepts  Blicero's  perspective  or  that  of  the  unspecified  narrator  at  this  point.  Blicero,  of  
course, would have it that the cycle is infection and death, perhaps confirmed in the early  
scene where it is asked “[w]hat Wheel did They set in motion?” (208), a mere few pages after  
one of the text's infrequent direct mentions of the term “holocaust” (205). In contrast to this, 
as already stated, the narrator's face-value assertions side with the cycle. These aspects of  
polyphony and polyvalence are further demonstrated in the fact that cyclicality is a crucial  
component of “Christian death”, otherwise known as the “Baby Jesus Con Game”, spurned by  
the “Europeanized” Herero in favour of “Tribal death”. Crucially though, it is stated that the  
Herero's mode is one that “calculates no cycles, no returns”, thus once again relativizing the 
depiction of circularity (318). While one overspilling aspect of utopic objective remainder was  
“one-timeness”,  an  evaluation  of  this  aspect's  associations  relies  upon  a  pre-formed 
conception of the speaker, thus rendering it  conceptually useless.  Cycles and one-timeness 
must  be  removed  from  the  concept  in  order  to  cover  both  these  instances  in  Gravity's  
Rainbow. As Mattessich puts it: “[t]here is in the text both a natural cycle  and  a rupture or 
arrest of that cycle”.47 Perhaps, then, it could rest in their autonomy?
Blicero's autonomy looks beyond doubt, for as “the Zone's worst specter” he sits as  
“the  highest  oppressor”  and  his  “power  is  absolute”.  Indeed,  further  to  the  remarks  on 
Blicero's  conflict  with  the  They  system,  he  also,  in  part,  exhibits  identity  with  this  
establishment for, in the epistemological realm, “the real SS guards […] his own brother-elite,  
didn't  know  what  this  man  was  up  to”  (666).  Simultaneously,  he  presents  a  “motherly,  
47 Mattessich, Lines of Flight, 83.
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eager-to-educate look”; the parent and teacher who teaches uncertainty and breeds paranoia  
(759).  Yet this is not the consistent presentation throughout  Gravity's Rainbow.  In an early 
scene, Blicero's impotence is revealed as “[h]e can do nothing”, sitting “[a]mong dying Reich” 
for he needs his sadism, “he needs her so, needs Gottfried”, reality coming from “the straps 
and whips leathern, real in his hands”, trusting only to “[d]estiny” that he will be killed neither  
by one of the many “rocket misfires” nor by Katje's betrayal to a British air raid, “not that way  
– but it will come” (96-97). Furthermore, Blicero is not presented as the highest authority in a  
theological  context.  Instead,  he is  metaphorically  transcribed as  a  messenger,  consistently 
referred to in the angelic domain, for as a colonialist German he is “the Angel who tried to 
destroy us in Südwest” (328).
Tchitcherine's autonomy is likewise a double-faced leaf. On the recto he is strong and 
commanding, harbouring his own secret desires to kill  Enzian of which the system remains 
unaware, despite the tinge of fear that accompanies such subversion: “[a]nd when They find  
out I'm not what They think...” (566). On the verso lies another story, a character paralysed,  
moved  only  by  Their  desires,  for  although  his  transgressions  “did  not  mean  death  for  
Tchitcherine, not even exile”, under the Stalinist context the euphemism of “a thinning out of  
career possibilities” is clear (343). This is also coupled with the epistemological dilemmas in the 
novel, for Tchitcherine can believe he is autonomous and yet possess little agency, masked by 
the superdense knowledge-blackholes around which he orbits: “using him the same way he  
thinks he's using Slothrop”, the stress surely lying here upon “he thinks” (612). Again, both 
these episodes fall under an incoherent notion of autonomy that cannot be said to constitute a  
utopic identification; indeed, it would take “no small amount of legwork to assemble all these  
pieces of paper” (352).
Could the distinction lie, then, in their marginality? This is unlikely. Blicero is at once a  
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lone (were)wolf  and a representative  of  the Nazi  ideology;  Tchitcherine simultaneously an 
outcast yet continuing the great terror, for Slothrop, at least. This conceptual trinity cannot be 
shown to distinguish between Blicero's and Tchitcherine's attempts at redemption; concepts 
that were supposed to isolate particularity here fail to define the particular. This could, in fact,  
be a problem that merits  further  examination in respect to how Adorno's  work is  used in 
literary studies, for it is the same mode of working that Adorno claims felled Husserl:
Husserl the logician, on the other hand, would indeed sharply distinguish 
the mode of apprehending the essence from generalizing abstraction – what 
he had in mind was a specific mental experience capable of perceiving the 
essence in the particular – but the essence to which this experience referred 
did not differ in any respect from the familiar general concepts (ND, 9).
Ipsa Scientia Potestas Est: Pynchon and Materialism
Having these episodes  disentangled from the  knotted  utopian  triad  of  marginality,  
autonomy  and  one-timeness  allows  the  identification  of  the  conceptual  over-spill  that  
accounts for the critical judgement upon the Tchitcherine/Blicero transcendence differential.  
This  hinges,  I  contend,  around  the  fact  that  Blicero  is  eventually  “driven  deep  into  Their 
province, into control, synthesis and control” (661). Of course, synthesis is also the term most  
often used to crudely and reductively describe the closing move in a three-step-plan version of  
the Hegelian dialectic. For a conflation of synthesis, in this sense, and control, it is interesting  
to  note  that  in  the  preceding  chapters  on  Wittgenstein  and  Foucault,  both  power  and 
knowledge structures have been explored. Now, though, in consideration of both, but not at  
the  crude  level  of  cabal-istic  haves  and  have-nots  in  a  knowledge  economy,  it  becomes 
necessary to explore the ways in which the process of thought begins to be seen as analogous 
to the process of domination, beginning with an interrogation of the idealist and materialist 
traditions at work in Pynchon's writing.
It is well-documented that, in Gravity's Rainbow, the benzene ring represents, as does 
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the  rocket,  many  things  to  many  people.  These  range  from  an  oneiric  “fantastic  fact”  
presenting the “underlying non-rational components of science and technology” in its role as a  
“tool for metaphor and style”;48 a harbinger of mankind's twilight as a representative of the 
suicidal system;49 a central player in Pynchon's crafting of “Germany as an embodiment of the 
most extreme tendencies of technological society” through the IG Farben connection;50 or a 
parallel to the Nazi death infection, leading to Slothrop's disintegration through Plasticman.51 
However,  in  light  of  the  philosophical  frame presented  here,  it  makes  sense  to  deploy  a 
linguistic  overlap as  a  bridge  point  between reality/nature  and reason;  between synthetic  
judgements and synthetic plastics.
As Daniel Berthold-Bond notes,52 Engels' pronouncement that “the great basic question 
of all philosophy […] is that concerning the relation of thinking and being” 53 was preceded by 
Hegel  sixty  years  earlier  in  his  lectures  on  the  history  of  philosophy.  Speaking  on  the 
idealism54/materialism divide, Hegel indicates “the cognitive unity of subject and object”;55 the 
aim being “to reconcile thought or the Notion with reality”.56 More interestingly, though, this 
Hegelian lineage in Engels is useful with regard to Pynchon and the philosophical tradition as it  
is here that one finds a description of materialism's refutation of the Kantian  ding an sich  
through none other  than “organic  chemistry”.57 Engels  argues that the true death-knell  of 
Kantian idealism was not the counter-idealism of Hegel but, driven by the “ever more rapidly  
onrushing  progress  of  natural  science  and  industry”,  the  knowledge  gained  by  creation 
48 Friedman, ‘Science and Technology’, 99–100.
49 Morgan, ‘Gravity’s Rainbow: What’s the Big Idea?’, 90.
50 Tölölyan, ‘War as Background’, 52–54.
51 Hendin, ‘What Is Thomas Pynchon Telling Us?’, 46–47.
52 Berthold-Bond, Hegel’s Grand Synthesis, 2.
53 Engels, Feuerbach, 30.
54 A helpful discussion of the debates on the term ‘idealism’ can be found at Ameriks, ‘Introduction’, 
8–9. I have tended to err towards Ameriks’ sceptical definition.
55 Berthold-Bond, Hegel’s Grand Synthesis, 37.
56 Hegel, History of Philosophy, 3:345; see also ibid., 3:160, 551.
57 Engels, Feuerbach, 33.
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(“bringing it into being”) and use.58 While this differs in its route from the first of Marx's Theses  
on  Feuerbach –  which  critiques  passive  materialist  contemplation  set  against  active,  but 
abstract,  idealism – the emphasis  remains upon the shift  from idealism to a  new form of  
materialism that includes human activity.59 This materialism is twofold rooted in the positivist 
tradition developed by Comte; empirically in the “sense certainty of systematic observation 
that secures intersubjectivity”60 and in its duck-test-esque utility, “l'utile”, an expansion of the 
“power of control over nature and society”.61 In short, according to Engels, materialist science, 
including organic chemistry, slayed Kantian idealism.
To  broach  the  extent  of  Pynchon's  materialist  outlook  might  seem  a  strange 
undertaking. After all, work by David Cowart has asserted the primacy in Pynchon's writing of 
“challenging and subverting materialist complacency”.62 Furthermore, Douglas Fowler writes 
extensively,  albeit  unconvincingly,  on  the  “clash  between  this  world  and  [...]  The  Other 
Kingdom”.63 Gravity's  Rainbow  itself,  as  with  much  of  Pynchon's  fiction,  is  saturated  with 
paranormal occurrences, from its multiple séances to The White Visitation and passages on the 
“Region of Uncertainty” at the centre of “Subimipolexity” (700). While one initial retort might  
be to challenge this on the basis that the perception and cognition of idealism differ from  
spiritual and supernatural structures, there has been much commentary to undermine such a  
response.  Indeed, this is most marked in the writings of Lenin who refers to philosophical  
idealism  as  a  “road  to  clerical  obscurantism”,64 a  view  furthered  by  Maurice  Cornforth's 
declaration that “[a]t bottom, idealism is religion, theology”; there is a structural affinity.65
58 Ibid., 32–34.
59 Marx, ‘Theses on Feuerbach’, 73.
60 Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, 74; see also Frisby, ‘Introduction to the English 
Translation’, xi.
61 Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, 77.
62 Cowart, Thomas Pynchon: The Art of Allusion, 36.
63 Fowler, A Reader’s Guide to Gravity’s Rainbow, 10.
64 Lenin, ‘On the Question of Dialectics’, 14.
65 Cornforth, Dialectical Materialism, 20.
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However, three core aspects of this initial foin against Pynchon's materialism can be 
easily parried. The first is that the appearance of paranormal belief systems is consistent with 
the generic mediation of the novel's setting and should not necessarily be read as indicative of 
mimetic fidelity to reality. As Brian McHale has recently observed, building on Cowart's seminal  
work on film in  Gravity's  Rainbow,66 Pynchon's novels  from 1973 onwards appropriate the 
generic of the era in which they are set and also, therefore, the thematic content, a strategy he 
terms “mediated historiography”:67 “[i]f Against the Day is a library of early-twentieth-century 
entertainment  fiction,  then  Gravity's  Rainbow is  a  media  library  of  the  1940s”.68 The 
appearance  of  séances  in  conjunction  with  a  detective/mystery  setup  (combining  two 
Pynchonian strands) would be consistent with the films of the era such as  The Hound of the  
Baskervilles  (1939),  Pillow of Death (1945) and  The Phantom Thief  (1946), which all feature 
mediated communication with the dead, to name but three examples.69 As with the character 
Felipe in  Gravity's Rainbow, Pynchon could be merely “using a bit of movie language” (GR, 
612).
The  second  basic  refutation  of  an  idealist  Pynchon  hinges  on  the  accessibility  of 
Pynchon's  beyond.  For  a  transcendental  idealism  to  hold,  the  thing-in-itself  must  be 
inaccessible  and  unknowable  except  through  appearance.  This  door  swings  both  ways  in 
Gravity's  Rainbow  for  the very purpose of  a  séance is  to experience the beyond, but it  is  
generally through a medium that shapes cognition of the other side into acceptable forms, as 
with the subjective aspects of Kant's idealism. This is not always the case though, for as Cowart  
highlights, several of Slothrop's dreams “feature contact or near contact with the dead”.70 For 
66 Cowart, Thomas Pynchon: The Art of Allusion, 31–62.
67 McHale, ‘Genre as History’, 25.
68 Ibid., 21.
69 Backer, Mystery Movie Series of 1940s Hollywood, 56–57, 164–165, 257–259.
70 Cowart, Thomas Pynchon: The Art of Allusion, 50.
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Cowart, the status of the oneiric as a knowledge-construct is dubious as it is “linked to the  
ontological and epistemological importance of movies in the novel”.71 However, dreams and 
séances are not the only encounters with the dead. For many in Pynchon's camp Dora, death  
came as the liberating equivalent of the American Army and they are now on the “spiritual 
rampage”. To fend off these ghouls it is suggested that one can “[u]se the natural balance of 
your  mind  against  them”  (GR,  296). In  this  instance  it  appears  that  the  mechanisms  of 
perceptual  concepts  that  permit  understanding  can  be  used  to  isolate  the  invading 
thing-in-itself and banish the phenomenon to the realm of the noumenon. Nevertheless, as  
with the return of Tantivy (GR, 551-552) and more thoroughly covered by Kathryn Hume,72 the 
spiritual must have, in the first instance, crossed the perceptual divide and entered the realm 
of the material even when “certain messages don't always 'make sense' back here” (GR, 624).
The  third  perspective  that  assaults  a  Pynchon-against-materialism  comes  from Jeff  
Baker  whose excellent work on Pynchon's  politics  traces the pragmatist  association of  the 
idealist tradition with right-wing Nazi ideology in Dewey, Kedward and Westbrook.73 Obviously, 
this critique is pertinent in an Adornian context, for other sinister components of the idealist  
tradition filter back into the text. Consider, for instance, Slothrop's horrific dream wherein he  
has found “a very old dictionary” and, as it falls open to the page containing the entry “JAMF”,  
the name of his, perhaps non-existent, experimental persecutor, he finds that “[t]he definition  
[reads]: I.” (GR, 287) Both Terry Caesar74 and Theodore D. Kharpertian75 have pointed out this 
conflation of identity as enmeshing Slothrop in Their power systems while Deborah Madsen 
has  seen  a  synthesis,  or  “complete  identification”  here.76 These  conclusions  are  merited. 
71 Ibid., 51.
72 Hume, Pynchon’s Mythography, 50–55.
73 Baker, ‘Amerikkka Über Alles’, 327.
74 Caesar, ‘A Note on Pynchon’s Naming’, 9.
75 Kharpertian, A Hand to Turn the Time, 126.
76 Madsen, The Postmodernist Allegories, 84.
188
However,  it  can  also  be  seen  that  the  possibility  of  such  a  statement  rests  upon  the  
interchangeability and homogenization of subjects that Adorno brings to the fore; as V. puts it 
in relation to the Herero: “being able to see them as individuals” has become a “luxury” (V., 
268). Other instances of such identity-conflation abound, from the anti-Platonism exhibited in  
the first chapter of this thesis, through to the exchange between Roger Mexico and Rózsavölgyi 
in which it  is  postulated that  they could be “the  same person” (GR,  634)  or  the fact  that 
Slothrop's  nominalist  identity  also  consists  of  multiple  components,  which  Pynchon  freely 
alternates: “Ian Scuffling climbs on, one foot through an eye-splice, the other hanging free. An  
electric  motor  whines,  Slothrop  lets  go  the  last  steel  railing”  (GR,  306).77 This  negative 
association of idealism is played out in Gravity's Rainbow through Pynchon's idealist metaphor, 
for it is not for no reason that “The War has been reconfiguring space and time into its own 
image” (257), as if, with the Kantian tradition, space and time were aspects to be possessed:  
“their  time,  their  space” (GR, 326). This aspect of shaping idealism corresponds to Pynchon's 
critique of “delusional systems” in which “[w]e don't have to worry about questions of real or 
unreal. They only talk out of expediency. It's the system that matters. How the data arrange 
themselves inside it” (GR, 638). Idealism, in both transcendental and absolute forms, comes 
under  heavy  political  critique  in  Gravity's  Rainbow,  but  it  always  worth  remembering  the 
comforting words of Enzian to Katje: “[n]one of it may look real, but some of it is. Really” (659).
If this thinking does lead to some chink in the virtually unscathed armour of Pynchon's  
idealism, or at least to some form of dialogue with materialism, it would make sense to search 
for its implications in the realm of control and synthesis. As I will  demonstrate in the next  
section, re-contemplating notions of transcendence in this light can be highly profitable. 
77 Ian Scuffling is Slothrop's false name at this point.
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Beyond an Ideal World
Beginning to think about  Gravity's  Rainbow in light of Adorno's  Negative Dialectics  
allows a return, if the phrasing can be forgiven, to the issue of cyclicality and to an examination 
of  Blicero's  sacrificial  launch  as  a  moment  that  pits  the  idealist  and  materialist  traditions  
against one another while also mounting a critique of positivist dialectics itself. To trace this, it  
is necessary to aggregate the moments of comment upon sacrifice and absolutism that occur 
in the novel, the foremost of which takes place in the first extended commentary upon the 
Zone Herero (314-329).
The  conversation  between  Josef  Ombindi  and  Enzian  at  this  point  turns  upon  a 
guessing game to identify an act that “you ordinarily wouldn't think of as erotic – but it's really 
the most erotic thing there is”. The first clue offered in this game of “twenty questions” is that  
“[i]t's a non-repeatable act”, which must necessarily exclude “firing a rocket” because “there's  
always another rocket” (319). This clearly ties in with the plan to launch the 00001. However, 
the second, and final clue – that the answer “embraces all of the Deviations in one single act”  
(notably with Enzian becoming “irritated” by the normalisation implied by the term) – leads to 
the conclusion that the phenomenon of which they speak “is the act of suicide”.
In the light of this unfolding, Blicero's launch of the 00000 can be seen as the point of  
attempted synthesis  between several  strands inherent in the Zone Herero passage,  an act  
subsequently  repeated  by  Enzian's  Revolutionaries  of  the  Zero.  The  first,  most  obvious 
thesis/antithesis pair fused in the 00000 is Gottfried's willing complicity (unrepeatable suicide)  
with  a  rocket  launch  (cyclicality).  In  this  respect,  the  synthesis  approaches  one-timeness 
through  repetition.  Secondly,  as  Madsen  points  out,  Pynchon's  rocket  synthesis  fuses  the 
differing factions of the Herero into the unified goal of the prevailing System, perhaps best  
seen  in  the  00001.  As  the  route  of  their  mythological  return  approaches  burnout,  the  
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marginality  of  each group matters not,  for  all  of  their  plans achieve “'Their'  design”:78 the 
elimination of the Herero. At once, the utopian specificity of the event exhibits identity with  
the smothering master concept. Finally, and critically most well known, Blicero's and Enzian's 
launches fuse autonomy with loss of agency. Blicero believes, for instance, that the Rocket is  
the  key  to  “understand  truly  his  manhood”,  an  active  undertaking  “won,  away  from  the 
feminine darkness”, but simultaneously a submission; it is “demanded, in his own case, that he 
enter  the  service  of  the  Rocket”  (GR,  324).  For  Enzian,  asserting  his  agency  in  “schemes, 
expediting,  newly  invented  paperwork”,  it  is  also  a  loss  as  his  act  is  a  mere  secondary  
repetition, a repetition that must end with the one-timeness of tribal death (318). Finally, for  
Gottfried, who sits at the centre of the synthesis, his dialectic encounters two cross-woven 
axes, for his is the part of the masochist, the one who acts by surrendering his ability to act 
while, on the y-coordinate, as he is all too aware: “[t]his ascent will be betrayed to Gravity. But  
the Rocket engine,  the deep cry of  combustion which jars  the soul,  promises escape.  The 
victim, in bondage to falling, rises on a promise, a prophecy, of Escape...” (758).
These failed attempted syntheses of contradictions across each element of Adornian 
utopia into single subjects, acts and events are, as Adorno puts it, “not due to faulty subjective  
thinking” (ND, 151). Instead, the absolute-idealist “act of synthesis […] indicates that it shall  
not be otherwise”, it closes down the possibility of difference, the utopian, as “[t]he will to 
identify works in each synthesis” (148). The will,  in each of these cases, is to subsume the 
opposite, to eradicate the contradiction, to make reality conform to reason's domination and 
thereby escape. As has been seen, though, under this schema repetition drags one-timeness 
back, the group subsumes the marginal and gravity brings down escape. Blicero's attempted 
mastery of the world, in order to transcend it, can be seen to work in much the same way as  
78 Madsen, The Postmodernist Allegories, 86.
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Adorno's  framing of  idealist  dialectics.  In Pynchon's fictional  world,  positivity  is  continually  
thwarted and it is, instead, a necessary negativity that is placed at centre-stage.
This reading gains further weight as it helps to differentiate Tchitcherine's redemption.  
Consider that Geli  Tripping's magic does not take two incompatible ends of a loaf and join  
them, but rather “breaks a piece of the magic bread in half” (GR, 734). Indeed, it is made clear  
that the “[y]oung Tchitcherine” viewed “Marxist dialectics” as “the antidote” – a determined 
synthetic,  aggressive  dance  of  collision  and  subsuming  annihilation  –  but  that  he  also  
appreciated that his allegiance to such a fusion would only be determined at “the point of  
decision” (701). Reading this passage in light of Tchitcherine's subsequent turn away from the 
place Pynchon earlier describes as that “[w]here ideas of the opposite have come together,  
and lost their oppositeness” leads to two conclusions (50). Firstly, Pynchon does not critique 
materialism solely through a paralysing idealism. Instead, his criticism is, at points, immanently  
materialist. Secondly, it is possible to see a kinship with Adornian negativity that separates  
Tchitcherine's and Blicero's respective “redemptions”. Blicero's moment of closing possibilities 
attempts  to  cross  the  final  edge,  mistakenly  believing  this  moment  to  be  freedom.  As 
Achtfaden's narrative passage observes: 
You follow the edge of the storm, with another sense – the flight-sense,  
located nowhere, filling all your nerves... as long as you stay always right at  
the edge between fair lowlands and the madness of Donar it does not fail 
you, whatever it is that flies, this carrying drive toward – is it freedom? (GR, 
455).
Tchitcherine's “personal doom” is “always to be held at the edges of revelations”, but this is  
also his personal salvation (566). Transcendence, when viewed in terms of dialectical progress,  
both idealist  and materialist,  is  not a positive goal  in  Gravity's  Rainbow;  one must instead 
remain forever moving in terms of negative critique, allowing thought to continually unthink 
itself. Process not progress. This persistent negativity explains Roger's notion of persistence in  
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his “ineffectual” counterforce tirade:
What you get, I'll take. If you go higher in this, I'll come and get you, and 
take  you  back  down.  Wherever  you  go.  Even  should  you  find  a  spare 
moment of rest, with an understanding woman in a quiet room, I'll be at the 
window. I'll always be just outside. You will never cancel me (636-637).
Yes, Tchitcherine goes to the edge, his “edge of the evening” where he “has passed his  
brother by” (735). He does not, however, cross over; he does not wish on the “star between 
his feet” for escape (759). He remains immanent. Blicero, conversely, at his own “edge of the  
evening” can look only upwards, beyond the event horizon, drawn towards the positivity from 
which no light would escape, which he knows goes on and he lets go on, for “the true moment 
of shadow is the moment in which you see the point of light in the sky. The single point, and 
the Shadow that has just gathered you in its sweep...” (759). This is not to say that immanence  
guarantees success. There remains the possibility, in Gravity's Rainbow, for utopian critique to 
be of no value whatsoever, a determinate negation that overlays only the same: “[a]nother 
world laid down on the previous one and to all appearances no different” (664). Furthermore,  
future work will  need to explore  the extent to which this  phenomenon is  integrated with 
Pynchon's  geo-politics;  after  all,  “commodity  and  retail”  are  “an  American  synthesis  […] 
grouped under the term 'control'” (581). It is here, though, in parallel to an Adornian Negative  
Dialectics  –  a  work  that  resonates  strongly  with  Gravity's  Rainbow  –  that  Tchitcherine's 
redemption  can  best  be  framed.  Amid  collapses  all  round as  positive  utopia  dissolves,  as 
“[e]ach day the mythical  return Enzian dreamed of  seems less  possible”  (519),  across  the 
myriad of contradictions, conceptual aporias and classificatory attempts, it all boils down to a  
single pair of words that encapsulate Pynchon's stab at positivity, resolution and self-content  
dialectics. Tchitcherine remains at his edge in a cyclical eternity. For while it can syntactically  
be  read in reference to the many instances  of  passing  one's  brother  by,  the juxtaposition 
creates  a  sense  of  temporal  strangeness,  of  cross-cutting  markers.  Indeed,  as  with  the 
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recurrent critique made by Roger Mexico, never to be displaced, he remains there (he remains 
here) “often forever” (735).
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Human Resources: Dialectic of Enlightenment
“We have no doubt [...] that freedom in society is inseparable from 
enlightenment thinking”
– Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment79
“The social spectrum ran from von Braun, the Prussian aristocrat, down the 
likes of Pökler, [...] yet they were all equally at the Rocket's mercy”
– Thomas Pynchon, Gravity's Rainbow80
“Myth is already enlightenment, and enlightenment reverts to mythology” proclaims 
the introduction to Adorno and Horkheimer's  Dialectic of Enlightenment  (xvii).  This  chiastic 
statement lies at the core of this work's account of a fundamental incompatibility between 
enlightenment's goals of “liberating human beings from fear” (the freedom that Adorno and  
Horkheimer believe is inseparable from enlightenment thinking) and the simultaneous state of 
“the wholly  enlightened earth” as “radiant with triumphant calamity” (DoE,  1).  The key to 
grasping this interrelation of enlightenment and myth lies in the depiction of nature, to which  
one sub-section will here be dedicated. Nature, for the longest period, was deemed to hold a  
degree of enchantment; it was intrinsically meaningful. The abstracted tales that correlate to  
such a foundationalist stance are myths. Conversely, at the dawn of the Age of Reason there  
began a progressive disenchantment of nature: “[f]rom now on, matter was to be controlled  
without the illusion of immanent powers or hidden properties” (DoE,  3). The world and all 
aspects therein were available to be used and understood; there was no longer any intrinsic  
meaning: “[o]n their way toward modern science human beings have discarded meaning” (3).  
79 DoE, xvi.
80 GR, 402.
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This disenchantment of nature is termed enlightenment. Adorno and Horkheimer, however,  
saw a dialectic between these terms. Myth was always a way of conceptualising nature; it  
possessed  the  structural  movement  towards  an  epistemology.  Myth  is  a  thrust  at 
enlightenment and carries within it  the same seed of domination for “[i]n their mastery of 
nature, the creative God and the ordering mind are alike […] [m]yth becomes enlightenment  
and  nature  mere  objectivity”  (6).  Enlightenment,  conversely,  contains  the  capacity  for  
reversion. The central aim of enlightenment was supposed to be a liberation from fear (1).  
However,  the antagonism towards nature that triggered enlightenment is  re-introduced by 
enlightenment's very progress. This is because, as reason comes to the fore as a dominating 
force, human beings are increasingly distanced from nature, set in opposition to it and the only  
valid  thought  is  that  which  uses  nature  instrumentally  (21).  This  leads  to  a  disturbing 
conclusion,  for  as  existing  rationalized  social  relations  become  cemented  through 
instrumentality,  “[a]t  the  moment  when  human  beings  cut  themselves  off  from  the 
consciousness of themselves as nature, all the purposes for which they keep themselves alive – 
social progress, the heightening of material and intellectual forces, indeed, consciousness itself 
– become void” (42-43). In short, purely logical thought is reified and becomes mythological,  
beyond criticism as rationality itself appears natural and is imbued with a meaning of its own.81
This  chapter  will  explore  the  novel  conceptions  of  enlightenment  put  forward  in 
Adorno and Horkheimer's work against the backdrop of previous Pynchon scholarship on this 
subject, including that already presented in this work, through a threefold thematic approach:  
nature, myth and dialectical enlightenment.
81 The best summary of this process, which will not be repeated verbatim here, is in Stone, ‘Adorno and 
the Disenchantment of Nature’.
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Incoherent Strife: Nature is Not Natural
Although, as Alison Stone points out,82 contemporary debates over disenchantment, 
particularly those first advanced in the early 1990s by Bruno Latour,83 have suggested that a 
simplistic dichotomy of disenchanting modernity is no longer feasible, it is the extent to which  
Pynchon engages with nature as an ecological construct and nature as a debate on the concept  
of naturalness, that must first be questioned.
Pynchon's relation to ecology has been comprehensively explored, predominantly in 
Gravity's Rainbow. Among the earlier researchers to pick up on these strains is Michael Vannoy 
Adams who deduces a “catastrophic  moral”84 from  Gravity's  Rainbow with particular  focus 
upon the new ways in which, re-phrasing the novel itself,  “[n]ature is  at the mercy of the 
chemists”.85 Meanwhile,  Douglas  Keesey's  article  convincingly  explores  the  intersection 
between  Pynchonian  nature  and  the  supernatural,  positing  an  ecosystem  of  murder, 
demonstrating  the  “interconnectedness  of  everything  in  the  ecosphere”.86 Keesey's  work, 
unfortunately,  blames  a  crassly  defined  “distorting  materialist  ideology”87 for  “commercial 
exploitation”,88 but the core aspect here was furthered upon by Gabriele Schwab, who reads  
Pynchon's narrative as an “ecological fiction” in which it is the “unification and interrelation of  
commonly  isolated  areas  of  experience  that  convey  the notion  of  history”.89 On  a  slightly 
different tack, Tom LeClair has argued in his study of literary “mastery” that Gravity's Rainbow  
is focused upon a systems-analysis of mankind's place within a reading of nature shaped by 
82 Ibid., 232.
83 For instance, the replication of nature in Boyle’s laboratory and whether this constitutes the facts 
speaking for themselves. Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, 28–29.
84 Adams, ‘The Benzene Uroboros’, 154.
85 Ibid., 157.
86 Keesey, ‘Nature and the Supernatural’, 84.
87 Ibid., 90.
88 Ibid., 92.
89 Schwab, ‘Creative Paranoia and Frost Patterns of White Words’, 99.
197
Lovelock's Gaia90 while Robert L. McLaughlin revives Pynchon's damning critique of IG Farben 
for its “process by which nature is destroyed and people are dehumanized”. 91 Moving towards 
later appraisals and Thomas Schaub looks back upon Gravity's Rainbow amid the eco-critique 
of  plastics  within  which  the  novel  is  situated92 while,  finally,  Christopher  K.  Coffman  has 
examined the depiction of a normative environmentalism in Against the Day, arguing that the 
text's conflation of Bogomilism, Orphism and Shamanism brings focus to the “responsibilities 
of environmental stewardship”.93
These efforts, however, veer away from asking a key question about enlightenment 
that comes to the fore under an Adornian framework: how does this ecological situation sit 
with regard to “Enlightenment's program […] the disenchantment of the world” (DoE, 1)? This 
in turn requires an examination of the techno-political interconnections with the natural world  
and also a query along the line that Latour calls modernity's “work of purification”; 94 could it be 
that nature is not natural? Indeed, Coffman posits a complex “interaction of the natural and  
the artificial”  but does not go deeper into a querying of  these terms.95 The most apposite 
examples to begin a parallel  close-reading of this phenomenon are the golem in  Mason & 
Dixon and the defence mechanisms highlighted by Coffman in Against the Day.
In  addition  to  providing  yet  another  potential  Borges  reference,  the  presence  of 
golems in Mason & Dixon neatly encapsulates the problematic essence of a natural nature and 
the  anthropocentrism  that  such  a  stance  would  entail.  Golems  are,  in  the  first  instance,  
artificial:  Luise's  husband “Makes Golems,–  oh,  not  the big  ones,  Lotte!  No,  Kitchen-size,– 
some of them quite clever” (MD, 481) and the “giant Golem” was “created by an Indian tribe 
90 LeClair, Art of Excess, 36–48.
91 McLaughlin, ‘IG Farben and the War Against Nature’, 335.
92 Schaub, ‘The Environmental Pynchon’.
93 Coffman, ‘Bogomilism, Orphism, Shamanism’, 112.
94 Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, 10–11.
95 Coffman, ‘Bogomilism, Orphism, Shamanism’, 93.
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widely suppos'd to be one of the famous Lost Tribes of Israel” (485). Dixon immediately makes  
the connection to the other “artificial” living being in the novel, for “It sounds enough like the  
Frenchman's Duck to make him cautious” (485). Again, however, the process of artifice and 
creation is not one of empiricist, scientific  progress and the codification of mathematics in 
which Adorno claims “thought is reified” (DoE, 19) but is closely entwined with mysticism and 
spirituality,  Judaic  and  Christian;  another  point  of  materialist/idealist  crossover.  It  is  also, 
though, melded with more of Pynchon's cartoon imagery, in this case Popeye, for the only  
words the Golem knows “Eyeh asher Eyeh” are glossed by “a somehow nautical-looking Indiv. 
with gigantic Fore-Arms, and one Eye ever a-Squint from the Smoke of his Pipe” as “I am that  
which I am”, a clear reflection of the original character's “I am what I am” (MD, 486). As has 
already been touched upon, comic book characters have a mythological  element;  they are 
disentangled from reason.96 While Inherent Vice's conversation on Donald Duck's facial hair (IV, 
28) perhaps confirms H. Brenton Stevens reading of cartoon and comic-book reference as a  
form of myth specifically deployed by Them “to promote [a] dangerous type of innocence”97 
and Lot 49's allusion to the cartoon where “Porky worked in a defence plant” (TCoL49, 63-64) 
thus indicates complicity, this particular reference provides a novel directional comment upon 
the “nature” of the Golem. Indeed, the Golem sits as a mythological entity poised between a 
representation  of  a  primeval,  untamed,  from-Pan,  “headlong”  nature,  confirmed  through 
comic-book myth affiliation and of a constructed, “created” nature. 
While  the  Golem's  status  as  built,  artificial  entity  is  clear  –  it  is,  after  all,  a  being 
fashioned  from  clay98 –  there  are  also  many  prominent  textual  links  and  comparisons  to 
constructions of non-human origin. Consider for instance that the Golem is “taller than the 
96 Interestingly, this is a view not shared by Adorno: DoE, 109.
97 Stevens, ‘Look! Up in the Sky! It’s a Bird! It’s a Plane! It’s . . . Rocketman!’.
98 See also VL, 348.
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most  ancient  of  the Trees” and posited by  Dixon as  “a  Wonder of  the Wilderness” (485).  
Furthermore, the false dichotomy of the creations of man and the natural world are exposed in  
Pynchon's  novel  through  allusion  to  apocryphal  gospels.  Directly  after  the  erroneous  
mis-reference to Exodus 4.14, which should read  3.14 as this is the verse dealing with  Eyeh 
asher Eyeh,  Pynchon veers towards the non-canonical,  pseudepigraphical  Infancy Gospel  of  
Thomas' account of Jesus' creation of life from clay. Compare Pynchon: 
“In the Infancy Gospel of Thomas, you see, Jesus as a Boy made small, as 
you'd say, toy Golems out of Clay,– Sparrows that flew, Rabbits that hopp'd. 
Golem fabrication is integral to the Life of Jesus and thence to Christianity” 
(486).
to Thomas:
“Then,  taking  soft  clay  out  of  the  mixture,  he  formed  from  it  twelve 
sparrows  […]  Jesus  clapped  his  hands  with  a  shout,  and  the  birds  flew 
away”.99
It is possible, from this, that Pynchon uses the God-made-flesh of Christ as an intersection for 
the equivalence of human and spiritual creation that finds its locus in the Golem. Furthermore,  
the  reference  is  not  time-locked;  the  synonymous  substitution  of  twentieth-  and 
twenty-first-century speech-patterns – “as you'd say” for “like” and “you see” for “ya know” –  
is another of the playful ways in which Pynchon makes his story, if not for all time, then at least  
for two time periods. Through this intersection emerges a critique of the spheres of nature and  
the human as  purified and discrete,  a  critique that  chimes with  Adorno's  contention of  a  
“denial of nature in the human being for the sake of mastery over extrahuman nature” ( DoE, 
42).
The intricate matrix within which the Golem is situated is further complicated by the 
debate on Timothy Tox as an Enlightenment figure; the question that overshadows the Golem 
99 Burke, De Infantia Iesu Evangelium Thomae Graecae, 303–304; none of the many Greek and Latin 
sources scoured and translated by Burke feature the rabbits mentioned by Pynchon.
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is one of domination. From the spiritual perspective of the Rabbi of Prague, it appears that  
Tox's  desire  to  control  “What  he  now  styles,  'His  Golem'”  is  insanity:  “He  is  mad”  (684). 
Conversely, Tox sees his use of the Golem as justified: “It will protect me, as it will protect  
them it sets free”, he claims. The counter-response from the Rabbi is, unsurprisingly: “'Twas 
ne'er  your Creature to command,  Tim” (685).  Within  an Adornian frame of  a  domineering 
enlightenment,  Tox begins to reveal the interconnectedness of myth and enlightenment in  
Pynchon's  fiction,  centred  around  nature.  Thus  Pynchon's  narrative  of  (dis-)enchantment 
begins to reveal itself as more complicated than a top-down domination, but a querying of this  
system itself.
Moving into Pynchon's twenty-first-century work and a similar pattern of crossover 
emerges in Against the Day. To begin to explore this, consider Coffman's argument that “what 
the Interdikt, the Figure uncovered by the Vormance Expedition and the Tatzelwurms suggest 
[is that] the spirit of the earth is a living one opposed to principles represented by such entities  
as  'the  eastern  corporations'  who  assault  the  earth  'with  drills  and  dynamite'”.100 This  is, 
indeed, the direct, straight, reading that Pynchon puts into the mouth of Frank Traverse (AtD, 
929).  However,  several  salient features of  the examples given here must be counterposed 
against this interpretation.
Firstly,  each  of  these  episodes,  in  which  a  natural  entity  strikes  back  against  an 
incursion  to  its  sacred  nature,  models  its  retaliation  upon human aggression.  To  progress 
through Coffman's examples, the Interdikt intersects these two spheres; it is a man-made line 
of poison gas that somehow “appears to take on some of the earth's knowledge and become 
violently self-aware”.101 In fact, the phosgene gas, the highly toxic agent used as a chemical 
100 Coffman, ‘Bogomilism, Orphism, Shamanism’, 105.
101 Ibid., 95.
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weapon in World War I, found along the Interdikt can be formed as a product of the exposure 
of chloroform to oxygen in the presence of light, a key thematic player in Against the Day. The 
Interdikt  line  is  a  clear  example  of  the  ways  in  which  chemical  production  processes,  so 
disparaged in  Gravity's Rainbow,  are transformed in Pynchon's later work into a dialectical 
oscillation  from  human  to  nature,  to  a  synthesised  fusion  of  both,  albeit  retaining  the 
respective  components.  Finally  in  this  sequence,  the  Tatzelwurms,  suggested  as  a  natural  
entity, are highly ambivalent figures; they communicate in human language (659), are explicitly  
posited as a semiotic device and take violent, yet rational, action against railroad construction 
(655). Of these shafts, the Tatzelwurm is the strongest in Coffman's quiver, yet it still bows to a  
human intersect.
Secondly,  this  hybrid,  nature-human  dialectic  in  Against  the  Day moves  forward 
curiously. To demonstrate this, consider that the Tatzelwurm has “had more time to evolve 
toward a more lethal, perhaps less amiable, sort of creature” (655).  This turns the path of 
progress,  as  far  as  Pynchon  can  be  reconciled  with  such  a  programme,  back  towards  an  
Adornian enlightenment  as  an attempted liberation  from the fear  of  nature.  In  Pynchon's  
inversion, a “natural” entity with human characteristics evolves to counter specific threats to 
its life force. In this way, an arms race is posed between humans and nature; a race that is, in 
the co-incidence of the hybrid, concurrently undermined. This chimes well with the return to  
the cycle that is posed in Adorno and Horkheimer's formation of anti-Semitism; “persecutors 
and victims form part of the same calamitous cycle” (DoE, 140). It is important to note that this 
is not a victim-blaming statement, particularly as it pertains to the Holocaust, but rather an  
insistence that domination occurs when “blinded people, deprived of subjectivity, are let loose  
as subjects” (140).  The fact that evolution of human and nature turns, in  Against the Day, 
towards  a  competition  to  achieve  the most  heightened violence  demonstrates  a  renewed 
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scepticism towards, or belief on Pynchon's part in a dialectic of, the Enlightenment project. As 
the naturalness  of  nature  comes under fire,  ecological  systems are  no longer  the primary  
concern of questions of the “natural” in Pynchon's work. Instead, to re-cite Adorno, it turns 
back towards the fact that “[a]t the moment when human beings cut themselves off from the  
consciousness of themselves as nature, all the purposes for which they keep themselves alive 
[…] become void” (DoE, 43).
Inherent Vice: Enlightenment Enchanted
As Beckett might put it: there's certainly no lack of void and the fictional poetry of Tox  
in Mason & Dixon offers Pynchon the opportunity to play upon the epistemological character 
of myth while also exploring the Adornian Enlightenment's “clean separation between science 
and  poetry”  (DoE,  12).  After  Tox  has  recited  a  portion  of  the  Pennsylvaniad  recalling  the 
stationing of Highland troops around Lancaster it is revealed that the Golem is an “American 
Golem” and specifically “No Friend of the King” (MD, 490). While Adorno explicitly states that 
“enlightenment's relapse into mythology is not to be sought so much in the nationalistic [...]  
mythologies”  (DoE,  xvi),  upon  the  Golem's  appearance,  Dixon  makes  a  causal  connection 
“Have thoo summon'd it here, with thy Verses?” to which Tox responds “Somewhat as ye may 
summon  a  Star  with  a  Telescope”  (MD,  490).  The  role  of  Tox's  poetry,  which  recounts 
nationalistic  myth,  is  to  make that  nationalism visible  as  the Golem.  The Golem is  known 
through a process of disenchantment; making visible. It is a process of enlightenment.
The dilemma that Pynchon introduces is that this disenchantment, this enlightenment,  
leaves  the  reader  with  an  impossible,  enchanted  object  of  knowledge.  This  can  be  best 
explained  through  recourse  to  Dialectic  of  Enlightenment wherein  the  first  section  of  the 
bipartite thesis reads: “[m]yth is already enlightenment” (xvii). This myth, at once nationalist, 
natural and supernatural, begins to excavate its own fundamentally epistemological character.  
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However,  in  the  largest  study  on  Pynchon  and  myth  to  date,  Kathryn  Hume  omits  the 
relationship  between  the  critique  of  enlightenment  effected  by  Pynchon's  works  and  the  
epistemological structure introduced by myth. Granted, she acknowledges that “mythologies 
concern themselves with origins, with the gap between origins and present” but neglects to  
also examine the ways in which such a mode works in parallel to scientific knowledge and 
enlightenment.102 It is towards such a stance, through Dialectic of Enlightenment's notions of 
dis/enchantment to which this section will now turn.
Beginning from this premise, certain aspects of an enlightenment/myth dialectic can 
be seen in the knowledge structures of Pynchon's latest novel, Inherent Vice. The most obvious 
reading of such a phenomenon would take the famed '68 slogan, “[u]nder the paving stones,  
the beach!” – the epigraph to the novel – and see the literal, parallel reading to Dialectic of  
Enlightenment; in contemporary, enlightened society, human freedom has been repressed in 
contravention of the stated purpose of Enlightenment thought. This, however, is only part of  
the  story.  Indeed,  given  the  preceding  analysis  of  Gravity's  Rainbow,  it  would  be  highly 
incongruous for a synthesizing dialectic to emerge. Instead, a different dialectic is unveiled 
early  in  the  novel.  Here  is  where  Pynchon's  counter-dialectic  and  mythical  cycle  of  
enchantment begins:
A visitor was here already, in fact, waiting for Doc. What made him unusual  
was,  was  he  was  a  black  guy.  To  be  sure,  black  folks  were  occasionally 
spotted west of the Harbor Freeway, but to see one this far out of the usual  
range, practically by the ocean, was pretty rare. Last time anybody could 
remember a black motorist in Gordita Beach, for example, anxious calls for 
backup went out on all the police bands, a small task force of cop vehicles 
assembled, and roadblocks were set up all along Pacific Coast Highway. An 
old Gordita reflex, dating back to shortly after the Second World War, when 
a black family had actually tried to move into town and the citizens, with 
helpful advice from the Ku Klux Klan, had burned the place to the ground 
and then, as if some ancient curse had come into effect, refused to allow 
102 Hume, Pynchon’s Mythography, 18–19.
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another house ever to be built on the site. The lot stood empty until the  
town finally  confiscated it  and turned it  into a park,  where the youth of 
Gordita Beach, by the laws of karmic adjustment, were soon gathering at 
night  to  drink,  dope,  and  fuck,  depressing  their  parents,  though  not 
property values particularly. (IV, 14)
This passage gives a curious twist upon the first reading of Hippie History. While a traditional,  
positive narrative would read that enlightenment undermines myth, this is not the case here.  
Firstly, with “[u]nder the paving stones, the beach!” it is clear, as discussed previously with 
regard to  Wittgensteinian overwriting,  that  the beach is  not  erased by  the paving  stones,  
merely built upon and repressed. Secondly, however, this passage shows that the dialectical  
negation can function bi-directionally; in the destroyed house the paving stones now lie under  
the  beach.  In  this  metaphor,  the  representative  of  civilization  and  enlightenment,  
contemporary housing, has been torn down to accommodate the beach. Furthermore, though, 
it is the beach that now holds its own conceptual domination, for no matter how much one 
reads this “karmic adjustment” it masks a history of horrific racial attacks and property seizure.  
Pynchon's representation of the beach myth is far more ambivalent than a straightforward loss 
of subjunctive hope can countenance, for while it is true that “everything in this dream of  
prerevolution was in fact doomed to end and the faithless money-driven world to reassert its  
control over all  the lives it  felt  entitled to touch, fondle, and molest” (129-130), the beach 
myth does not offer salvation. As Rob Wilson's review of Inherent Vice puts it: “[w]e cannot tell 
if  Pynchon now sees any escape from this  commodifying system of  cultural  plenitude and 
capitalist  containment”.103 Hippiedom  is  already  repression  and  repression  reverts  to 
hippiedom.
This offers a counterpoint to a genealogical history of oppression; it would be too easy 
103 Wilson, ‘On the Pacific Edge of Catastrophe’, 224.
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to re-enchant overwritten cultural entities such as the beach. Instead, Pynchon deliberately 
dis-enchants or enlightens the reader on several of these myths. Take, for instance, the early  
predecessor  to  the  internet,  ARPAnet,  featured  in  Inherent  Vice.  The  internet  is  now 
championed, even among traditional mainstream media channels, as an important medium for 
freedom of speech104 and one that needs defending from those who would limit expression to 
promote their  own commercial  interests.105 Pynchon plays  to this  –  Fritz  Drybeam worries 
about the FBI monitoring his connection (IV, 258) – but also uses his genealogical historical 
technique to foreground a different narrative. The sequence begins when Fritz puts forward  
the mythological, altruistic stance for ARPAnet and our contemporary conception of an “open” 
internet: “[i]t's a network of computers, Doc, all connected together by phone lines. UCLA, Isla  
Vista, Stanford. Say there's a file they have up there and you don't, they'll send it right along at  
fifty thousand characters per second”. Presented here is the community-spirited, open-culture  
side of the internet as envisaged by individuals such as Lawrence Roberts106 which perseveres 
to  this  day  in  projects  such as  the Linux  kernel.  Pynchon,  however,  opts  to  foreground a  
different history of the 'net:
“Wait, ARPA, that's the same outfit that has their own sign up on the 
freeway at the Rosecrans exit?”
“Some connection with TRW, nobody over there is too forthcoming, like 
Ramo isn't telling Woolridge? [sic]” (IV, 54).
First of all,  the “Rosecrans exit” is not free of ethical judgement in itself. Although  William 
Rosecrans,  after  whom it  was named,  fought  for  the Union in  the Civil  War,  he  was also 
president of the New Coal River-Slack Water Navigation Company and under his presidency 
“the company entered the coal-oil business”,107 a fact that it is hard to see as other than an 
104 Various, ‘Free Speech and the Internet’.
105 Basulto, ‘SOPA’s Ugly Message to the World About America and Internet Innovation’.
106 Abbate, Inventing the Internet, 46.
107 Lamers, The Edge of Glory, 17.
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indictment; Inherent Vice has been described, after all, as an “eco-horror narrative”.108
More interestingly,  however,  as  is  superficially  glossed by  the Pynchon-Wiki,109 the 
Thompson Ramo Wooldridge company, founded by the fathers of the ICBM, was peripherally 
connected to the development of ARPAnet, the predecessor of the internet. In, again, tracing  
back a genealogy of contemporary technology to the rocket, Pynchon's research track runs  
deep; the connection between TRW and ARPAnet is not obvious. Indeed, perhaps the best 
mirror  of  this  oblique  reference  is  the  shared  name  and  initial  between  Pynchon's  Glen 
Charlock and Glen Culler, the TRW employee whose node was among the first four connected  
to the new packet-switching network110 and the man responsible for the second draft of the 
Interface Message Processor.111 Although the point is cryptically made,112 the implications are 
well  phrased by Janet Abbate: “[i]n the years since the Internet was transferred to civilian  
control,  its  military  roots  have  been  downplayed  […  but]  [t]he  Internet  was  not  built  in 
response  to  popular  demand […]  Rather,  the  project  reflected  the  command economy of  
military  procurement”.113 Pynchon  is  correct,  therefore,  in  positing  this  connection  as  the 
network's construction on behalf of ARPA did place impositions upon academic work, even if 
these came ex post facto, for as Leonard Kleinrock puts it: “[e]very time I wrote a proposal I  
had to show the relevance to the military's applications”.114 Furthermore, several of ARPA's key 
figures  from  1965  onwards,  such  as  Robert  Taylor,  were  former  NASA  employees,  the 
genealogy  of  that  organisation  having  been  thoroughly  asserted  by  Pynchon  in  Gravity's  
108 Wilson, ‘On the Pacific Edge of Catastrophe’, 219.
109 Pynchon Wiki Contributors, ‘Chapter 4 | Inherent Vice’.
110 Committee on Innovations in Computing and Communications et al., Funding a Revolution 
Government Support for Computing Research, 173.
111 Salus and Cerf, Casting the Net, 26.
112 To find reference to Culler, one has to dig deep into Internet history. The following comprehensive  
’net histories, for instance, have no mention of his role: Committee on Innovations in Computing and 
Communications et al., Funding a Revolution Government Support for Computing Research; Hafner, 
Where Wizards Stay Up Late.
113 Abbate, Inventing the Internet, 144–145.
114 Ibid., 77.
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Rainbow.115
In this moment we can see Pynchon's opposing screw-threads on the dialectic being  
turned.  Consistently  enlightening  the  reader  on  mythological  technologies,  Pynchon 
simultaneously mythologises and re-enchants those natural elements from which technology 
has severed us. Indeed, this second element is no better illustrated than in the figure of St. Flip  
of Lawndale in whose story Pynchon re-infuses “hippie metaphysics” (IV, 101). In 2007 the US 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration performed a feat of disenchantment upon 
the Mavericks of Half Moon Bay, deducing from their seafloor mapping project that
As waves get  close  to  shore,  their  base begins  to  run into the seafloor, 
slowing the deeper parts of the wave. The shallower part of the wave keeps  
moving at  the same pace,  causing  the wave to stand up and then pitch 
forward. This creates the wave face that is so sought-after by surfers.116
Pynchon, however, does not let this stand. Instead, his hippies of 1970 believe that
“There's too many stories about that break. Times it's there, times it ain't. 
Almost  like  something's  down  below,  guarding  it.  The  olden-day  surfers 
called it Death's Doorsill. You don't just wipe out, it grabs you – most often 
from behind just  as you're heading for  what you think is  safe water,  or  
reading some obviously fatal shit totally the wrong way –  and it pulls you 
down so deep you never come back up in time to take another breath, and 
just as you lunched forever, so the old tales go, you hear a  cosmic insane  
Surfaris laugh, echoing across the sky.”
[…]
“A patch of breaking surf right in the middle of what's supposed to be deep 
ocean? A bottom where there was no bottom before?” (IV, 100-101).
Here, through a hippie mythology, Pynchon re-enchants the Mavericks for, although his novel  
is  set  at  a  time  when  this  scientific  information  was  unavailable,  the  Luddite  mode  of  
Pynchon's thought also veers towards such an approach and the contemporary knowledge of  
the author does not find itself included. This differs wildly from the historical irony of, say, the 
115 Ibid., 43–44.
116 McKenna, ‘Map Reveals Secret of Awesome Mavericks Waves’.
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Jesuit telegraph in  Mason & Dixon. In this case, there is no indication of the latter scientific 
approach, merely a swerve back towards mythology. These two sides of the same coin can be  
neatly  summarised  with  Adornian  phrasing:  when  natural  phenomena  can  be  explained 
scientifically, Pynchon re-enchants. When technological phenomena appear mythical, Pynchon 
enlightens.
To give one final example of this strategy at work, it is worth returning, briefly, to the 
question that Doc poses to his ARPAnet-connected friend Fritz: “[d]oes it know where I can 
score?” (54). While this is the question that Doc asks of almost everybody, the most explicit  
echo of this phrase is in the Ouija board episode: “[h]ey! You think it knows where we can  
score?”  (164).  This  instance  exhibits  the  mythological  element  as  the  greater  force  for 
resistance  to  the  governmental  agenda,  for  while  no  response  is  forthcoming  from  the 
computer network with a sinister military background, the esoteric knowledge of the Ouija  
board  thwarts  Nixon's  forthcoming  war  on  drugs  as,  upon  asking  the  question,  “[t]he 
planchette took off  like  a  jackrabbit,  spelling  out almost  faster  than Shasta could copy an  
address down Sunset somewhat east of Vermont, and even throwing a phone number” (164).
In this case, the address provided by the voice at the end of the telephone line leads  
only to an empty lot but there was an initial suspicion that the unsubtle subtext of the message 
read:  “[s]tay  away!  I  am  a  police  trap”  (164).  Eventually,  though,  this  dead-end  result  is 
attributed to the notion that “concentrated around us are always mischievous spirit forces, just 
past the threshold of human perception, occupying both worlds, and that these critters enjoy 
nothing better than to mess with those of us still attached to the thick and sorrowful catalogs  
of human desire” (165). These spirit forces, again crossing over to thwart an idealist Pynchon 
while  simultaneously troubling a purely materialist  standpoint,  sound a great deal  like the  
golem, bridging the natural and the artificial while questioning the process of purification itself.  
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They also link back, however, to complete the swirling counter-dialectic offered by Pynchon in  
Inherent Vice. Indeed, they are the embodiment of the Pynchonian “badass” as set out in “Is It  
O.K. to Be A Luddite?” (43-44) and, regardless of how much certain figures would like to recast  
the badass  in an entirely  new, nationalistic,  racist  frame,  the fact  that  Bigfoot  Bjornsen is  
described  as  “[o]ne  of  America's  true  badasses”  in  the  view of  Art  Tweedle,  a  right-wing 
operative, does not make it so for Pynchon (IV, 202).
Pynchon's  badasses  thwart  human  designs  as  a  mischievous  mythology.  Pynchon, 
though, is no such badass. While he may mythologise and he is certainly mischievous, the  
areas in which he enlightens and those in which he enchants can be thoroughly identified. In  
fact, in Pynchon, as with Adorno and Horkheimer's thesis, mythological re-enchantment can 
result  from the  alienation  of  technocratic  enlightenment  and  mythology  was,  all  along,  a 
counter-narrative of enlightenment. As a penultimate remark here, it is necessary to state that,  
for reasons of space, I have used the term “re-enchant” in a limited way. A portion of Dialectic  
of  Enlightenment is  concerned  with  the  way  in  which  re-enchantment  merely  affirms  the 
“nature” of a reified thought process and it would be necessary for further work to examine 
this.  In  the  meanwhile,  it  will  suffice  to  say  that  in  a  demonstration  of  an  anti-synthetic  
un/enlightenment, this bi-directionality is at least part of the project of Pynchon's latest novel,  
best embodied by the conflation of the beach and paving stones in which, in its repudiation of  
both linearity and total cyclicality, the final dialectical revelation is unfurled: “[b]uilt into the  
act  of  return  finally  was  this  glittering  mosaic  of  doubt.  Something  like  what  Sauncho's  
colleagues in marine insurance liked to call inherent vice” (IV, 351).
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Pynchon and Aesthetic Theory
“In the false world all ηδονη [pleasure] is false”
– Theodor W. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory117
The non-linear, temporal distortions that occur in Pynchon's novels can be explained 
without too much difficulty. As Pynchon notes in “Nearer my Couch to Thee”, contemporary 
capitalist society has imposed linear time-structures upon the world, a routinised clock-time 
that summons workers to their assigned factory for their assigned hours (“Nearer”, 16-18). In 
an attempt to offer some mode of resistance, Pynchon imagines alternate time structures that  
ring  true  to  human  existence  or  the  existence  that  humans  should,  or  could,  have.  It  is 
interesting to note, then, that within a critique of the empiricist treatment of art in the draft  
introduction  to  Aesthetic  Theory,  Adorno  states  that  “[f]or  most  people,  aesthetics  is 
superfluous.  It  disturbs  the  weekend  pleasures  to  which  art  has  been  consigned  as  the 
complement to bourgeois routine” (426). This concluding section will formulate the degree to 
which Pynchon's artistic practice can be reconciled with Adorno's model of aesthetics.  This 
turns around a curious concept of art in which “[t]he ideal perception of artworks would be  
that in which what is mediated becomes immediate”, or, put otherwise, in which “naïveté is 
the goal, not the origin” (429). Two questions immediately spring from these observations, the  
terms used in each nevertheless requiring subsequent detailed unpacking. Firstly, is Pynchon's  
work actually a product of what Adorno terms “The Culture Industry”? To rephrase this: could 
it be that Pynchon's brand of counter-cultural novel actually serves as a distraction from – or 
over-mediation and commodification of  – the truth, ensnared, as Stefan Mattesich puts it,  
within a matrix of discursive production with “simultaneous complicity in, and resistance to, a 
117 AT, 15.
211
late capitalist social logic”?118 Secondly, are Pynchon's works true art, or, when decoded, are 
they too unnaïve, too committed to truly fulfil this function?
C'est Magnifique, mais est-ce l'Art?
Art, in Adorno's view, is integrally entwined with the dialectic of enlightenment (AT, 
37), for  “[t]he aporia of art, pulled between regression to literal magic or surrender of the  
mimetic impulse to thinglike rationality, dictates the law of its motion; the aporia cannot be 
eliminated” (71). In its relation to extra-aesthetic reality, art is caught in a double bind. On the  
one hand, it  is clear that artworks are material  and the technical skill  of the artisan is the  
manifestation of this. Conversely, art extends beyond the mere factual and “[t]his persists in  
the astonishment over the technical work of art as if it had fallen from heaven” (70). This is 
where Adorno situates the truth content, the objective truth, of art. However, the truth of art  
is an enlightenment process, for it disenchants through enchantment, best seen in the fact that 
the “materialistic motif's form remains what it had been external to that form: critical” (64). In  
short,  “[a]rt  is  rationality  that  criticizes  rationality  without  withdrawing  from  it”;  
“[e]mancipated from its claim to reality, the enchantment is itself part of enlightenment: Its  
semblance disenchants the disenchanted world” (75).
Clearly, Adorno has a very different conception of “truth” to that normally present in 
contemporary, ordinary usage. Indeed, most would see truth in art or elsewhere, as a fidelity 
to reality and experience, preferably a reality mediated through an intersubjective objectivity; 
scientific truth. This is not the truth that Adorno claims for art, for this implies that reality is  
true. However, simultaneously Adorno refutes the claim that truth in art is subjective, for this 
would  create  a  situation  whereby  speechless  artworks  are  filled  “by  the  beholder  with  a 
standardized echo of himself” (23). Instead, the truth in art arises through its power of critical  
118 Mattessich, Lines of Flight, 10.
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negation: “[b]eauty is not the platonically pure beginning but rather something that originated 
in the renunciation of what was once feared” (62). Put otherwise, “works become beautiful by  
the force of their opposition to what simply exists” (67); “only what does not fit into this world 
is true” (76). In light of this, the first section here will be given over to an exploration of the 
extent to which Pynchon's novels  can be said to conform to Adorno's definition of artistic  
truth.
Artworks  are,  then,  more  than  their  material  presence  in  the  world.  They  are  a  
combination  of,  or  perhaps  oscillation  between,  their  materiality,  the  thinglike-ness  or  
quiddity, and their internal content that negates reality. They are, in this mode, more than 
either of these aspects but without venturing deeply into an idealist realm of inaccessibility. 
Indeed,  although Adorno terms this  more-ness  “spirit”,  he  claims that  this  term has  been 
“severely compromised […] by idealism”, among others, and also that this is not an idealism:  
“[i]f  the  spirit  of  artworks  were  literally  identical  with  their  sensual  elements  and  their  
organization, spirit would be nothing but the quintessence of the appearance: The repudiation  
of this thesis amounts to the rejection of idealism” (AT, 116-117). Instead, it is posited that 
these  combined  materialities  go  beyond  mere  materialism,  “things  among  things”,  a  
materialism that permits an additional layer that is super-material but not idealistic; “[t]hat  
through which artworks, by becoming appearance, are more than they are: This is their spirit.  
The determination of artworks by spirit is akin to their determination as phenomenon [used in  
contrast to noumenon], as something that appears, and not as blind appearance” (114).  It  
must also be noted, though, that the the truth content of an artwork, which depends upon 
critique, is different to spirit. An artwork may be possessed of spirit, yet still lack truth content:  
“[t]he spirit of works can be untruth” (116).
The first point of intersection with Pynchon that must be broached lies in Adorno's  
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statement that “[a]rtworks have no truth without determinate negation; developing this is the  
task of aesthetics today. The truth content of artworks cannot be immediately identified. Just 
as it is known only mediately, it is mediated in itself” (170). From this it must be inferred that 
the production context and also the formed content of an artwork, such as  V.  or  Gravity's  
Rainbow, must be assessed in order to locate their determinate negation. To begin, then, the 
author-specific production-context remains, as with most Pynchon biography, murky. What is 
certain is  that, prior to his McArthur fellowship award, Pynchon operated on the standard  
commercial basis of a publisher's advance; there is no radical anti-capitalist sentiment at play  
here.119 This is not, however, the true focus of Adorno's statements. Adorno does not believe 
that the truth content of artworks is to be found by locating the work in the sphere of the  
subjective, fetishized creator: “[t]he element of self-alienness that occurs under the constraint  
of the material is indeed the seal of what was meant by 'genius'. If anything is to be salvaged of  
this concept it must be stripped away from its crude equation with the creative subject, who 
through  vain  exuberance  bewitches  the  artwork  into  a  document  of  its  maker  and  thus 
diminishes it” (223).
Secondly, then, as already broached throughout this work, much of Pynchon's writing 
can be seen as a critique of, response to, or perhaps determinate negation of, the revival of  
right-wing  politics  in  the  United  States  in  the  post-War  period.  Through  an  unmasking 
depiction  of  this  reality,  in  all  its  indifference  to  variance  between  subjects-as-objects,  
Pynchon's art makes reality call itself by its true name, for “[a]rt is modern art through mimesis  
of the hardened and alienated; only thereby, and not by the refusal of a mute reality, does art  
become eloquent; this is why art no longer tolerates the innocuous” (AT, 28). Furthermore, in 
Pynchon's work on rationality that comes to the fore in the later  Mason & Dixon,  it  is not 
119 For excellent biographical material on Pynchon’s editorial correspondence, see Rolls, ‘Pynchon, in His 
Absence’.
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through  a  nonsensical  negation  of  reason  in  unreason,  but  rather  specific  contexts  that 
enlighten  the  reader  of  the  dangers  of  enlightenment.  As  Adorno  puts  it,  giving  further 
credence to the earlier reading of Pynchon: “[i]t is not through the abstract negation of the  
ratio, nor through a mysterious, immediate eidetic vision of essences, that art seeks justice for  
the repressed, but rather by revoking the violent act of rationality by emancipating rationality  
from what it holds to be its inalienable material in the empirical world. Art is not synthesis, as 
convention holds;  rather,  it  shreds synthesis  by the same force that affects synthesis” (AT, 
183-184).
This  form  of  determinate  negation  also  bridges  the  spheres  of  universalism  and 
particularism that Adorno deems among the defining features of art. While, most broadly, the 
very role of language is to “[mediate] the particular through universality” (AT, 268), Pynchon's 
parallactic  contexts  continually  query  this  category  and,  to  a  great  extent,  transcend it.  A  
further thrust in this direction, though, must be explored. In its revolt against a specific political  
context, is Pynchon's work too committed, too didactic to truly be Adornian art? This must be 
considered because,  as  Adorno puts  it,  “[w]hat  is  social  in  art  is  its  immanent  movement 
against society, not its manifest opinions” (297) while “[e]ven prior to Auschwitz [the notion 
that artworks' meaning was their purpose] was an affirmative lie” (200).
Consider,  then, that  Gravity's  Rainbow, although a difficult  work in many respects, 
does not really hide its political hand. The Anubis houses a “screaming Fascist cargo” (GR, 491) 
alongside mention of “the grim phoenix which creates its own holocaust” (415); many of the 
political contexts of Pynchon's work, perhaps even more so in Vineland and Inherent Vice, are 
readable. Yet if,  according to Adorno, this is not the way through which art makes its true  
impact upon the world,  where is  one to look? The answer comes from the fact  that it  is  
resistance to the exchange principle that sits at the heart of Adorno's theory of art: “[a]rt's 
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asociality is the determinate negation of a determinate society” for “[t]here is nothing pure, 
nothing structured strictly according to its own immanent law, that does not implicitly criticize  
the debasement of a situation evolving in the direction of a total exchange society in which  
everything is heteronomously defined” (AT, 296). The core questions, refined in light of this 
argument, become difficult for Pynchon: do Pynchon's novels resist the exchange/comparison 
impulse?
Clearly,  Pynchon's  overt  content  proposes  a  disdain  for  the  interchangeability  of  
subjects,  this  being  the  rationale  for  the  preceding  section's  epigraphic  reference:  
“specialization hardly mattered, class lines even less. [...] [T]hey were all equally at the Rocket's  
mercy” (GR, 402). As the incarnation of the capitalist military-industrial complex, the Rocket  
here  fulfils  several  functions.  In  the  first  instance  it  demolishes  class  lines,  usurping  the  
traditional  European  structures  of  privilege;  the  Rocket  could  be  deemed,  in  fact,  to  be 
inherently American in form, despite its geographic origin. Secondly, leading on from this, the 
Rocket is posed as a satire of American meritocracy, for the demolition of class comes not with 
the  introduction  of  a  naïve  American  dream  but  with  the  realisation  that  death  remains 
arbitrary. Finally, this arbitrariness can be seen more abstractly as a damnation of the ways in 
which the industrial-military-capitalist  complex views all  subjects  as  the same and thereby 
values all subjectivity as nothing. This reading is slippery because it easily degenerates into a  
system that favours class distinction; somewhat unlikely given the otherwise-communicated 
political  intent  of  Pynchon's  novels.  However,  when  viewed  as  satire  conjoined  with  this  
non-exchange principle, the sentiment is accurate. Certainly, in terms of the manifest content,  
Pynchon displays “the image of what is beyond exchange” and “suggests that not everything in  
the world is exchangeable” (AT, 110).
This content-level  proclamation is,  though, a very different proposition to Adorno's  
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claim  that  art  in  and  of  itself  posits  a  dialectical  counterpoint  to  reified  thought  and  
consciousness. Yet there is another way in which these works extricate themselves from the 
sphere of exchange; it lies, with apologies to Adorno's Minima Moralia, in Pynchon's courtesy 
of  sparing  the  reader  the embarrassment  of  believing  himself  cleverer  than  the author.120 
Pynchon's opacity, his difficulty, demonstrates an Adornian mimesis that is key to a critical 
utopia.  Indeed,  harking back to Pynchon's Wittgenstein,  the form of  an autonomous work 
reveals the “hidden” “it should be otherwise”.121 When one has become locked within what the 
Philosophical  Investigations  calls  a  “perspective”,  it  is  imperative  to  remember  that  the 
critically  held  understandings  of  Pynchon  are  not  self-evident.  Instead,  his  works  make 
themselves  like  the  world,  opaque,  in  order  to  posit  a  critical  other.  In  demanding 
reader-involvement to unearth the latent, not apparent, injustices, Pynchon at once prioritises  
the object in an act of artistic generosity, while simultaneously revealing the wrongness of 
reality; mimesis of the hardened and alienated. Pynchon's novels delicately balance the issues 
of commitment and artistic truth; they conform to Adorno's notion of truth content through 
their negation-by-opacity.
And All That Jazz
One of the most interesting, and most hotly contested, of all Adorno's formulations is 
his aversion, in every case, to jazz music. Adorno believes that jazz is a mode that is altogether 
too comfortable with contemporary wrong reality: “this conflict is not to be conceived in the  
manner of jazz fans for whom what does not appeal to them is out of date because of its  
incongruity  with  the  disenchanted  world”  (AT,  76).  Indeed,  Adorno  sees  in  jazz  music 
complicity with contemporary domination within a mode that presents the illusionary front of 
120 See MM, 49.
121 Adorno, ‘Commitment’, 194.
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spontaneity; “the fundamental beat is rigorously maintained”.122 For Adorno, the attempt to 
see jazz as “a corrective to the bourgeois isolation of autonomous art, as something which is  
dialectically advanced” is to succumb to “the latest form of romanticism”.123 This betrayal of 
the truth content in  music  boils  down, in Robert  W. Witkin's  reading, to two aspects.  For  
Adorno: 1.) jazz is devoid of dialectical progression “in which the elements are not open to 
being  mediated  by  one  another”.  In  short,  there  is  no  inner-aesthetic  socio-historical  
progression; 2.) jazz falsely asserts that it contains this progression, it is “music in which the 
elements (like those of the sonata allegro) give the false appearance of mediating one another  
and of  undergoing an historical  development in which they are reconciled with the whole 
when in reality they are more or less totally constrained in their relations”. Put otherwise: 
“[j]azz,  in  Adorno's  theorisation,  is  a  product  of  the  culture  industries,  a  reflex  of  market  
relations”,124 it “seemed to hint at a revolutionary undertone, [but] is in truth nothing but the  
expression of the impoverishment of a music fabrication that became so standardized and  
attuned to consumption that it  lost its last little bit of freedom”.125 Its command is simple: 
“obey, and then you will be allowed to take part”.126
Pynchon's stance on jazz can be seen both intra- and extra- textually to be opposed to 
this view. Beginning in the archive, Herman and Krafft point out in their review of the editorial  
correspondence between Corlies Smith and Pynchon, that  V.'s black jazz musician, McClintic 
Sphere, was construed by Smith as a “protest” figure, a stance with which Pynchon appears to  
agree:
Smith’s  third  and  “most  major  suggestion,”  as  he  calls  it,  concerns  the 
character McClintic Sphere, the black jazz musician. Smith wants Pynchon to 
122 Adorno, ‘On Jazz’, 470.
123 Ibid., 473.
124 Witkin, ‘Why Did Adorno “Hate” Jazz?’, 151.
125 Adorno, ‘Farewell to Jazz’, 496.
126 Adorno, ‘On Jazz’, 490.
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cut him, “because he strikes something of a false note in that he somehow 
leads the reader to believe that the Negro problem is going to become at  
least a side issue.” Smith submits it is not Pynchon’s intention to write a 
“Protest Novel” (23 Feb. 1962), and so, to avoid that kind of reading, Sphere 
has  to  go.  In  his  reply,  Pynchon  first  agrees  that  “Protest”  is  not  his  
intention,  but  then  defends  the  presence  of  Sphere  because  of  his 
connection  with  Paola  Maijstral  and  his  importance  to  the  1956  plot  in 
general. So the character stays in. But comparing, for example, typescript 
chapter 23 with section IV of the published novel’s chapter 10 shows that 
Pynchon did  notably  reduce  the  race angle  and  the “doctrinaire  liberal” 
friendship  between  Sphere  and  a  white  New  York  character,  Roony 
Winsome, who is also “obsessed with Paola” (13 Mar. 1962).127
Although  this  reading  focuses  more  upon  race  in  conjunction  with  jazz  –  a  historical  
intersection  that  Adorno  wrongly  rejects128 –  the  frequency  with  which  jazz  appears  in 
Pynchon's  novels  is  impressive.  Beginning  with  Gravity's  Rainbow, prominent  reference  is 
made early  in the text  to Charlie  Parker  and “Cherokee”.  What is  most notable,  however,  
about this reference is that Pynchon's writing style also veers into a “jazz” mode:
Follow? Red, the Negro shoeshine boy, waits by his dusty leather seat. The 
Negroes all over wasted Roxbury wait. Follow? “Cherokee” comes wailing 
up  from  the  dance  floor  below,  over  the  hi-hat,  the  string  bass,  the 
thousand sets of feet where moving rose lights suggest not pale Harvard 
boys and their dates, but a lotta dolled-up redskins. The song playing is one 
more lie about white crimes. But more musicians have floundered in the 
channel to “Cherokee” than have got through from end to end. All those 
long, long notes . . . what’re they up to, all that time to do something inside 
of? is it an Indian spirit plot? Down in New York, drive fast maybe get there 
for the last set— on 7th Ave., between 139th and 140th, tonight, “Yardbird” 
Parker is finding out how he can use the notes at the higher ends of these  
very chords to break up the melody into have mercy what is it a fucking 
machine gun or something man he must be out of his mind 32nd notes 
demisemiquavers say it very (demisemiquaver) fast in a Munchkin voice if  
you can dig that coming out of Dan Wall’s Chili House and down the street—
shit, out in all kinds of streets (his trip, by ‘39, well begun: down inside his 
most affirmative solos honks already the idle, amused dum-de-dumming of 
old Mister fucking Death he self) out over the airwaves, into the society gigs, 
someday as far as what seeps out hidden speakers in the city elevators and 
in  all  the  markets,  his  bird’s  singing,  to  gainsay  the  Man’s  lullabies,  to 
subvert the groggy wash of the endlessly, gutlessly overdubbed strings. . . . 
127 Herman and Krafft, ‘Fast Learner’, 6.
128 Adorno, ‘The Perennial Fashion - Jazz’, 269; Adorno, ‘On Jazz’, 477; for critique, see Gracyk, ‘Adorno, 
Jazz, and the Aesthetics of Popular Music’, 536.
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So  that  prophecy,  even  up  here  on  rainy  Massachusetts  Avenue,  is 
beginning these days to work itself out in “Cherokee,” the saxes downstairs 
getting now into some, oh really weird shit. . . . (GR, 63-64).
Aside  from  the  digressive,  elliptical  style  and  the  scorn  towards  the  white,  privileged 
appropriation of jazz that had earlier been a focus in V. (280-281), Pynchon here reiterates the 
rebellious and race-orientated aspects of jazz music through the condensed tale of  Charlie 
Parker's discovery of bebop and foreshadowing of his early death.129 While the emphasis upon 
the subversive elements of jazz could be, as Krin Gabbard suggests, a result of Pynchon's own  
demographic category, it is equally clear that a cultural judgement is also at work here when 
Slothrop “expels the familiar garbage of  white American culture from his body”. 130 Indeed, 
Pynchon inverts the roots of white fear of jazz in order to celebrate that inversion for, as Bruce  
Johnson puts it: “[j]azz threatened the aesthetic, moral and political controlling mechanisms of  
the  entrenched  cultural  gatekeepers,  and  most  fundamentally  it  reversed  the  mind/body 
hierarchy that formed the basis of Enlightenment rationalism”, thus providing a clear rationale 
for Pynchon's affinity.131
Of course, Gravity's Rainbow contains musical multitudes. J Tate catalogues: “George 
Formby, Falkman and His Apache Band, 'Dancing in the Dark,' Lecuona's 'Siboney,' Bob Eberle  
and 'Tangerine,' a tango by Juan D'Ariengo, The Andrews Sisters, Carmen Miranda, Sinatra,  
Irving Berlin, Gene Krupa, Hoagy Carmichael, Bing Crosby, Guy Lombardo, Nelson Eddy, Sandy 
MacPherson at  the Organ,  'Love in  Bloom' (Jack  Benny's  theme song),  Dick Powell  'In  the  
Shadows Let Me Come and Sing to You' (from Goldiggers of 1933), Stephen Collins Foster,  
Spike  Jones,  Roland  Peachey  and  His  Orchestra,  'There,  I've  Said  It  Again,'  Primo  Scala's 
Accordion Band”.132 Within this incomplete list, Bob Eberly, The Andrews Sisters, Irving Berlin,  
129 See Priestley, Chasin’ the Bird, 27.
130 Gabbard, ‘Images of Jazz’, 336.
131 Johnson, ‘The Jazz Diaspora’, 42.
132 Tate, ‘Gravity’s Rainbow: The Original Soundtrack’, 8.
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Gene Krupa, Hoagy Carmichael, Bing Crosby, Guy Lombardo and Spike Jones could be said to 
have at least some form of jazz-inflection in their musical affiliations. Pynchon's focus here, 
however, upon the moment at which the 25-year-old Parker first formulated bebop highlights 
that, even within his own deployment of “jazz”, there are specific, delineated sub-genres. This 
is of relevance because, as Johnson notes, “[b]y the mid-1930s, a growing body of articulate 
defenders  of  jazz  were  forced  to  agree  that,  in  the  theatrical  excesses  of  swing, 
African-American  music  had  surrendered  to  all  that  was  crassly  commercial  in  mass 
modernity”.133
Although Adorno cannot be exculpated on the charge that he had only listened to 
lesser jazz specimens,134 Ingrid Monson's description of this interior division in early jazz brings 
out the exact features at which Adorno levels his critique: “New Orleans brass bands and string  
bands embellished familiar tunes by paraphrasing and syncopating the melodies. […] Later, as  
the  improvisational  tradition  expanded,  gifted  soloists  –  most  notably  Louis  Armstrong  – 
provided  the  model  for  lengthier  and  more  varied  improvisation  that  went  beyond 
ornamenting  and  paraphrasing  a  known  melody  by  relying  increasingly  on  the  underlying 
harmony as the basis of improvisation”.135 In both cases, from the description provided here, it 
is clear how Adorno could have perceived the spontaneous elements of jazz as pre-constrained  
by an underlying invariance. In the former, it is the pre-set melody, in the latter, modal scales  
that  constitute  the  constraining  sub-form.  When  it  is  considered,  also,  that  the  standard 
against which Adorno is most likely to have compared jazz was Schoenberg's pre-twelve-tone 
atonality, as featured throughout a substantial portion of his musicological output, even the 
later  riffing  styles  of  Thelonius  Monk  could  be  deemed  vulnerable  to  such  criticism  of 
133 Johnson, ‘Jazz as Cultural Practice’, 98; see also Alain Locke, ‘The Negro and His Music’.
134 Witkin, ‘Why Did Adorno “Hate” Jazz?’, 146–147.
135 Monson, ‘Jazz Improvisation’, 115.
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constraint, for the variation on a theme necessarily implies the theme.
However, Adorno's critique is overly harsh and partial in its account.136 Furthermore, it 
remains  unclear  how such a riffing  development  could  not,  itself,  be  seen as  a  dialectical  
progression. It is more likely then, that despite the realm of aesthetics within which Adorno's 
critique sits, Pynchon's use of jazz is more adequately explained through sub- and post-sub- 
cultural theory, particularly given the range of jazz sub-genres and inevitable hierarchy that 
forms  within  his  novels.  To  provide  a  framework  for  the  mechanisms  whereby 
music-orientated subcultures interact with or deviate from the mainstream culture upon which  
they riff, it is worth briefly examining the emergence of punk wherein an already substantial  
subcultural critical-base exists.137 To trace the phenomenon in a British context is somewhat 
easier than in the States as the Sex Pistols can be seen as the central figures and their narrative 
illustrates, broadly,  a four-step trajectory that is  mirrored in the fate of many other music  
subcultures: 1.) deviation from the mainstream and semiotic styling; 2.) public-emergence into  
mainstream consciousness; 3.) rejection of synthesis; 4.) integration/incorporation. The release 
of Never Mind the Bollocks, Here’s the Sex Pistols in 1977 took place at a moment when the 
deviation from the mainstream  of the subcultural movement had already been defined by 
their American contemporaries including, among others, MC5 [1969], the New York Dolls 
[1973], The Ramones [1974] and Patti Smith [1975].138 In this case, as would equally apply to 
later  jazz  musicians,  The Sex  Pistols  built  upon a pre-existing  musical  and counter-cultural  
heritage; an incremental approach. Next, the public-emergence phase for the Sex Pistols is 
best characterised by their live televised interview with Bill Grundy in 1976 when guitarist 
Steve Jones called the host a ‘dirty fucker’.139 Predictably, this induced  a moral panic in the 
136 See Witkin, ‘Why Did Adorno “Hate” Jazz?’, 162.
137 For instance Hebdige, ‘Subculture’; Laing, ‘Listening to Punk’.
138 Dates given are of first album release.
139 Southall, 90 Days at EMI, 52.
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tabloid media who branded the band “filth”, thereby alienating them as unreasonable and 
clearly demarcated as outsiders, albeit outsiders of whom the general public were now all too 
aware.140 From  its  very  outset,  British punk’s rejection of synthesis  lay in its  purported 
anti-capitalist/anti-commodification stance,141 in its very insistence on alterity and opposition. 
However,  the integration or incorporation phase occurred when the mainstream marketed a 
“punk” product that no longer reflected the original ethic, such as clothing prefabricated with 
safety pins and, alongside drug problems and the death of Sid Vicious, there was little that 
could be done to stem the commodifying tide of capitalism from sweeping punk into its arms. 
The Sex Pistols disbanded a year after the release of their only album.
Such a schema, albeit hashed out in an extremely reduced form here142 can be applied 
to jazz in musical terms whereby, over the course of several waves, this same arc of subcultural  
self-obliteration  comes  to  the  fore.143 This  mode,  derived  primarily  from  the  output  of 
Birmingham's Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, particularly Hebdige, has come under  
fire though for its “heroic rhetoric of resistance, the valorization of the underdog and outsider” 
and over-prioritization of semiotics and style.144 Sarah Thornton's work improved upon this 
earlier model by deploying Bordieu's theories of capital to fashion a mode in which subcultures  
are defined in terms of an elitism that actually works with the “mainstream”. Yet, from this 
work it emerges that there is perhaps some truth in the oft-made anecdotal charge of Pynchon 
as  a  very  “male”  writer.  If  part  of  Pynchon's  work  rests  upon  a  depiction  of  a  (failing) 
revolutionary  subculture,  often  a  fusion  of  music  and  race,  then,  as  Thornton,  Peter  G. 
140 Lewis, ‘The Creation of Popular Music’, 42.
141 Ibid., 43.
142 This reductive stance is used purely for reasons of space and applicability, not for lack of awareness 
of the problematized space in which subcultures are produced; for instance, how is the mainstream 
defined? What role does the media play in the construction of subcultures?
143 See Harvey, ‘Social Change and the Jazz Musician’.
144 Stahl, ‘Tastefully Renovating Subcultural Theory’, 27.
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Christenson  and  Jon  Brian  Peterson  point  out,  American  attitudes  in  the  1980s  on  the  
connotations of mainstream music varied greatly by gender; for males “the label mainstream 
[was]  essentially  negative,  a  synonym for  unhip” while females perceived the same tag as 
meaning “popular music”.145 Pynchon does, however, delineate internal subcultural hierarchies 
– for instance, the Revolutionaries of the Zero – and, in so doing, avoids over-simplifying; as 
Jeremy Gilbert and Ewan Pearson see it, for Thornton “however 'radical' a group may consider  
their particular practice to be, in truth they are merely trying to accumulate subcultural capital  
at the expense of the unhip”.146
Clearly,  as  with  24fps  and  the  Herero  projects,  politically  engaged  counter-/sub- 
cultures go down the pan in Pynchon's writing. Simultaneously, though, there is a presentation  
of jazz music, often in directly racial contexts, as a revolutionary force. However, the important  
aspect to raise here, brought to the fore through Adorno's critique of jazz, is that Pynchon's 
depiction  of  jazz  is  entwined  in  a  dialectic  of  society  and  the  individual;  one  that  resists 
synthetic domination. For while Pynchon's elegy to Parker lies within a subversive context – 
“out  over  the  airwaves,  into  the  society  gigs,  someday  as  far  as  what  seeps  out  hidden  
speakers in the city elevators and in all the markets, his bird’s singing, to gainsay the Man’s  
lullabies, to subvert the groggy wash of the endlessly, gutlessly overdubbed strings...” (GR, 64) 
– Pynchon demonstrates, through temporal distortion, the insidious mimetic impulse toward 
an impossible unity, for “down inside his most affirmative solos honks already the idle, amused  
dum-de-dumming  of  old  Mister  fucking  Death  he  self”;  the  “prophecy”  of  Parker's  death  
infiltrates his music, despite the subversive element projected by that same music that will  
outlive the musician. This drive was formulated by Adorno in Aesthetic Theory when he wrote 
that artworks' survival “requires that their straining toward synthesis develop in the form of  
145 Thornton, Club Cultures, 104; Stahl, ‘Tastefully Renovating Subcultural Theory’, 298.
146 Gilbert and Pearson, Discographies, 159–160.
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their  irreconcilability”  (306).  In  the  realm  of  subject/object,  individual/society  dialectics, 
Adorno believes that art must promise, and strive for, the impossible synthesis thereby holding  
out a critical promise.
In terms of jazz critique, Adorno may be wide of the mark. Yet Pynchon retains some of  
that critique, demonstrating its pre-emptive infection by the wider culture. But where does  
this leave the Pynchon reader with “Keep Cool but Care”? As Herman and Krafft put it: “Sphere  
appears so streetwise in the typescript that the line might even be construed as ironic on his  
part rather than as the straightforward ethical suggestion it has most often been taken for”.147 
With this in mind, it is now towards the constellatory fusion of high and low within Pynchon's  
novels that the final section of this thesis will turn.
Magic and Puns: Closing Remarks on Highs and Lows
It has often been noted that Pynchon's style, as is typical of postmodern fiction, fuses  
high  and  low  culture  in  a  merger  that  gives  no  overriding  privilege  to  a  singular  aspect; 
narratives of alterity are given equal priority.148 Yet despite their supposed focus upon alterity, 
it has always been problematic that Pynchon's blend of high and low results in an art that  
remains extremely high. When formulated in this way, it becomes a reiteration of Adorno's 
statement on the reduction of “the dialectics of nonidentity and identity to a mere semblance:  
identity wins over nonidentity” (ND, 173). Conversely, of course, the play of high and low are 
ensnared within a dialectic that brings this discussion back full-circle to the interplay between 
whole and part; the low contributes to the high, which eradicates the low.
The key moment at which Adorno deals with this phenomenon in Aesthetic Theory is in 
his treatment of montage. Indeed, he writes: “[m]ontage is the inner-aesthetic capitulation of  
147 Herman and Krafft, ‘Fast Learner’, 6.
148 See, perhaps most recently, Cowart, Thomas Pynchon & the Dark Passages of History, 116.
225
art  to  what  stands  heterogeneously  opposed  to  it.  The  negation  of  synthesis  becomes  a  
principle of form” (AT, 203). Although montage is normally used in a cinematic context, an area  
that  would,  nonetheless,  be  more  than  apt  for  Gravity's  Rainbow,  Adorno  traces  this 
development back to “pasted-in newspaper clippings” protesting against the inadequacy of 
impressionism to prevent  its  “[relapse]  into romanticism”.  In  montage,  Adorno claims,  the 
mode strives for “a nominalistic utopia: one in which pure facts are mediated by neither form 
nor concept […] The facts themselves are to be demonstrated in deictical  fashion […] The  
artwork wants to make the facts eloquent by letting them speak for themselves”. Through this 
constellation  (for  that  is  surely  its  right  name)  art  “begins  the  process  of  destroying  the  
artwork as a nexus of  meaning”.  Montage,  for Adorno, fails  in its  aim because it  ends up 
constructing a dominating superstructure that suppresses the microstructure; “[t]he idea of  
montage […] becomes irreconcilable with the idea of the radical, fully formed artwork with 
which it was once recognized as being identical” (AT, 204). This is because, in Adorno's view, 
montage was “meant to shock” and “once this shock is neutralized, the assemblage once more  
becomes merely indifferent material” and any extra-aesthetic communication is lost.
Two questions  emerge  from Adorno's  discussion  of  montage  that  are  relevant  for 
Pynchon and upon which this chapter will draw to a close: 1.) what room is there, in Adorno's  
aesthetics, for pleasure, for affirmative feeling? 2.) How much shock value does Pynchon still  
hold, in the twenty-first century? The first of these questions should be considered in light of 
the preceding section on jazz. Adorno's antipathy towards jazz is premised upon the notion  
that music that provides pleasure to the masses must merely satisfy an urge that has been  
ingrained or socially induced by the hostile environment of The Culture Industry: "[i]n the false  
world  all  ηδονη  [pleasure]  is  false"  (AT,  15).  If  fun,  enjoyment  and  pleasure  are  all  false 
semblances of true pleasure, which would only be possible in the fulfilment of an unfulfillable 
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utopia, then what is the point of living in the world of a life that does not live?
Erica Weitzman has made some excellent observations on the ways in which Adorno's  
notions of fun and pleasure in art are actually hugely problematic and interwoven. 149 The best 
example of this is the concept of the ridiculous and the childish in art. Adorno claims that “the  
more reasonable the work becomes in terms of its formal constitution, the more ridiculous it  
becomes  according  to  the  standard  of  empirical  reason.  […]  All  the  same,  the  ridiculous 
elements in artworks are most akin to their intentionless levels […] Foolish subjects like those  
of  The Magic Flute  and  Der Freischütz have more truth content through the medium of the 
music than does the Ring, which gravely aims at the ultimate” (AT, 158-159). In some sense, 
fun and pleasure are integral to art150 while at another level these pleasures must still only 
serve the purpose of negative critique.
It should not be hard to deduce that Pynchon sits in a complex relationship to such 
thought. Ultimately, though, this model is Pynchonian, for the same quantitative outweighing 
that was seen in montage and the identity of identity and nonidentity is manifest. To see this,  
consider  Pynchon's  ridiculous  moments:  custard  pie  fights,  chase  scenes,  comic  book 
characters, ninjas, humorous character names; as William Donoghue puts it: “physical comedy 
whose inspiration is  more the cartoon strip  than the stage”.151 Indeed,  Donoghue has  this 
analysis spot-on and even manages to redeem James Woods' pejorative term “hysteria” for 
Pynchon's work when he writes: “[t]he essence of comedy is incongruity, usually of high and 
low.  Pynchon’s  version  involves  beginning  in  the  real  (verisimilitude)  and  then  shifting  to  
cartoon. The effect is the equivalent of watching someone pretentious slip on a banana peel:  
the 'real' world is brought low and made to look ridiculous”.152 In short: Pynchon's use of the 
149 Weitzman, ‘No Fun’.
150 See Attridge, The Singularity of Literature, 118–119.
151 Donoghue, ‘Pynchon’s “Hysterical Sublime”’, 453.
152 Ibid., 455.
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ridiculous and the childish,  in juxtaposition with the serious critique of material  inequality,  
ends with a critique of material inequality. In the high and the low, the high again wins out.  
Although these aspects of Pynchon's work are pleasurable, the pleasure is never divorced from  
an Adornian concept of a false pleasure, continually critically grounded. As Catherine Lui puts  
it: “[c]ontemporary art mimes the 'hardened and the alienated' not in order to 'entertain.' It  
has to take a risk with regard to commodities and spectacle, or else it becomes 'innocuous'”. 153 
If Pynchon makes us laugh, the last laugh goes to thinking, not feeling, even if the subject of  
that thinking is feeling. As Adorno pessimistically put it, however: “[t]he pleasure of thinking is 
not to be recommended”.154
Furthermore, Pynchon becomes increasingly hostile towards pleasure and affirmative 
feeling as his career progresses. Against the Day takes its title inspiration from many sources – 
light, photography, biblical allusion – but one of the key internal textual referents reads thus: 
It went on for a month. Those who had taken it for a cosmic sign cringed 
beneath the sky each nightfall, imagining ever more extravagant disasters. 
Others, for whom orange did not seem an appropriately apocalyptic shade, 
sat outdoors on public benches, reading calmly, growing used to the curious 
pallor.  As  nights  went  on  and  nothing  happened  and  the  phenomenon 
slowly faded to the accustomed deeper violets again, most had difficulty  
remembering the earlier rise of heart, the sense of overture and possibility, 
and went back once again to seeking only orgasm, hallucination,  stupor, 
sleep, to fetch them through the night and prepare them against the day 
(AtD, 805).
Here,  sensual  pleasure  –  degraded through  the  term “only”  –  is  the  retreat  that  fortifies  
individuals against the clock-time routine of work; it provides a sham consolation that allows 
the revolutionary moment, in all its shock and splendour, to be backgrounded. In this sense, it  
follows  Adorno's  critique  of  jazz  and  popular  music  in  which,  he  claimed,  “[t]he  whole 
structure of popular music is standardized”, and thereby “[t]his inexorable device guarantees  
153 Lui, ‘Art Escapes Criticism’, 240.
154 Adorno and Horkheimer, Towards a New Manifesto, 89.
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that  regardless  of  what  aberrations  occur,  the  hit  will  lead  back  to  the  same  familiar  
experience, and nothing fundamentally new will be introduced”.155 The new, as the utopian 
revolution, is rejected, a stance that Pynchon certainly held in Vineland. As Thomas Hill Schaub 
points out, the “misoneism” (the “hatred of anything new”) of Cesare Lombroso “explicitly 
opposes  the  meliorism  of  liberal  politics  to  the  radical  break  that  is  the  requirement  of 
revolution”.156 Pynchon's regulative utopianism is tempered so as to exclude revolution, but 
condemns meliorism. It simultaneously co-opts pleasure and affirmation into that system; a 
mere wish-fulfilment experience in the predictable, which allows for the unregulated flow of 
late capitalism to ever continue. But mightn't we find some way back? It is unlikely because  
Pynchon, the essentialist, voices, through Frenesi, the conjecture that “some Cosmic Fascist 
had  spliced in a DNA sequence requiring this form of seduction” (VL,  83).  Yet, the close of 
Inherent  Vice  holds  hope,  as  the  reader  waits,  with  Doc,  for  the  fog  to  burn  away,  “for  
something else this time”; the hope for the new remains. Hope coupled with the unknown. No  
trajectories of history, no predicting the revolution, but no hopelessness without hope: “[t]he 
belief that it will come is perhaps a shade too mechanistic. It can come”.157
For a  closing  remark,  then,  it  has  emerged in  the last  few years  that  Adorno and  
Horkheimer attempted, in a 1956 session, to think about the production of their own version 
of “The Communist Manifesto”. There are, in this fascinating document, two lines worthy of 
brief juxtaposition with the views on utopia and ethics formulated through the analysis above:  
“[w]hen you reject utopia, thought itself withers away”158 and “[t]he horror is that for the first 
time we live in a world in which we can no longer imagine a better one”. 159 These statements, 
155 Adorno, ‘On Popular Music’, 438.
156 Schaub, ‘The Crying of Lot 49 and Other California Novels’, 37.
157 Adorno and Horkheimer, Towards a New Manifesto, 61.
158 Ibid., 5.
159 Ibid., 107–108.
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brought together, reveal the heart of Pynchon's political, ethical and philosophical position,  
jarring against one another in an impossible non-synthesis. Given all this, the final question to  
be addressed is: does Pynchon still shock? As David Cowart has recently put it in his Thomas 
Pynchon & the Dark Passages of History, Pynchon's legacy will be ensured not by the critical 
efforts of the academy but by the legacy he leaves in creative terms. Once absorbed, though,  
his style is no longer the shock of the new, but it is unrelenting. Over the course of seven  
novels, Pynchon has presented a coherent vision that can largely be said to exist within an 
Adornian frame. Pynchon's refusal of synthesis, constellatory mode, refusal of idealism, disdain 
for logical positivism and (ir)regulative utopia align him with this school of thought. For a final  
appraisal of the interactions between the philosophical projects in this thesis and the curious 
route by which this conclusion has been reached, I will now turn to a retrospective conclusion  
and ask, finally, what this tells us about the work of Thomas Pynchon.
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Conclusion
Pynchon's work sits at the crossroads of many theoretical thinkers. However, this study 
demonstrates that it is not the case, as has previously been supposed, that Pynchon's citation 
of early Wittgenstein aligns him with this philosopher. Instead, from this initial observation, it 
has emerged that Pynchon's novels enact a mournful nostalgia for a regulative utopian state; a 
utopia indefinitely suspended through Pynchon's essentialist stance towards human nature.  
This  is  not  a  nostalgia  for  any  lost,  past  situation1 –  in  V.  Pynchon  terms  this  “a  phony 
nostalgia” (156), a “sickness for the past” (336) – but rather a hope for that which does not  
exist and is never to come. In this sense, much of his writing can be seen to turn towards the 
systems of ethics as they pertain to enlightenment, revolution and ipseity in the late works of  
Michel Foucault. Finally, proceeding from this notion of a regulative utopia, an exploration of 
the consistent  thought  of  Theodor W.  Adorno reveals  a  deep-rooted affinity  to  Pynchon's  
writing on the philosophical, political and aesthetic levels.
 As expected, in each of these engagements the fit is far from perfect and this provides  
compelling evidence to continue Hanjo Berressem's notion of an intersubjective triangulation 
of  Pynchon's  position through assessment against  various  paradigms.  Each does,  however,  
provide insight in its own right, adding to an understanding, first and foremost, of Pynchon's  
ethical and political stance. The benefit of comparing Pynchon against schematized thought as  
opposed to free-wheeling analysis lies in the Newtonian merit of hyperopia; it is unlikely that a  
literary study without some form of theoretical structure would see so far without the gigantic  
shoulders  upon  which  it  sits.  Of  course,  there  is  always  the  danger  with  Pynchon  and 
philosophy of  a paranoid connectedness.  Yet,  by adopting a stance of  negativity  alongside 
positive correlations, a nuanced approach is more than possible.
1 See Hutcheon, A Poetics of Postmodernism, 89 for more on nostalgia in the postmodern novel.
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Although  much  of  Pynchon's  work  demonstrates  an  outright  hostility  toward 
systematized thought, philosophy and theorization, access and understanding have never been 
the proprietary right of the author. It may be that “the only consolation” we can draw “from 
the present chaos” is that our “theory managed to explain it” (V., 189), but in a Pynchonian 
world of negative utopia and limited resistance, it remains key to have those explanations so 
that we can exercise, in those miniature sub-dermal pockets of potential, our small, personal  
right to fight those systems of domination. As Adorno once formulated it: “[t]he truth content 
of  an  artwork  requires  philosophy”  (AT,  433).  It  has  been  my  contention  through 
demonstration  here,  however,  that  it  is  more  accurate  to  say  that  the  truth  content  of  
Pynchon's artworks requires philosophies.
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